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Cryptographic protocols form the backbone of our digital society. Unfortunately, the
security of numerous critical components has been neglected. As a consequence, attacks
have resulted in financial loss, violations of personal privacy, and threats to democracy.
This thesis aids the secure design of cryptographic protocols and facilitates the evaluation
of existing schemes.
Developing a secure cryptographic protocol is game-like in nature, and a good designer
will consider attacks against key components. Unlike games, however, an adversary is not
governed by the rules and may deviate from expected behaviours. Secure cryptographic
protocols are therefore notoriously difficult to define. Accordingly, cryptographic protocols
must be scrutinised by experts using procedures that can evaluate security properties.
This thesis advances verification techniques for cryptographic protocols using formal
methods with an emphasis on automation. The key contributions are threefold. Firstly,
a definition of election verifiability for electronic voting protocols is presented; secondly,
a definition of user-controlled anonymity for Direct Anonymous Attestation is delivered;
and, finally, a procedure to automatically evaluate observational equivalence is introduced.
This work enables security properties of cryptographic protocols to be studied. In par-
ticular, we evaluate security in electronic voting protocols and Direct Anonymous Attesta-
tion schemes; discovering, and fixing, a vulnerability in the RSA-based Direct Anonymous
Attestation protocol. Ultimately, this thesis will help avoid the current situation whereby
numerous cryptographic protocols are deployed and found to be insecure.
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The security objectives of numerous deployed systems have not been satisfied. As a
consequence, high-profile security failures have been observed, for example: an exploit
in the London Underground’s Oyster card system allows free travel [GHG08, GGM+08,
GRVS09]; vulnerabilities in electronic voting systems have resulted in their decommis-
sion [UK07, Bow07, Min08, Bun09]; and issues with electronic passports permit modifi-
cation, cloning and invasions of privacy [JMW05, Jue06, KJBK09, CS10a]. These failures
can be attributed to the difficulties of designing secure cryptographic protocols.
Cryptographers aim to deliver protocols which preserve security requirements in the
presence of an arbitrary adversary. However, such an adversary should not be expected to
follow any prescribed rules, nor adhere to any particular behavioural patterns. Moreover,
the ingenuity of the adversary should be considered boundless. As an analogy, consider,
for example, the challenge faced by the architects of the ‘inescapable’ Alcatraz. The prison
is situated 1.5 miles from San Francisco, California, and isolated from the mainland by
the strong currents of San Francisco Bay. In addition to the treacherous waters and
the physical security features, inmates were counted twelve times a day and the ratio of
inmates to armed guards was three to one. Despite this, an elaborate escape plan was
hatched by Clarence Anglin, John Anglin, Frank Morris and Allen West which involved the
fabrication of: life-like dummies, fashioned from soap, toilet paper and hair (the dummies
were used to avoid detection during evening head counts); tunnelling equipment, built
from the motor of a stolen vacuum cleaner; and a raft, constructed from the rain coats
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of fellow inmates. On June 11, 1962 the two Anglin brothers and Morris escaped the
prison. Their whereabouts are currently unknown. Given the water temperature and
tidal direction, the official FBI investigation presumes the three men drowned; however,
the only thing known for certain, is the security of Alcatraz was violated. Designing
a resilient prison to contain such devious inmates, whom are determined to escape, is
difficult. In some sense, cryptographers face a more challenging problem: a prison may
be considered inescapable if no inmate has successfully broken out; by comparison, we
will only consider a protocol to be secure, if security requirements cannot be violated by
any adversary.
This thesis will aid the secure design of cryptographic protocols and facilitate the
evaluation of existing schemes, with a particular focus on electronic voting and anonymous
attestation. These application domains are particularly salient, due to the discovery of
vulnerabilities in the RSA-based Direct Anonymous Attestation scheme (Chapter 4) and
the world-wide loss of public confidence in electronic voting systems following numerous
failures [Sal88, Rub02, Mer02, CEC+08].
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Cryptographic protocols will
be introduced (Section 1.1) and their security properties will be discussed (Section 1.2).
Computational and symbolic approaches for protocol verification will be considered (Sec-
tion 1.3) and symbolic analysis techniques will be investigated in more depth (Section 1.4).
A detailed description of the contribution made by this thesis will be presented in the
context of existing work (Section 1.5), a summary of publications will be provided (Sec-
tion 1.6) and, finally, an overview of the thesis structure will be summarised (Section 1.7).
1.1 Cryptographic protocols
Cryptographic protocols are small distributed algorithms that aim to provide some
security-related objective over a public communication network, such as the Internet.
Since the communication medium is public, an adversary may interfere with messages;
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this introduces the possibility of interference by a powerful adversary and has made the
design of secure protocols notoriously difficult. The canonical example is the Needham-
Shroeder public key protocol [NS78], which is intended to provide mutual authentication
of two principals. The protocol was scrutinised by experts for nearly two decades before
Lowe [Low96] discovered a man-in-the-middle attack. This dictates the necessity for pro-
tocol verification and, moreover, highlights the need for automated support to overcome
the inherent human weaknesses present in the manual verification process.
1.2 Security properties
Cryptographic protocols are required to satisfy a plethora of security requirements. These
requirements include classical properties such as secrecy and authentication, and emerg-
ing properties including, but not limited to, anonymity, non-repudiation and verifiability.
These security requirements can generally be classified as indistinguishability or reacha-
bility properties. Reachability properties are more simplistic, and they are typically used
to express requirements of a protocol’s derivable states. For example, secrecy can be ex-
pressed as the inability of deriving a particular value from all possible protocol executions.
The notion of indistinguishability allows us to reason about more complex properties. In-
tuitively, two protocols are said to be indistinguishability if an observer has no way of
telling them apart. Anonymity can be naturally formulated as an indistinguishability
property, for example, actions within a group of agents are anonymous if an action per-
formed by an arbitrary agent is indistinguishable from an action performed by another
agent.
1.3 Protocol verification
The process of verifying cryptographic protocols has led to the development of two re-
search communities, namely: provable security and formal methods. The techniques of
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each field are almost completely disjoint [AR00, PSW00, AR02, War03, War05]: formal
methods are reliant on simple abstract modelling techniques, whereas provable security
uses complicated computational proofs. With the exception of perfect security [Sha49],
which is generally unobtainable, neither community can make any absolute mathematical
statement about the security of a protocol, and the best we can do is prove the relative dif-
ficulty of violating security properties. In particular, we can consider a provable security
reduction, which shows that the difficulty of breaking the protocol is at least as difficult
as solving a well-known mathematical problem that is widely believed to be intractable.
However, as cryptography has evolved, more complex protocols have been developed and
provable security methodologies have, unfortunately, provided limited success in their
analysis [Moo88, Mea03, KM06, KM07]. Indeed, Chen, Morrissey & Smart [CMS08a,
pp157] attribute flaws in the security proof of RSA-based Direct Anonymous Attestation
protocol [BCC04] to the highly complex nature of Direct Anonymous Attestation schemes
and the inherent difficulties of composing correct provable security proofs. By compar-
ison, formal method approaches have shown to be particularly suited to the analysis of
complex cryptographic protocols, and will be adopted here.
1.3.1 Formal methods
Formal methods, as defined by Meadows [Mea03, §2], combine a language which can be
used to model a cryptographic protocol and its security properties, together with an effi-
cient procedure to determine whether a model does indeed satisfy those properties. Gritza-
lis, Spinellis & Georgiadis [GSG99] classify three types of protocol analysis: inference-
construction, attack-construction and proof-construction. Inference-construction tech-
niques are based upon modal logics; they reason about the evolution of knowledge and
beliefs within a system to show that certain conditions are satisfied. Attack-construction
methodologies attempt to discover vulnerabilities using algebraic properties of a proto-
col’s algorithms. The majority of these attack-construction techniques conduct some form
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of state space exploration; that is, a model of the system is defined and then analysed in
an attempt to discover a path to an insecure state. Proof-construction techniques model
the computations performed in a protocol and define security properties as theorem,
automated theorem checkers are then used to verify these theorems and thus prove prop-
erties of the model. Gritzalis, Spinellis & Georgiadis [GSG99] liken proof-construction
to attack-construction, suggesting that proof-construction techniques replace state space
exploration “with theorems about these searches.”
Meadows argues that inference-construction techniques are generally weaker than
attack-construction methods, because they operate at a higher level of abstraction [Mea00,
Mea01]; hence, interest in inference-construction has waned, as attack-construction meth-
odologies have improved. Paulson [Pau98] claims that attack-construction and proof-
construction techniques are complementary: attack-construction techniques are typically
easy to use and can provide an assurance that a model satisfies security criteria; by
comparison, proof-construction methodologies are more complicated, but allow a more
thorough analysis. A primary objective of this thesis is to introduce tools suited to the
verification of security properties during protocol development; accordingly, we focus on
attack-construction techniques to allow rapid prototyping of cryptographic schemes.
Dolev-Yao adversary. Attack-construction methods typically assume that crypto-
graphic protocols should achieve their objectives in the presence of an adversary that
has full control of the network (sometimes called the Dolev-Yao attacker [DY83]) and
cryptography is usually assumed to be perfect. Since the adversary has complete control
of the network, messages may be read, modified, deleted, or injected. The adversary is
also able to manipulate data contained within those messages, under the restriction of
perfect cryptography, that is, the attacker is only able to perform cryptographic opera-
tions when in possession of the required keys. It follows, for example, that an adversary
may compute the ith element of a tuple or, given the necessary keys, decrypt ciphertexts.
The relationships between cryptographic primitives are captured by a set of deduction
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rules. For example, an equation modelling symmetric decryption can be expressed as
dec(k, enc(k,m)) = m. This equation captures the notion that symmetric encryption is
perfect: given a ciphertext enc(k,m), the plaintext m can only be recovered using the
secret key k. If the encryption scheme has some other characteristic (for example, if the
scheme is homomorphic), then it is important that these properties are also captured to
avoid missing attacks. For expressibility, we should consider frameworks which permit a
large class of cryptographic primitives to be modelled.
1.4 Analysis using formal methods
Verification of cryptographic protocols is difficult due to several sources of unboundedness,
including: messages of arbitrary length and the possibility of an unbounded number of
sessions (protocol executions). In this section, we will consider methodologies that allow
the formulation of precise security statements about cryptographic protocols and the
conditions under which these statements hold. (For further discussion see Blanchet [Bla08,
§1.4], Delaune [Del11, §1] and Meadows [Mea03, Mea04].)
1.4.1 Reachability properties
Reachability properties are expressed as assertions defined over protocol execution traces
and the possibility of arbitrarily many sessions makes analysis particular problematic. One
solution is to explore a finite part of the state space and prove partial results using model
checkers, for example, FDR [Ros95], Murϕ [MMS97], and Brutus [CJM00]. Alternatively,
Rusinowitch & Turuani [RT01, RT03] avoid this source of undecidability by restricting
honest participants to a bounded number of sessions (the number of messages sent by
the adversary, and the length of those messages, remains unbound) and present an NP
decision procedure for secrecy properties in the Dolev-Yao model with symmetric and
asymmetric cryptography. This result has been enriched to consider more complicated
properties of cryptographic primitives, for example, Chevalier et al. [CKRT03a, CKRT05]
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and Comon-Lundh & Shmatikov [CLS03] present a decision procedure for secrecy in the
presence of an adversary that can exploit properties of the XOR operator and Chevalier
et al. [CKRT03b] consider an adversary that can exploit Diffie-Hellman exponentiation,
the complexity of these procedures are shown to be in NP.
Techniques exploring finite state spaces or considering a bounded number of sessions
are useful for discovering attacks, but cannot be used to assert the security of a protocol;
in particular, there may exist an attack outside the considered search space (for exam-
ple, a revision of the Garay & Mackenzie contract signing protocol [GM99] was shown
to be secure for n ≤ 4 participants [CKS04, CKS06]; but, Mukhamedov & Ryan [MR08]
presented an attack for n ≥ 5 participants). Henceforth, this limitation will be avoided
by considering only techniques that consider all states and an unbounded number of
sessions; unfortunately, proving the security of a protocol in this context is undecid-
able [DLMS99, DLMS04]. Accordingly, we will consider sound but incomplete techniques
and as a consequence we will accept methodologies that may not terminate or may report
false attacks.
Lowe [Low96, Low99] demonstrated that limitations of finite state exploration can be
overcome by introducing manual proofs that show such results are sufficient; in particu-
lar, Lowe proved the security of the Needham-Shroeder-Lowe public key protocol in this
context by manually proving that if the revised scheme was vulnerable to an attack, then
the attack would be discovered in the finite model. Ideally, we would like to avoid such
manual proofs. Meadows [Mea94, Mea96b, EMM05, EMM06] considers an unbounded
number of sessions by applying sound user-guided pruning to derive a tractable model
from an infinite state space, these results have been implemented in the NRL Protocol
Analyzer. (See Meadows [Mea96a] for a comparison between the NRL Protocol Analyzer
and Lowe’s approach using FDR.) Thayer, Herzog & Guttman [THG98, THG99] intro-
duce strand spaces which allow more compact formalisations of state and Song, Berezin
& Perrig [Son99, SBP01] propose a verification procedure which has been implemented
as Athena, this tool also reduces the state space by pruning. Both the NRL Protocol
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Analyzer and Athena may fail to terminate for an unbounded number of sessions and,
based upon Athena, Cremers [CM05, Cre06, Cre08b, Cre08a] proposes the Scyther tool
which guarantees termination, but may only analyse a bounded number of sessions when
a result cannot be obtained in the unbounded case. Meier, Cremers & Basin [MCB10]
extend Scyther to generate correctness proofs which can be automatically checked using
theorem provers, this exploits the strengths of proof-construction techniques to provide
stronger results.
Bolignano [Bol97] proposes an abstract model which over-approximates the adver-
sary’s power. This has proven to be useful for approaches using tree automata [Mon99,
Mon03, GK00] and, more generally, techniques based upon resolution of Horn clauses
[Wei99]. (Tree automata can be encoded as Horn clauses [FSVY91].) Boichut, He´am &
Kouchnarenko [BHKO04, BHK05, BHK06, BHK09] extend the tree automata reasoning
technique proposed by Genet & Klay [GK00] and implement their results in the TA4SP
verification tool. Blanchet [Bla01, Bla02, Bla09, Bla11] uses resolution of Horn clauses
to reason with reachability properties in processes of the applied pi calculus [AF01] and
these results have been implemented in ProVerif. These over-approximation techniques
have proven to be successful, despite the possibility of reporting false attacks and non-
termination.
1.4.2 Indistinguishability properties
Indistinguishability properties are captured using equivalence [MPW92a, MPW92b, AG97,
AF01]. Equivalence has been studied independently of cryptography in the pi calcu-
lus [San93, Vic94, Dam95, San96, Dam97] and automated tools have been proposed, for
example, Another Bisimulation Checker [Bri05] and the Mobility Workbench [VM94]. In
the context of cryptographic protocols, Abadi & Gordon [AG97] introduced the spi cal-
culus to study equivalence. The spi calculus is restricted to a basic set of cryptographic
primitives and this framework has been extended to the applied pi calculus by Abadi &
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Fournet [AF01] to overcome this limitation.
Definitions of equivalence usually quantify over all possible adversaries and this makes
proofs difficult. It is therefore useful to introduce alternative definitions that coincide
and prove results in the alternative setting; labelled bisimilarity [AG98a, AG98b, BN02,
BN05] has been particular useful for this purpose in the spi calculus. In the applied pi
calculus, Abadi & Fournet [AF01] claimed that their definitions of equivalence and labelled
bisimilarity coincide; however, a formal proof of this claim has not been published, and
additional assumptions are known to be necessary [AF06, BJPV09, ARR10]. Accordingly,
the use of labelled bisimilarity for proofs of equivalence in the applied pi calculus should
be avoided. We will now review decision procedures for equivalence.
Durante, Sisto & Valenzano [DSV00, DSV03] present an decision procedure for equiv-
alence which considers a bounded number of sessions in the spi calculus. In the applied
pi calculus, Abadi & Cortier [AC04a, AC05a, AC06] introduce a decision procedure for
static equivalence (that is, in the presence of a passive adversary with a bounded num-
ber of sessions) in the context of subterm convergent equational theories ; this result has
been exploited by Baudet, Cortier & Delaune [BCD09, BCD10] and Ciobaˆca˘, Delaune &
Kremer [CDK09b] to provide automated tools (namely, YAPA and KISS) for the analysis
of static equivalence. Baudet [Bau05] extends the work of Abadi & Cortier to consider
an active adversary for a bounded number of sessions. As discussed in the context of
reachability properties, such techniques are useful for finding attacks but cannot guar-
antee the absence of attacks and, henceforth, we consider methodologies that analyse all
states. Unfortunately, proving equivalence for an unbounded number of sessions is an
undecidable problem [Han03, AC04a, AC06] and we will therefore consider sound but
incomplete decision procedures.
Blanchet, Abadi & Fournet [Bla04, BAF08] focus on equivalences between pairs of
processes which share the same structure and differ only in the choice of terms. They
introduce the notion of uniformity, a sufficient condition for observational equivalence,
and automated reasoning is supported by ProVerif. However, the notion of uniformity is
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often too strict for the equivalences we wish to consider and the technique may report
false attacks.
The potentially infinite number of execution traces due to messages sent by the ad-
versary makes reasoning about equivalence difficult. In a variant of the spi calculus,
Borgstro¨m, Briais & Nestmann [BBN04] avoid this problem by treating each message
from the adversary as a variable (thereby ensuring that a message input is mapped to a
single transition) and similar results are obtained by Delaune, Kremer & Ryan [DKR07,
DKR10a] for the applied pi calculus. Both Borgstro¨m, Briais & Nestmann and Delaune,
Kremer & Ryan present decision procedures for fragments of the original calculi, for
example, Delaune, Kremer & Ryan do not consider disequalities (that is, they do not
consider else-branches in conditional statements). In a different direction, Cortier & De-
laune [CD09] have shown that equivalence coincides with trace equivalence for determinate
processes (based upon [Bau05], this yields a decision procedure for a bounded number of
sessions).
1.4.3 Automated verification tools
The inability of experts to identify the flaw in the Needham-Shroeder public key pro-
tocol highlights inherent weaknesses in the manual verification process and necessitates
automated analysis tools. We will now summarise the capabilities of the state-of-the-art
tools introduced in the previous section, with the notable omission of the NRL Protocol
Analyzer which is not publicly available.
AVISPA [ABB+05] AVISPA provides a common interface for a number of analysis
tools including TA4SL [BHKO04, BHK05, BHK06, BHK09]. AVISPA/TA4SL is
capable of evaluating reachability properties for an unbounded number of sessions.
(AVISPA also provides support for CL-Atse [Tur06], OFMC [BMV03, BMV05], and
SATMC [AC04b, Com05, AC05b]; but, these tools are limited to a finite number of
sessions.)
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ProVerif [BS11] ProVerif is capable of evaluating reachability properties [Bla01, AB02,
Bla02, AB05a, Bla09, Bla11] and observational equivalence [Bla04, BAF05, BAF08],
in the context of an unbounded number of sessions. The tool is capable of producing
attack traces [AB05c]: when a property cannot be proved, an execution trace which
falsifies the desired property is constructed. Support is provided for user-defined
equations and the resolution algorithm has been proven to terminate for tagged
protocols [BP03, BP05]
Scyther [Cre07] Scyther [CM05, Cre06, Cre08b, Cre08a] is capable of evaluating reach-
ability properties for an unbounded number of sessions; moreover, if a result cannot
be obtained (due to the undecidable nature of the problem), then security of a
bounded number of sessions is evaluated. It follows that termination is guaran-
teed. The tool is also capable of generating correctness proofs suitable for theorem
checkers [MCB10] and producing graphical attack traces.
The AVISPA tool is particularly well-suited to the analysis of security properties for a
bounded number of sessions (using OFMC, CL-Atse, and SATMC), but TA4SL provides
only limited support in the unbounded case. For example, over-approximation coupled
with the absence of attack traces is particularly problematic in AVISPA/T4SL, because
it is difficult to distinguish between false attacks caused by over-approximation and real
attacks [CLN09]. ProVerif provides support for equivalence, in addition to reachability, al-
though due to over-approximation it may report false attacks. ProVerif also supports user-
defined equations and the following (non-exhaustive list of) cryptographic primitives can
be modelled: symmetric and asymmetric cryptography; digital signatures; hash functions;
bit-commitment; and signature proofs of knowledge. Scyther does not over-approximate
and is therefore able to avoid reporting false attacks; moreover, unlike ProVerif, Scyther
is guaranteed to terminate and produce a result (albeit, possibly only for a bounded num-
ber of sessions). However, Scyther does not support user-defined equational theories nor
can control flow be modelled and these factors limit the class of protocols that can be
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modelled. Table 1.1 summarises the capabilities of these tools. (For further comparison
between tools see [CLN09, PBP+10, LTV10, DSHJ10].)
AVISPA/TA4SL ProVerif Scyther
Reachability 3 3 3
Equivalence 7 3 7
User-defined theory 7 3 7
Attack traces 7 3 3
No false attacks 7 7 3
Termination 7 7 3
Table 1.1: A comparison of automated verification tools
Applied pi calculus and ProVerif. The applied pi calculus provides a framework
for analysing reachability and equivalence properties with automated support provided
by ProVerif. The support for user-defined equations allows a large class of cryptographic
protocols to be modelled and our discussion demonstrates ProVerif is a leading tool.
Moreover, the applied pi calculus and ProVerif have been successfully used to model
cryptographic protocols from a variety of application domains and some applications are
listed below. On this basis, the applied pi calculus and ProVerif will be adopted by this
thesis.
• Abadi & Blanchet [AB05b] use correspondence assertions to verify certified email
[AGHP02].
• Abadi, Blanchet & Fournet [ABF07] analyse the JFK (Just Fast Keying) [ABB+04]
protocol – which was one of the candidates to replace IKE as the key exchange
protocol in IPSec – using correspondence assertions and equivalence properties in a
combination of manual and automated proofs.
• Blanchet & Chaudhuri [BC08] study the integrity of the Plutus file system [KRS+03]
on untrusted storage using correspondence assertions, resulting in the discovery and
subsequent fixing of weaknesses in the initial system.
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• Bhargavan et al. [BFGT06, BFG06, BFGS08, BFGT08] use ProVerif to analyse
cryptographic protocol implementations written in F#; in particular, the Transport
Layer Security (TLS) protocol has been studied in this manner [BCFZ08].
• Chen & Ryan [CR09] have evaluated authentication protocols found in trusted com-
puting, and have discovered vulnerabilities.
• Delaune, Kremer & Ryan [KR05, DKR06, DKR09, DKR10b] and Backes, Hrit¸cu &
Maffei [BHM08] formalise and analyse privacy properties for electronic voting using
equivalence.
The application of formal method techniques are limited by: 1) the absence of rig-
orously defined security properties [Oka98, Bel99, Aba00, Mea04]; and 2) the lack of
efficient procedures to evaluate security properties [BM92, Rus93, GSG99]. This thesis
will advance the applied pi calculus and ProVerif in this context.
1.5 Contribution and literature review
The objective of this thesis is to aid the secure design of cryptographic protocols and facil-
itate the evaluation of existing schemes. This is achieved in the context of the applied pi
calculus by defining the security properties of protocols (Part II) and developing efficient
procedures for the automated analysis of observational equivalence (Part III). Accord-
ingly, this thesis will help avoid the current situation whereby numerous protocols are
deployed and subsequently found to be insecure; ultimately helping to prevent attacks
which cause financial loss, violations of personal privacy and threats towards democ-
racy. The applicability of the methodologies and techniques introduced by this thesis are
demonstrated throughout by analysing cryptographic protocols. A detailed description
of the key chapters will now be presented.
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Chapter 3
Electronic voting systems lack the transparency offered by their paper-based counterparts.
For example, in paper-based systems, the whole process, from ballot casting to tallying,
can be observed; by contrast, it is not possible to observe electronic operations performed
on data. Some electronic voting systems attempt to avoid this limitation by assuming the
hardware and software running the election is trusted. In practice, this level of trust is very
difficult to achieve and thus, systems based upon such assumptions have failed [Bun09,
Min08, Bow07, UK07]. A better approach is to provide verifiable voting systems (for
example, [JCJ02, JCJ05, CRS05, Adi06, Dag07, Adi08]), that allow voters and election
observers to check that votes have been recorded, tallied and declared correctly. Moreover,
these checks can be performed in a manner independent of the election system’s hardware
and software. In this chapter, a definition of election verifiability is presented.
In related work, Juels, Catalano & Jakobsson [JCJ02, JCJ05, JCJ10] present a defi-
nition of universal verifiability in the provable security model. Their definition assumes
voting protocols produce non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge (also called
signature proofs of knowledge) demonstrating the correctness of tallying. Here we consider
a definition in the formal model. Universal verifiability was also studied by Chevallier-
Mames et al. [CMFP+06, CMFP+10]. They show an incompatibility result: protocols
cannot satisfy verifiability and vote privacy in an unconditional way (that is, without
reliance on computational assumptions). But, as witnessed by [JCJ02, JCJ05], weaker
versions of these properties can hold simultaneously; furthermore, our case studies demon-
strate that privacy and verifiability can coexist. Baskar, Ramanujam & Suresh [BRS07]
formalise individual verifiability, and Talbi et al. [TMT+08] consider individual and uni-
versal verifiability. Both of these definitions are tightly coupled with the protocol by
Fujioka, Okamoto & Ohta [FOO92] and cannot easily be generalised. Moreover, Talbi
et al. characterise individual execution traces as verifiable or not, and it is unclear how
their definition can be used to assert that a protocol satisfies verifiability (that is, every
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execution of the protocol is verifiable); in particular, the authors only show that a single
execution of the protocol by Fujioka, Okamoto & Ohta satisfies verifiability, and do not
make any claims about the verifiability of the protocol.
In complimentary work, Backes, Hrit¸cu & Maffei [BHM08] formalise correctness prop-
erties (including inalterability and eligibility) for honest protocol executions; if an elec-
tronic voting scheme satisfies their definition and the participants execute the protocol
as intended, then no one can change a voter’s vote and only registered voters can vote
and at most once. However, their definition provides no assurances when participants
deviate from the protocol (that is, when participants do not perform honest executions).
It follows that a scheme can be correct, but not provide the intended security properties;
this may occur, for example, because a dishonest administrator chooses to run a malicious
variant of the protocol. In this respect, a verifiable electronic voting protocol is more de-
sirable because voters and observers can check that the correctness properties hold, even
in the presence of dishonest administrators. In addition to verifiability and correctness
properties, electronic voting protocols are expected to satisfy privacy properties (includ-
ing ballot secrecy, receipt freeness, and coercion resistance) and fairness (including ballot
independence and no early results). Table 1.2 summarises these properties and highlights
several definitions of security properties that have emerged in the literature.
We present a generic definition of election verifiability in terms of boolean tests. These
tests are required to satisfy several conditions for all possible execution traces. This fa-
cilitates the evaluation of verifiability in electronic voting protocols. The definition also
allows identification of the hardware and software components that must be trusted for
the purpose of election verifiability, thereby facilitating the comparison of electronic vot-
ing protocols on the basis of trust assumptions. The framework is compatible with a large
class of electronic voting schemes, including those based upon blind signatures, homomor-
phic encryption and mixnets. Moreover, the definition is used to analyse verifiability in
three electronic voting protocols, two of which have been implemented and deployed. In
particular, the Helios 2.0 protocol is evaluated; this scheme is particularly significant due
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to its real-world deployment: the International Association of Cryptologic Research used
Helios to elect its board members [BVQ10], following a successful trial in a non-binding
poll [HBH10]; the Catholic University of Louvain adopted the system to elect the uni-
versity president [AMPQ09]; and Princeton University used Helios to elect the student
vice president [Pri10]. This demonstrates the suitability of the framework for analysing
real-world election systems.
Chapter 4
Trusted computing has introduced a hardware device, called a Trusted Platform Module,
to allow systems to provide cryptographic guarantees about their state. The hardware
chip contains a unique key to root trust and, as a consequence, cryptographic operations
may reveal a platform’s identity. This raises privacy concerns. Brickell, Camenisch &
Chen [BCC04] overcome this privacy issue with the introduction of Direct Anonymous
Attestation (DAA): a remote authentication scheme for trusted platforms which provides
user-controlled anonymity and traceability. In this chapter, a definition of user-controlled
anonymity is presented and used to analyse the RSA-based DAA scheme [BCC04], dis-
covering a vulnerability.
In related work, Brickell, Camenisch & Chen [BCC04] and Brickell, Chen & Li [BCL08b,
BCL09] present definitions in the provable security model; the relationship between these
models is unknown [CMS08a, pp158]. Here we consider a definition in the formal model,
based upon informal descriptions of user-controlled anonymity [BCL08b, BCL09]. By
comparison, Backes, Maffei & Unruh [BMU08] formalised an earlier notion of user-
controlled anonymity (informally described in [BCC04]) for their model of the RSA-based
DAA protocol. This formalisation can probably be generalised, but it pre-dates the defini-
tion of user-controlled anonymity by Brickell, Chen & Li [BCL08b, BCL09] and considers
a conceptually weaker adversary. Rudolph [Rud07] also proposes an attack against RSA-
based DAA which violates privacy; however, this vulnerability has been discounted by
Leung, Chen & Mitchell [LCM08] as infeasible for large-scale violations of privacy and,
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moreover, can be detected in the presence of a single honest verifier.
We present a generic definition of user-controlled anonymity as an equivalence property
suited to automated reasoning using ProVerif. The definition is used to analyse anonymity
in the RSA-based DAA protocol [BCC04]. This scheme is particularly significant, as the
TPM specification version 1.2 [TCG07] (which has been defined as an ISO/IEC interna-
tional standard [Int09]) mandates support for RSA-based DAA and, moreover, estimates
suggest the TPM has been embedded in over 300 million computers [Tru09] (although,
some experts claim only 5% of these TPMs have been turned on [Mar08, §6]). The analysis
discovers a vulnerability which can be exploited by a passive adversary and, under weaker
assumptions, by corrupt administrators. This demonstrates the suitability of the frame-
work for analysing DAA schemes which have been deployed. Finally, a fix is identified
and the revised scheme is shown to satisfy user-controlled anonymity.
Chapter 5
Formal method techniques require efficient procedures for evaluating security properties.
Moreover, automated reasoning is highly desirable to avoid errors associated with hand-
written proofs. In this chapter, a new procedure for automatically verifying observational
equivalence will be introduced, with particular emphasis on proving privacy properties.
As previously discussed, uniformity is too strong for the equivalences we wish to con-
sider and this chapter will introduce a weaker condition (see Section 1.4.2 for a summary
of related work). In addition, the applied pi calculus is extended to allow modelling of
barrier synchronisation. The study of equivalences in the context of synchronisation is
particularly interesting, because certain security properties can only be realised if par-
ticipants synchronise their actions in a specific manner. For example, privacy preserving
protocols (including electronic voting, vehicular ad-hoc networks, and anonymity net-
works) make such assumptions. These results are implemented in the tool ProSwapper,
an extension of ProVerif, and the applicability of the tool is demonstrated by analysing
vote privacy in electronic voting protocols and privacy in vehicular ad-hoc networks.
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1.7 Overview and structure
An overview of this thesis is outlined below.
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Part I. Presents introductory and background material.
Chapter 1. Introduces this thesis and describes the research problem.
Chapter 2. Recalls the applied pi calculus which forms the foundation of this
thesis.
Part II. Formalises symbolic security definitions for electronic voting and anonymous
attestation.
Chapter 3. Presents a definition of election verifiability for electronic voting proto-
cols. This definition is used to analyse election verifiability in the FOO, Helios
and JCJ-Civitas electronic voting schemes.
Chapter 4. Delivers a definition of user-controlled anonymity for Direct Anonymous
Attestation protocols. This definition is used to discover vulnerabilities in the
RSA-based Direct Anonymous Attestation scheme.
Part III. Develops procedures for evaluation of security properties, with an emphasis on
automation.
Chapter 5. Defines an automated reasoning procedure for observational equiva-
lences with a focus on protocols in which participants synchronise their ac-
tions. This technique is used to analyse vote privacy in the FOO electronic
voting scheme and privacy in the CMIX vehicular ad hoc networking protocol.
Part IV. Presents an evaluation.
Chapter 6. Considers further work and presents a conclusion.
2
Background: Applied pi calculus†
The applied pi calculus [AF01, RS11] is a language for describing and analysing crypto-
graphic protocols. It provides an intuitive process syntax to describe the actions of the
participants in a protocol, emphasising their communication. The syntax is coupled with
a formal semantics to allow reasoning about protocols. The language is based upon the pi
calculus with the addition of a rich term algebra to enable modelling of the cryptographic
operations used by protocols. In this respect, the applied pi calculus also has similarities
with the spi calculus [AG97]. The key difference concerns the way in which cryptographic
primitives are handled. The spi calculus has a fixed set of primitives built in (namely,
symmetric and public key encryption), while the applied pi calculus allows a wide variety
of more complex primitives (including, for example, non-deterministic encryption, digital
signatures, and proofs of knowledge) to be defined by means of an equational theory.
The applied pi calculus permits formal modelling of properties including: reachability,
correspondence and observational equivalence. In the context of cryptographic protocols,
these properties are particularly useful, since they allow the analysis of traditional security
goals such as secrecy and authentication. Moreover, emerging properties such as privacy,
traceability and verifiability can also be considered.
†This chapter is a compressed variant of [RS11].
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Figure 2.1 Syntax for terms
L,M,N, T, U, V ::= terms
a, b, c, . . . , k, . . . ,m, n, . . . , s name
x, y, z variable
f(M1, . . . ,Ml) function application
2.1 Syntax and informal semantics
The calculus assumes an infinite set of names, an infinite set of variables, and a signature Σ
consisting of a finite set of function symbols, each with an associated arity. A function
symbol with arity 0 is a constant. Terms are built by applying function symbols to names,
variables and other terms; as shown in Figure 2.1, where f ranges over the functions of Σ
and l is the arity of f . We use metavariables u,w to range over both names and variables.
Tuples u1, . . . , ul and M1, . . . ,Ml are occasionally abbreviated u˜ and M˜ . We write {M/x}
for the substitution that replaces the variable x with the term M . Similarly, we write
{m/n} for the substitution that replaces the name n with the name m. Arbitrarily large
substitutions can be written as {M1/x1, . . . ,Ml/xl} or {M˜/x˜}. The letters σ and τ range
over substitutions. We write Nσ for the result of applying σ to the variables (or names)
of term N . A term is ground when it does not contain variables.
We assume a type system for terms generated by a set of base types S, which includes
the universal type Data. In addition, if ω is a type, then Channel〈ω〉 is a type too.
Formally, the set of types generated by the base types S is the smallest set Ω satisfying:
1) S ⊆ Ω, and 2) if ω ∈ Ω then Channel〈ω〉 ∈ Ω. Names and variables can have any type.
By convention we use a, b, c for channel names, k, s as names of base type and m,n for
names of any type. A channel of type Channel〈ω〉 may communicate messages of type ω.
For simplicity, function symbols can only be applied to, and return, terms of base type.
We always assume that terms are well typed and that substitutions preserve types.
The syntax for processes is presented in Figure 2.2. The null process 0 does nothing;
P | Q is the parallel composition of processes P and Q; replication !P is the infinite
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Figure 2.2 Syntax for processes
P,Q,R ::= processes (or plain processes)
0 null process
P | Q parallel composition
!P replication
ν n.P name restriction
if M = N then P else Q conditional
u(x).P message input
u〈M〉.P message output
composition P | P | . . .; and name restriction ν n.P binds n inside P . The conditional
if M = N then P else Q is standard, but we stress M = N represents equality (modulo
an equational theory) rather than strict syntactic identity. For convenience, we abbreviate
conditionals as: if M = N then P , when Q is the null process. Finally, communication
is captured by message input and message output. The process u(x).P awaits a message
from channel u and then behaves as P , with the received message bound to the variable
x. The process u〈M〉.P is ready to send M on channel u and then run P . In both of these
cases, we may omit P when it is 0. We write P{M/x} for P with all free occurrences of
x replaced by M and, in such a substitution, we insist that no name n occurring in M
becomes bound by a restriction ν n occurring in P ; sometimes we write let x = M in P
in place of P{M/x}.
Bracketing must be used to avoid ambiguities in the way processes are written down.
For example, the process !P | Q might be interpreted as (!P ) | Q or as ! (P | Q). To avoid
too much bracketing, we adopt conventions about the precedence of process operators.
Unary operators !, ν n, u(x), and u〈M〉 bind more closely than binary operators, and the
binary if-then-else operator binds more closely than the binary operator |.
The expression P | Q | R is also ambiguous, since it could mean either (P | Q) | R
or P | (Q | R). However, we will later see that these processes are semantically identical,
so we tolerate the ambiguity in the syntax. Another possible ambiguity arises because
of the convention of omitting “else 0” in the if-then-else construct; consequently, it is
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Figure 2.3 Syntax for extended processes
A,B,C ::= extended processes
P plain process
A | B parallel composition
ν n.A name restriction
ν x.A variable restriction
{M/x} active substitution
not clear which “if” the “else” applies to in the expression: if M = N then if K =
L then Q else R. In absence of brackets indicating the contrary, we adopt the convention
that the else branch belongs to the closest if and hence the statement should be interpreted
as if M = N then (if K = L then Q else R).
Processes are extended with active substitutions to capture the knowledge exposed
to the adversarial environment (Figure 2.3). The active substitution {M/x} represents a
process that has previously output M . The value M is now available to the environment
by reference to the ‘handle’ x. The active substitution {M/x} can replace the variable
x for the term M in every process it comes into contact with. This behaviour can be
controlled by restriction, and the process ν x.({M/x} | P ) corresponds exactly to: let x =
M in P . This allows access to terms which the environment cannot construct. Arbitrarily
large active substitutions can be obtained by parallel composition, and we occasionally
abbreviate {M1/x1} | . . . | {Ml/xl} as {M1/x1, . . . ,Ml/xl} or {M˜/x˜}. We also use σ and
τ to range over active substitutions and we write Nσ for the result of applying σ to the
variables of N . Extended processes must have at most one active substitution for each
variable, and there is exactly one when the variable is under restriction. Finally, we write
ν u˜ for the (possibly empty) series of pairwise-distinct binders ν u1.ν u2. · · · .ν ul.
The type system for terms is extended to processes. It enforces: M,N are of the same
type in the conditional expression if M = N then P else Q; message input u(x) is defined
only where u is of type Channel〈ω〉 and x is of type ω; similarly, message output u〈M〉
requires u of type Channel〈ω〉 and M of type ω. Substitutions are always assumed to be
cycle-free. In addition, active substitutions {M/x} are such that the term M and variable
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x have the same base type; this assumption was not explicitly stated in [AF01] but its
necessity has been confirmed [AF06] and is essential for the validity of [AF01, Theorem 1]
as shown in [BJPV09]. Finally, we assume extended processes are well-typed.
The scope of names and variables are delimited by binders u(x) and ν u. The set
of bound names bn(A) contains every name n which is under restriction ν n inside A.
The set of bound variables bv(A) consists of all those variables x occurring in A that are
bound by a restriction ν x or input u(x). We also define the set of free names and the set
of free variables. The set of free names in A, denoted fn(A), consists of those names n
occurring in A not in the scope of the binder ν n. The set of free variables fv(A) contains
the variables x occurring in A which are not in the scope of a restriction ν x or input
u(x). We occasionally write fn(M), and fv(M), for the set of names, and respectively
variables, which appear in term M . An extended process is closed when every variable x
is either bound or defined by an active substitution. Bound names and bound variables
are subject to α-renaming.
A frame, denoted ϕ or ψ, is an extended process built from the null process 0 and
active substitutions {M/x}, which are composed by parallel composition and restriction.
The domain dom(ϕ) of a frame ϕ is the set of variables that ϕ exports; that is, the set
of variables x for which ϕ contains an active substitution {M/x}, where x is not under
restriction. Every extended process A can be mapped to a frame ϕ(A) by replacing every
plain process in A with 0. The frame ϕ(A) represents the static knowledge that is output
by a process to its environment. The domain dom(A) of A is the domain of ϕ(A).
2.2 Operational semantics
The signature Σ is equipped with an equational theory E, that is, a set of equations of
the form M = N , where the terms M,N are defined over the signature Σ (sometimes
written M,N ∈ TΣ). This allows us to capture relationships between primitives defined
in Σ. We define equality modulo the equational theory, written =E, as the smallest
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equivalence relation on terms that contains E and is closed under application of function
symbols, substitution of terms for variables and bijective renaming of names. We write
M =E N when the equation M = N is in the theory E, and keep the signature implicit.
When E is clear from the context, we may abbreviate M =E N as M = N . The
negation of M =E N is denoted M 6=E N (and similarly abbreviated M 6= N). For
further discussion on equational theories see Abadi & Fournet [AF01, §3] and Abadi &
Cortier [AC04a, AC05a, AC06].
Contexts may be used to represent the adversarial environment in which a process
is run; that environment provides the data that the process inputs, and consumes the
data that it outputs. We define context C[ ] to be an extended process with a hole. We
obtain C[A] as the result of filling C[ ]’s hole with the extended process A. An evaluation
context is a context whose hole is not in the scope of a replication, a conditional, an input,
or an output. A context C[ ] closes A when C[A] is closed.
2.2.1 Structural equivalence
Informally, two processes are structurally equivalent if they model the same thing, but
the grammar permits different encodings. For example, to describe a pair of processes
A,B running in parallel, the grammar forces us to put one on the left and one on the
right; that is, we have to write either A | B, or B | A. These two processes are said to be
structurally equivalent. Formally, structural equivalence (≡) is the smallest equivalence
relation on extended processes that is closed by α-conversion of both bound names and
bound variables, closed under application of evaluation contexts, and which satisfies the
rules in Figure 2.4. The rules for parallel composition, replication and restriction are
self-explanatory. Alias enables the introduction of an arbitrary active substitution with
restricted scope. Subst describes the application of an active substitution to a process
that it comes into contact with. The final rule, Rewrite, allows terms that are equal
modulo the equational theory to be swapped as desired.
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Figure 2.4 Semantics for processes
Par-0 A ≡ A | 0
Par-A A | (B | C) ≡ (A | B) | C
Par-C A | B ≡ B | A
Repl !P ≡ P | !P
New-0 ν n.0 ≡ 0
New-C ν u.ν w.A ≡ ν w.ν u.A
New-Par A | ν u.B ≡ ν u.(A | B)
where u 6∈ fv(A) ∪ fn(A)
Alias ν x.{M/x} ≡ 0
Subst {M/x} | A ≡ {M/x} | A{M/x}
Rewrite {M/x} ≡ {N/x}
where M =E N
Comm c〈x〉.P | c(x).Q −→ P | Q
Then if N = N then P else Q −→ P
Else if L = M then P else Q −→ Q
for ground terms L,M such that L 6=E M
Structural equivalence allows every closed extended process A to be rewritten as a
substitution and a closed plain process with some restricted names: A ≡ ν n˜.({M˜/x˜} | P ),
where fv(M˜) = fv(P ) = ∅ and n˜ ⊆ fn(M˜). It follows immediately that every closed frame
ϕ can be rewritten as a substitution with some restricted names: ϕ ≡ ν n˜.{M˜/x˜}, where
fv(M˜) = ∅ and n˜ ⊆ fn(M˜). We note that the domain of ϕ is x˜.
2.2.2 Internal reduction
A process can be executed without contact with its environment, either because if-
statements are evaluated and the then- or else-branch is taken, or because internal sub-
processes communicate with each other. The execution of a process with respect to
control flow and communication is captured by internal reduction. Formally, internal re-
duction (−→) is the smallest relation on extended processes closed under structural equiv-
alence and application of evaluation contexts, satisfying the rules of Figure 2.4. We write
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−→∗ for the reflexive and transitive closure of −→. Communication (Comm) is defined on
variables, making it look rather restricted. However, this entails no loss of generality
because Alias and Subst can be used to allow communication of an arbitrary term M
instead of a variable x. Conditionals (Then and Else) are dependent on the equational
theory. Applications of Then may require the use of the structural equivalence rule
Rewrite to derive “N = N” from “M = N” where M =E N . Else may require that
active substitutions in the context be applied using Alias and Subst to ensure L,M are
ground.
2.2.3 Labelled reduction
The semantics in Section 2.2.2 allow us to reason about protocols with an adversary
represented by a context. In order to prove that security properties hold for all adversaries,
quantification over all contexts is typically required, which can be difficult in practice. The
labelled operational semantics we now present aims to eliminate universal quantification
of the context.
The labelled semantics defines a ternary relation written A
α−→ B, where α is a label of
the form c(M), c〈u〉, or ν u.c〈u〉 such that u is either a channel name or a variable of base
type. The transition A
c(M)−−−→ B means that the process A performs an input of the term
M from the environment on the channel c, and the resulting process is B. The situation
for output is a bit more complicated, since there are several cases. If the value being
output is a free variable x or a free channel name d, then the label c〈x〉, respectively c〈d〉,
is used. If the value is a restricted channel name d, then the label ν d.c〈d〉 is used. Finally,
if the value being output is a term M , then the label ν x.c〈x〉 is used, after replacing the
occurrence of the term M by x and wrapping the process in νx.({M/x} | ). The semantics
are extended to include the rules that appear in Figure 2.5.
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Figure 2.5 Semantics for labelled transitions
In c(x).P
c(M)−−−→ P{M/x}
Out-Atom c〈u〉.P c〈u〉−−→ P
Open-Atom
A










α−→ A′ bv(α) ∩ fv(B) = bn(α) ∩ fn(B) = ∅
A | B α−→ A′ | B
Struct




The notion of indistinguishability is a powerful concept which allows us to reason about
complex properties that cannot be expressed as trace-based assertions. Intuitively, two
processes are said to be equivalent if an observer has no way to tell them apart. The
processes may be handling different data, and internally performing quite different com-
putations, but they look the same to an external observer. This notion allows us to define
strong notions of secrecy and privacy.
Roughly speaking, processes A and B are said to be observationally equivalent if: they
can output on the same channel for all contexts they are placed inside of, and for every
step made by A, there exists a step that B can make, such that the resulting pair of
processes are observationally equivalent (and vice-versa). We write A ⇓ c when A can
evolve to a process that can send a message on channel c; that is, when A→∗ C[c〈M〉.P ]
for some term M , process P and evaluation context C[ ] that does not bind c.
Definition 2.1 (Observational equivalence). Observational equivalence ≈ is the largest
symmetric relation R between closed extended processes with the same domain such that
A R B implies:
1. if A ⇓ c, then B ⇓ c;
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2. if A −→∗ A′, then B −→∗ B′ and A′ R B′ for some B′;
3. C[A] R C[B] for all closing evaluation contexts C[ ].
2.4 Assumptions and notation
In this thesis, all signatures are tacitly assumed to include the constant ∅, unary functions
fst, snd, and the binary function pair. In addition, equational theories are assumed to
include:
fst(pair(x, y)) = x snd(pair(x, y)) = y
For convenience, pair(M1, pair(. . . , pair(Mn,∅))) is occasionally abbreviated as (M1, . . . ,
Mn) and fst(snd
i−1(M)) is denoted pii(M). We also introduce some convenient notation
for sequence of names or variables. Given an infinite sequence of names or variables
u = u1, u2, u3, u4, . . . , the following self-explanatory abbreviations are used:
head(u) = u1
tail(u) = u2, u3, u4, . . .
odd(u) = u1, u3, . . .
even(u) = u2, u4, . . .
Part II
Formalisation of security properties
The failure of cryptographic protocols has been directly at-
tributed to the absence of rigorously defined security proper-
ties. This part introduces symbolic definitions for security in
electronic voting and anonymous attestation.

3
Election verifiability in electronic voting†
Overview. A definition of election verifiability is presented in terms of
boolean tests which can be performed on the data produced by an election. The
definition allows the evaluation of election verifiability in electronic voting
protocols. It also allows the identification of hardware and software compo-
nents that must be trusted for the purpose of verifiability, thereby facilitating
the comparison of electronic voting protocols on the basis of trust assump-
tions. Our definition of election verifiability is compatible with a large class
of electronic voting schemes – including those based upon blind signatures,
homomorphic encryption and mixnets – as will be demonstrated by analysing
the FOO, Helios 2.0 and JCJ-Civitas electronic voting protocols.
Electronic voting systems lack the transparency provided by their paper counterparts. For
example, paper-based elections often allow observation of the whole process (that is, from
ballot casting to tallying) and rely upon robustness characteristics of the physical world
(such as the impossibility of altering the markings on a paper ballot sealed inside a locked
ballot box). By comparison, it is not possible to observe the electronic operations per-
formed on bitstrings. As a consequence, computer systems may alter votes in a way that
cannot be detected. Some electronic voting systems attempt to eliminate the necessity
for transparency under the hypothesis that the hardware and software running the elec-
tion can be trusted. Unsurprisingly, this level of trust is very difficult to achieve and thus
†This chapter is an extension of [KRS10, SRKK10].
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deployed systems based upon such assumptions have failed [Bun09, Min08, Bow07, UK07].
The concept of election verifiability (also known as end-to-end verifiability) has emerged
in the academic literature to address this problem (for example, [JCJ02, CRS05, Adi06,
Dag07, Adi08]). The notion should allow voters and election observers to verify – indepen-
dently of the hardware and software running the election – that votes have been recorded,
tallied and declared correctly. Two aspects of verifiability are generally distinguished.
• Individual verifiability: a voter can check that her own ballot is published on the
election’s bulletin board.
• Universal verifiability: anyone can check that all the votes in the election outcome
correspond to ballots published on the election’s bulletin board.
In this thesis, another aspect is also identified.
• Eligibility verifiability: anyone can check that each ballot published on the bulletin
board was cast by a registered voter and at most one ballot is tallied per voter.
Eligibility verifiability is explicitly distinguished as a distinct property (although it occa-
sionally appears as part of universal verifiability in the literature).
Chapter contribution
A definition of election verifiability which captures individual, universal and eligibility
verifiability is presented. Formally, the definition captures verifiability as a triple of
boolean tests ΦIV ,ΦUV , and ΦEV which are required to satisfy several conditions when
parametrised with the data produced by an election protocol, for all possible protocol
executions. The test ΦIV is intended to be checked by individual voters who instantiate
the test with their private information (for example, their vote, and data derived during
the execution of the protocol) and public information relating to the election (for example,
the contents of the bulletin board). The tests ΦUV and ΦEV can be checked by any external
observer and hence only rely on public information.
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The consideration of eligibility verifiability is particularly interesting, as it provides an
assurance that the election outcome corresponds to votes legitimately cast. This property
has been largely neglected by existing electronic voting protocols, despite its suitability
as a mechanism to detect ballot stuffing.
Our definition of election verifiability dictates that only those parts of the voting
system that need to be trusted to achieve verifiability should be modelled; all the re-
maining parts of the system are controlled by the adversarial environment. This is a
further interesting aspect because it allows the clear identification of trust assumptions
needed for verifiability, and, therefore, permits comparison of electronic voting protocols.
In complementary work, Pieters [Pie10] compares voting systems on the basis of the proof
techniques used to achieve verifiability.
Tests ΦIV ,ΦUV , and ΦEV are assumed to be verified in a trusted environment (if a
test is checked by malicious software that always evaluates the test to hold, it is useless).
However, the verification of these tests can be repeated on different machines, using
software provided by various stakeholders, thereby increasing confidence. Alternatively,
this assumption can be eliminated by adopting human-verifiable tests as described by
Adida [Adi06, Chapter 5].
The application of our election verifiability definition is demonstrated by analysing
verifiability in three case studies: the protocol by Fujioka, Okamoto & Ohta [FOO92]
(commonly referred to as the FOO protocol); the Helios 2.0 protocol [AMPQ09] which
was effectively used in the election of board memebers for the International Association of
Cryptologic Research, the presidential election at the Catholic University of Louvain, and
the student vice president at Princeton University; and the protocol by Juels, Catalano
& Jakobsson [JCJ02, JCJ05, JCJ10] which has been implemented by Clarkson, Chong
& Myers [CCM08, CCM07] as Civitas (we occassionally refer to this protocol as JCJ-
Civitas). This demonstrates the suitability of the definition for a large class of protocols,
including schemes based upon mixnets, homomorphic encryption and blind signatures.
The protocols by Fujioka, Okamoto & Ohta and Helios 2.0 will be shown not to satisfy
38 CHAPTER 3. ELECTION VERIFIABILITY IN ELECTRONIC VOTING
eligibility verifiability and are vulnerable to ballot stuffing by dishonest administrators.
As these protocols do not proclaim to satisfy eligibility verifiability, this is not claimed
to be an attack, but simply a clarification of precisely which aspects of verifiability are
satisfied.
Structure of this chapter. Section 3.1 formalises electronic voting protocols in the
applied pi calculus. Section 3.2 specifies some notational conventions and defines the
individual and universal verifiability aspects of our definition (Section 3.2.1). The analysis
of FOO is presented in Section 3.2.2, and Helios is studied in Section 3.2.3. Our definition
is extended to eligibility in Section 3.3, and JCJ-Civitas is analysed in Section 3.4. Finally,
a summary is presented in Section 3.5.
3.1 Formalising electronic voting protocols
The framework should permit explicit specification of the trusted parts of an election
protocol. Ideally, only the communication channel between voters and voting terminals
should be trusted. In particular, the voter should not need to trust the election hardware
or software. However, achieving absolute verifiability in this context is difficult and the
trustworthiness of some parts of the protocol are often assumed. Such trust assumptions
are motivated by the fact that certain components of a protocol can be audited, or can be
executed in a distributed manner amongst several different election officials. For instance,
in Helios 2.0 [AMPQ09] the ballot construction can be audited using a cast-or-audit
mechanism (see Benaloh [Ben06, Ben07] for further details on ballot auditing).
Formally, the trusted parts of the voting protocol can be captured using a voting
process specification (Definition 3.1). This specification makes trust assumptions explicit;
however, whether such assumptions are reasonable depends on the context of an election.
Definition 3.1 (Voting process specification). A voting process specification is a tuple
〈V,A〉, where V is a plain process without replication and A is a closed evaluation context
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such that fv(V ) = {v} and rv(V ) = ∅.
Given a voting process specification 〈V,A〉, integer n ∈ N, and names s1, . . . , sn, we can
build the voting process
VPn(s1, . . . , sn) = A[V1 | · · · | Vn]
where Vi = V {si/v}. Intuitively, VPn(s1, . . . , sn) models the protocol with n voters casting
votes for candidates s1, . . . , sn. Note that the votes s1, . . . , sn are not required to be
distinct (several voters may cast votes for the same candidate).
Example 3.1 (Raising hands protocol). Consider the raising hands protocol in which
every voter outputs her signed vote. Cryptographic primitives are captured by the signature
Σ = {true, getmsg, pk, checksign, sign}, where true is a constant, getmsg and pk are unary
functions, and functions checksign and sign are binary. The signature is associated with
the equations:
checksign(pk(xsk), sign(xsk, xmsg)) = true
getmsg(sign(xsk, xmsg)) = xmsg
A trusted administrator, modelled by the context Aex, is assumed to distribute keying
material to voters and publish each voter’s public key.
Aex[ ] =̂ νd.νskA.(!νskV .d〈skV 〉.c〈sign(skA, pk(skV ))〉 | {pk(skA)/xpk} | )
The channel d is under name restriction to ensure voters’ keys are distributed privately,
and the active substitution {pk(skA)/xpk} models the fact that the administrator’s public key
is known (for example, published on the election bulletin board). The voter, who receives
her private key and then outputs her signed vote paired with her public key, is modelled
by the process:
Vex =̂ d(xskV ).c〈(pk(xskV ), sign(xskV , v))〉
This protocol satisfies election verifiability, as will be shown later in this chapter.
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For the purposes of individual verifiability, the voter may rely upon some data derived
during the protocol execution. To take such data into consideration, we distinguish a
subset of variables which we call record variables r and extend plain processes with the
record message rec(r,M).P construct. The record message construct permits a voter to
privately record some information which she may later use to verify the election. This
behaviour is captured by extending internal reduction to include rec(r,M).P → P |
{M/r}. Record variables are assumed to be unique in each process; that is, a record
variable may appear at most once. The type system ensures that the term M and record
variable r have the same type in rec(r,M); it also enforces that record variables may only
be used in the first argument of the rec construct or in the domain of an extended process.
Definition 3.2 allows processes to record restricted names and message inputs.
Definition 3.2. Let rv be an infinite sequence of distinct record variables. Given a process
P which does not contain replication, we define R(P ) = R′(rv, P ), where:
R′(r, 0) =̂ 0
R′(r, P | Q) =̂ R′(odd(r), P ) | R′(even(r), Q)
R′(r, ν n.P ) =̂ ν n.rec(head(r), n).R′(tail(r), P )
R′(r, u(x).P ) =̂ u(x).rec(head(r), x).R′(tail(r), P )
R′(r, u〈M〉.P ) =̂ u〈M〉.R′(r, P )
R′(r, if M = N then P else Q) =̂ if M = N then R′(odd(r), P ) else R′(even(r), Q)
Given a tuple of record variables r˜, the tuple of record variables obtained by indexing
each record variable in r˜ with i is denoted r˜i. The set of record variables in a process and
term are denoted rv(A) and rv(M). A voting process can now be constructed such that
the voter V records the values constructed and input during execution.
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Definition 3.3 (Augmented voting process). Given a voting process specification 〈V,A〉,
integer n ∈ N and names s1, . . . , sn, the augmented voting process
VP+n (s1, . . . , sn) = A[V
+
1 | · · · | V +n ]
where V +i = R(V ){si/v}{ri/r | r ∈ rv(R(V ))}.
The augmented voting process VP+n (s1, . . . , sn) models the voting protocol for n voters
casting votes s1, . . . , sn, who privately record the data that may be needed for verification
using record variables r˜i.
Example 3.2. Given integer n ∈ N and names s1, . . . , sn, the augmented voting process
associated with our raising hands process specification 〈Vex, Aex〉 is defined as follows
Aex[d(xskV ).rec(r1, xskV ).c〈(pk(xskV ), sign(xskV , s1))〉 | . . .
| d(xskV ).rec(rn, xskV ).c〈(pk(xskV ), sign(xskV , sn))〉]
3.2 Election verifiability
Election verifiability is captured using three tests ΦIV , ΦUV , and ΦEV . Formally, a test
is built from conjunctions and disjunctions of atomic tests of the form (M = N), where
M,N are terms. Tests may contain variables, and will need to hold on frames arising
from arbitrary protocol executions. We now recall the purpose of each test and assume
some naming conventions about variables.
Individual verifiability: The test ΦIV allows a voter to identify her ballot on the bulletin
board. The test has:
• a variable v referring to a voter’s vote.
• a variable w referring to a voter’s public credential.
42 CHAPTER 3. ELECTION VERIFIABILITY IN ELECTRONIC VOTING
• some variables x, x′, x¯, . . . expected to refer to global public values pertaining to the
election (for example, public keys belonging to election administrators).
• a variable y expected to refer to the voter’s ballot on the bulletin board.
• some record variables r1, . . . , rk referring to the voter’s private data.
Universal verifiability: The test ΦUV allows an observer to check that votes in the election
outcome correspond to ballots on the bulletin board.
• a variable vˆ referring to a tuple representing the election outcome.
• some variables x, x′, x¯, . . . as above.
• a variable yˆ expected to refer to a tuple containing all of the voters’ ballots on the
bulletin board.
• some variables z, z′, z¯, . . . expected to refer to outputs generated by the protocol for
the purposes of universal and eligibility verification.
Eligibility verifiability: The test ΦEV allows an observer to check that each ballot on the
bulletin board was cast by a registered voter and at most one ballot is tallied per voter.
The test has:
• a variable wˆ referring to a tuple containing public credentials of eligible votes.
• a variable yˆ, variables x, x′, x¯, . . . and variables z, z′, z¯, . . . as above.
The remainder of this section will focus on the individual and universal aspects of our
definition; eligibility verifiability will be discussed in Section 3.3.
3.2.1 Security definition: Individual and universal verifiability
The test ΦIV is parametrised with a single bulletin board entry (which an individual voter
needs to identify in some way, possibly by testing all of them); by comparison, the tests
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ΦUV and ΦEV can be applied to several bulletin board entries. The tests ΦUV and ΦEV
are therefore parametrised with an integer m ∈ N denoting the m bulletin board entries
considered; accordingly, we write ΦUVm and Φ
EV
m to denote such tests.
The tests suitable for the purposes of election verifiability have to satisfy certain con-
ditions: if the tests succeed, then the data output by the election is indeed valid (sound-
ness), and there is a behaviour of the election administrators which produces election
data satisfying the tests (effectiveness). Formally, these requirements are captured by
Definition 3.4. We write Tˆ ' Tˆ ′ to denote that the terms Tˆ and Tˆ ′ are a permutation
of each other modulo the equational theory; that is, Tˆ = (T1, . . . Tn), Tˆ
′ = (T ′1, . . . T
′
n)
such that there exists a permutation χ on {1, . . . , n} and for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n we have
pii(T ) =E piχ(i)(T
′) for some terms T1, T ′1, . . . , Tn, T
′
n and integer n ∈ N.
Definition 3.4 (Individual and universal verifiability). A voting specification 〈V,A〉 sat-
isfies individual and universal verifiability if there exists a test ΦIV , where for all m ∈ N
there exists a test ΦUVm , such that fn(Φ
IV ) = fn(ΦUVm ) = rv(Φ
UV
m ) = ∅ and rv(ΦIV ) ⊆




Soundness. For all contexts C, such that C[VP+n (s1, . . . , sn)] (−→∗ α−→−→∗)∗ B and ϕ(B) ≡
νn˜.σ for some process B, substitution σ and names n˜, we have:
∀i, j. ΦIVi σ ∧ ΦIVj σ ⇒ i = j (3.1)
ΦUVm σ ∧ ΦUVm {vˆ
′
/vˆ}σ ⇒ vˆσ ' vˆ′σ (3.2)∧
1≤i≤n
ΦIVi {pii(yˆ)/y}σ ∧ ΦUVm σ ∧ n = m⇒ (s1, . . . , sn) ' vˆσ (3.3)
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Effectiveness. There exists a context C, process B, substitution σ and names n˜, such
that C[VP+n (s1, . . . , sn)] (→∗ α−→→∗)∗ B, ϕ(B) ≡ νn˜.σ and
∧
1≤i≤n
ΦIVi {pii(yˆ)/y}σ ∧ ΦUVn σ (3.4)
An individual voter should verify that the test ΦIV holds when instantiated with
her vote si, the information r˜iσ recorded during the execution of the protocol and some
bulletin board entry yσ. Condition (3.1) ensures that the test ΦIV will hold for at most
one bulletin board entry. (Note that ΦIVi and Φ
IV
j are evaluated with the same ballot
yσ provided by C[ ].) The fact that her ballot is counted will be ensured by ΦUVm , which
should also be tested by the voter. The voter or an observer will instantiate the test
ΦUVm with the bulletin board entries yˆσ and the election outcome vˆσ. Condition (3.2)
ensures that ΦUVm holds only for a single outcome. Condition (3.3) ensures that if the
bulletin board contains the ballots of voters who voted s1, . . . , sn, then Φ
UV
m holds only
if the declared outcome is a permutation of these votes, where ΦUVm is instantiated with
precisely the n ballots cast by those voters (that is, there are no additional ballots in
yˆσ). The necessity for the precondition n = m should make it clear that individual and
universal verifiability cannot detect ballot stuffing. Finally, Condition (3.4) ensures that
there exists an execution where the tests hold. In particular, this allows us to verify
whether the protocol can satisfy the tests when executed as expected. This also forbids
tests which always evaluate to false and would make Conditions (3.1)-(3.3) vacuously
hold.
3.2.2 Case study: FOO
The FOO protocol, by Fujioka, Okamoto & Ohta [FOO92], is a seminal work based upon
blind signatures.
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M = commit(k, v)
Mˆ = blind(k′,M)
/ pk(skV ), sign(skV , Mˆ)
sign(skR, Mˆ) .







An election is created by naming a registrar and a tallier. The protocol is divided into
four phases: setup, preparation, commitment and tallying. The steps of the protocol
(Figure 3.1) will now be detailed, starting with the setup phase.
1. The registrar creates a signing key pair skR, pk(skR) and publishes the public part
pk(skR). Similarly, each voter is assumed to have a key pair skV , pk(skV ).
The preparation phase then proceeds as follows.
2. The voter computes the commitment to her vote M = commit(k, v) and sends the
signed blind commitment sign(skV , blind(k
′,M)), paired with her public key, to the
registrar.
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3. The registrar checks that the signature belongs to an eligible voter and returns the
blind commitment signed by the registrar sign(skR, blind(k
′,M)).
4. The voter verifies the registrar’s signature and unblinds the message to recover
M ′ = sign(skR,M), that is, her commitment signed by the registrar.
After some fixed deadline, the protocol enters the commitment phase.
5. The voter posts her ballot M,M ′ to the bulletin board.
Similarly, the last phase begins after some fixed deadline.
6. The tallier verifies all the bulletin board entries and appends an identifier ` to each
valid entry.
7. The voter checks the bulletin board for her entry, the triple `,M,M ′, and appends
the commitment factor k.
8. Finally, using k, the tallier opens all of the ballots and announces the election
outcome.
The distinction between phases is essential to uphold the protocol’s security properties.
In particular, voters must synchronise before the commitment phase to ensure privacy
(observe that without synchronisation, traffic analysis may allow the voter’s signature to
be linked with the commitment to her vote, which can then be linked to her vote) and
before the tallying phase to avoid publishing partial results, that is, to ensure the fairness
property of electronic voting.
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Equational theory
Based upon [KR05, DKR06, DKR09, DKR10b], blind signatures and bit commitment are
modelled by the following equations
unblind(xrand, sign(xsk, blind(xrand, xmsg))) = sign(xsk, xmsg)
unblind(xrand, blind(xrand, xplain)) = xplain
open(xrand, commit(xrand, xplain)) = xplain
checksign(pk(xsk), sign(xsk, xmsg)) = true
getmsg(sign(xsk, xmsg)) = xmsg
where true is a constant.
Model in applied pi
For verifiability, the voter must be able to generate a fresh nonce k (which should sub-
sequently be used by the untrusted voting terminal to compute the commitment to her
vote); all other operations – such as computing the commitment, blinding and signing –
can be performed by an untrusted voting terminal. Accordingly, the trusted components
are modelled as follows.
Definition 3.5. The voting process specification 〈Vfoo, Afoo〉 is defined as Vfoo =ˆ νk .c〈v〉.c〈k〉
and Afoo[ ] =ˆ .
We do not assert that the voting terminal uses blind signatures (although this is
crucial for privacy properties, it does not contribute to verifiability); accordingly, blinding
operations do not appear in our specification and, moreover, no trust assumptions are
made about whether blinding is used. Similarly, the voter’s signature on the blinded
committed vote and the confidentiality of signing keys are not required for individual and
universal verifiability; they are, however, essential for eligibility.
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Analysis: Individual and universal verifiability
Given integer m ∈ N let tests ΦIV and ΦUVm be defined as follows:
ΦIV =ˆ y =E (r, commit(r, v))
ΦUVm =ˆ vˆ =E (open(pi1(pi1(yˆ)), pi2(pi1(yˆ))), . . . , open(pi1(pim(yˆ)), pi2(pim(yˆ))))
Intuitively, a bulletin board entry should be a pair formed from the voter’s nonce and the
associated commitment to her vote. The identifier ` and the registrar’s signature are not
required for the purpose of verifiability, so these details are omitted.
Theorem 3.1. 〈Vfoo, Afoo〉 satisfies individual and universal verifiability.
Proof. Suppose m ∈ N and tests ΦIV ,ΦUVm are given above. We will now show that the
conditions of Definition 3.4 are satisfied.
(3.1) For all names s1, . . . , sn suppose C is a context, B is a process, σ is a substitution, n˜
is a tuple of names and i, j are integers such that C[VP+n (s1, . . . , sn)] (→∗ α−→→∗)∗ B,
ϕ(B) ≡ νn˜.σ, ΦIV {si/v, ri/r}σ and ΦIV {sj/v, rj/r}σ, where r = rv(ΦIV ). It follows that
pi1(y)σ =E riσ =E rjσ. Since the record variables ri and rj are handles for fresh nonces
generated by name restriction in processes Vfoo,i and Vfoo,j, it follows that i = j.
(3.2) We prove a stronger result: namely, the condition holds for all substitutions σ. Suppose
σ is an arbitrary substitution such that ΦUVm σ and Φ
UV
m {vˆ′/vˆ}σ hold. We have
vˆσ =E (open(pi1(pi1(yˆ)), pi2(pi1(yˆ))), . . . , open(pi1(pim(yˆ)), pi2(pim(yˆ))))σ =E vˆ
′σ
and immediately derive vˆσ ' vˆ′σ.
(3.3) Again, we will show that the condition holds for all substitutions σ. Suppose σ is an




i {pii(yˆ)/y}σ and ΦUVm σ hold, where n = m. By∧
1≤i≤n Φ
IV
i {pii(yˆ)/y}σ it must be the case for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n that
pii(yˆ)σ =E (ri, commit(ri, si))σ
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and hence open(pi1(pii(yˆ)), pi2(pii(yˆ)))σ =E si. Moreover, since n = m and Φ
UV
m σ we have
vˆσ =E (open(pi1(pi1(yˆ)), pi2(pi1(yˆ))), . . . , open(pi1(pim(yˆ)), pi2(pim(yˆ))))σ
=E (s1, . . . , sn)
The result (s1, . . . , sn) ' vˆσ follows.
(3.4) Suppose s1, . . . , sn are names and consider the following context:
Cfoo = c(xvote,1).c(xrand,1).let y1 = (xrand,1, commit(xrand,1, xvote,1)) in
...
c(xvote,n).c(xrand,n).let yn = (xrand,n, commit(xrand,n, xvote,n)) in
c〈(y1, . . . , yn)〉.
c〈(open(pi1(y1), pi2(y1)), . . . , open(pi1(yn), pi2(yn)))〉 |
We have C[VP+n (s1, . . . , sn)] (→∗ α−→→∗)∗ B such that
B = ν k1, . . . , kn.(c〈((k1, commit(k1, s1)), . . . , (kn, commit(kn, sn)))〉.
c〈(s1, . . . , sn)〉 | {k1/r1, . . . , kn/rn})
Moreover, B
ν yˆ.c〈yˆ〉−−−−→ ν vˆ.c〈vˆ〉−−−−→ ν k1, . . . , kn.σ such that
σ = {((k1, commit(k1, s1)), . . . , (kn, commit(kn, sn)))/yˆ, (s1, . . . , sn)/vˆ, k1/r1, . . . , kn/rn}




i {pii(yˆ)/y}σ ∧ ΦUVn σ.
3.2.3 Case study: Helios 2.0
Helios 2.0 [AMPQ09] is an open-source web-based election system, based upon homo-
morphic tallying of encrypted votes [ElG85, CP93, CDS94, CGS97, Sch09]. It allows the
secret election key to be distributed amongst several trustees, and supports distributed
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decryption of the election result. It also allows independent verification by voters and
observers. Helios 2.0 has been successfully used by the International Association of Cryp-
tologic Research to elect its board members [BVQ10], following a successful trial in a
non-binding poll [HBH10]. Helios has also been used by the Catholic University of Lou-
vain, in an election that had 25,000 eligible voters, to elect the University president, and
by Princeton University to elect the student vice president [Pri10].
Protocol description
An election is created by naming an election officer, selecting a set of trustees and running
a protocol that provides each trustee with a share of the secret part of a public key pair.
The election officer publishes the public part of the trustees’ key and the candidate list
t˜ = (t1, . . . , tl) on the bulletin board. The steps that participants take during a run of
Helios are as follows. (See [CS10b, CS11] for a formal cryptographic description.)
1. To cast a vote, the voter runs a browser script that inputs her vote s ∈ t˜ and creates
a ballot consisting of her vote encrypted by the trustees’ public key and a proof that
the ballot represents an allowed vote (this is needed because the ballots are never
decrypted individually; in particular, it prevents multiple votes being encoded as a
single ballot).
2. The voter can audit the ballot to check if it really represents a vote for her chosen
candidate; if she decides to do this, then the script provides her with the random
data used in the ballot creation. She can then independently reconstruct her ballot
and verify that it was indeed well-formed, but the ballot is now invalid. (Invalidating
audited ballots provides some protection against vote selling.)
3. When the voter has decided to cast her ballot, she submits it to the election officer.
The election officer authenticates the voter and checks that she is eligible to vote.
The election officer also verifies the proof, and publishes the ballot on the bulletin
board.
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4. Individual voters can check that their ballots appear on the bulletin board and, by
verifying the proof, observers are assured that ballots represent permitted votes.
5. After some predefined deadline, the election officer homomorphically combines the
ballots and publishes the encrypted tally on the bulletin board. Anyone can check
that tallying is performed correctly.
6. Each of the trustees publishes a partial decryption of the encrypted tally, together
with a proof of correct construction. Anyone can verify these proofs.
7. The election officer decrypts the tally and publishes the result. Anyone can check
this decryption.
Equational theory
We use a signature in which penc(xpk, xrand, xplain) denotes the encryption of plaintext xplain
using random xrand and key xpk, and xciph ∗ yciph denotes the homomorphic combination of
ciphertexts xciph and yciph (the corresponding operation on plaintexts is written + and on
randoms ◦). The term ballotPf(xpk, xrand, s, xballot) represents a proof that the ballot xballot
is a ciphertext on some plaintext name s, random xrand and key xpk; partial(xsk, xciph) is a
partial decryption of xciph when xciph is a ciphertext encrypted using the public key pk(xsk);
and partialPf(xsk, xciph, xpartial) is a proof that xpartial is a partial decryption of xciph when
xciph is a ciphertext encrypted using public key pk(xsk). We use the equational theory
that asserts that +, ∗, ◦ are commutative and associative, and includes the equations:
dec(xsk, penc(pk(xsk), xrand, xplain)) = xplain
dec(partial(xsk, ciph), ciph) = xplain
where ciph = penc(pk(xsk), xrand, xplain)
penc(xpk, yrand, yplain) ∗ penc(xpk, zrand, zplain) = penc(xpk, yrand ◦ zrand, yplain + zplain)
checkBallotPf(xpk, ballot, ballotPf(xpk, xrand, s, ballot)) = true
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where ballot = penc(xpk, xrand, s)
checkPartialPf(pk(xsk), ciph, partial, partialPf(xsk, ciph, partial)) = true
where ciph = penc(pk(xsk), xrand, xplain) and partial = partial(xsk, ciph)
Note that in the equation for checkBallotPf, s is a name and not a variable. As the
equational theory is closed under bijective renaming of names, this equation holds for any
name, but fails if one replaces the name by a term, for example, s + s. We assume that
all names are possible votes but give the possibility to check that a voter does not include
a term s+ s which would add a vote to the outcome.
Model in applied pi
The browser script is not verifiable; accordingly, the voter most trust:
• Ballot construction; that is, the script generates a pair consisting of the voter’s
encrypted vote and a proof that the ballot represents an allowed vote.
Although the voter cannot be assured that the script behaves correctly, trust is motivated
because the voter can audit ballot construction. Accordingly, the browser script is mod-
elled as part of the trusted context Ahelios in the voting process specification 〈Vhelios, Ahelios〉.
The voter Vhelios receives a channel name y on a private channel; this is a technical aspect
of our formalisation which allows the voter to privately communicate with her browser
script. She sends her vote on this channel to Ahelios, which creates the ballot for her.
The voter is sent the constructed ballot xballot and forwards it to the bulletin board. We
assume that the voter’s inputs y and xballot are stored in record variables ry and rballot.
Ahelios represents the parts of the system that are required to be trusted; it publishes
the election key, and includes the ballot creation script B which receives a voter’s vote,
generates a random m and returns the ballot (that is, the encrypted vote and a proof) to
the voter.
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Definition 3.6. The voting process specification 〈Vhelios, Ahelios〉 is defined where
Vhelios =ˆ d(y).y〈v〉.y(xballot).c〈xballot〉
Ahelios[ ] =ˆ νd.
(
(!νd′.d〈d′〉.B) | {pk(sk)/xpk} |
)
B =ˆ d′(xvote).νm.d′〈(penc(xpk,m, xvote), ballotPf(xpk,m, xvote, penc(xpk,m, xvote)))〉
At the end of the election the bulletin board is represented by a frame. The frame is
expected to define the trustees’ public key as xpk and the ballots as yˆ. It also contains
the homomorphic tally ztally of the encrypted ballots, and the partial decryption zpartial,
together a proof of correctness zpartialPf , obtained from the trustees. When the protocol is
honestly executed by n voters, the resulting frame should have a substitution σ such that
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n we have
xpkσ = pk(sk)
pii(yˆ)σ = (penc(pk(sk),mi, si), ballotPf(pk(sk),mi, si, penc(pk(sk),mi, si)))
zpartialσ = partial(sk, ztally)σ
zpartialPfσ = partialPf(sk, ztally, zpartial)σ
ztallyσ = pi1(pi1(yˆσ)) ∗ · · · ∗ pi1(pin(yˆσ))
Analysis: Individual and universal verifiability
Given m ∈ N, the tests ΦIV and ΦUVm , defined below, are introduced for verifiability
purposes.
ΦIV =̂ y =E rballot
ΦUVm =̂ ztally =E pi1(pi1(yˆ)) ∗ · · · ∗ pi1(pim(yˆ))
∧ ∧mi=1(checkBallotPf(xpk, pi1(pii(yˆ)), pi2(pii(yˆ))) =E true)
∧ checkPartialPf(xpk, ztally, zpartial, zpartialPf) =E true
∧ pi1(vˆ) + · · ·+ pim(vˆ) =E dec(zpartial, ztally)
∧ sndm(vˆ) =E ∅
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The test ΦIV checks that the voter’s ballot is recorded on the bulletin board and ΦUVm
checks that the tally is correctly computed.
Theorem 3.2. 〈Vhelios, Ahelios〉 satisfies individual and universal verifiability.
Proof. Suppose m ∈ N and tests ΦIV ,ΦUVm are given above. We show for all names
s1, . . . , sn that Conditions (3.1)–(3.4) of Definition 3.4 hold.
(3.1) Suppose C, B, σ, n˜, i and j are such that C[VP+n (s1, . . . , sn)](→∗ α−→→∗)∗B, ϕ(B) ≡ νn˜.σ,
ΦIVi σ and Φ
IV
j σ. It follows that pii(yˆ)σ =E rballot,iσ and similarly pij(yˆ)σ =E rballot,jσ.
But since record variables rballot,iσ and rballot,jσ contain distinct fresh nonces mi and mj
created by name restriction in the ballot creation script B, it follows that i = j.
(3.2) We prove a stronger result: namely, the condition holds for all substitutions σ. Sup-
pose σ is an arbitrary substitution such that ΦUVm σ and Φ
UV
m {vˆ′/vˆ}σ hold. Since
∧m
i=1
checkBallotPf(xpk, pi1(pii(yˆ)), pi2(pii(yˆ))σ =E true, by inspection of the equational theory it
must be the case that
pi1(pii(yˆ))σ =E penc(Mpk,i,Mrand,i, si)
for some ground terms Mpk,i, Mrand,i and name si, where 1 ≤ i ≤ m. It follows that
ztallyσ =E penc(Mpk,1,Mrand,1, s1) ∗ · · · ∗ penc(Mpk,m,Mrand,m, sm). Moreover, we have
checkPartialPf(xpk, ztally, zpartial, zpartialPf)σ =E true, hence
ztallyσ =E penc(pk(Msk),Mrand,1 ◦ · · · ◦Mrand,m, s1 + · · ·+ sm)
where pk(Msk) =E Mpk,1 =E · · · =E Mpk,m for some term Msk. It also follows that
zpartialσ =E partial(Msk, ztally)σ
We have dec(zpartial, ztally)σ =E pi1(vˆ)+· · ·+pim(vˆ)σ =E pi1(vˆ′)+· · ·+pim(vˆ′)σ =E s1+· · ·+sm
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and since sndm(vˆ)σ =E snd
m(vˆ′)σ =E ∅, it must be the case that
vˆσ =E (pi1(vˆ), . . . , pim(vˆ))σ ' (s1, . . . , sm) ' (pi1(vˆ′), . . . , pim(vˆ′))σ =E vˆ′σ
It follows immediately that vˆσ ' vˆ′σ.
(3.3) Again, we will show that the condition holds for all substitutions. Suppose σ is an




i {yi/y}σ and ΦUVm σ hold, where n = m. By∧
1≤i≤n Φ
IV
i {pii(yˆ)/y}σ it must be the case for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n that
pii(yˆ) =E (penc(pk(sk),mi, si), ballotPf(pk(sk),mi, si, penc(pk(sk),mi, si)))
Since n = m and ΦUVm σ holds, we have
ztallyσ =E pi1(pi1(yˆ)) ∗ · · · ∗ pi1(pim(yˆ)) =E penc(pk(sk),m1 ◦ · · · ◦mn, s1 + · · ·+ sn)
Moreover, checkPartialPf(xpk, ztally, zpartial, zpartialPf)σ =E true and hence
zpartialσ =E partial(pk(sk), ztally)σ
It follows that dec(zpartial, ztally)σ =E s1+· · ·+sm. By ΦUVm σ we also have dec(zpartial, ztally)σ
=E pi1(vˆ) + · · ·+ pim(vˆ)σ and sndm(vˆ)σ =E ∅. As before, we conclude vˆσ =E (pi1(vˆ), . . . ,
pim(vˆ))σ ' (s1, . . . , sm), hence (s1, . . . , sm) ' vˆσ
(3.4) The context C must marshal the election data onto the frame such that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n
we have xpkσ, pii(yˆ)σ, zpartialσ, zpartialPfσ and ztallyσ as defined above. Moreover, it defines
vˆσ = (s1, . . . , sn). For brevity, we omit formally defining C.
Observe that Condition 3.2 cannot be proved where ΦUVm =̂ pi1(vˆ) + · · · + pim(vˆ) =E
dec(zpartial, ztally) because, in general, given terms M1, . . . ,Mk, N1, . . . , Nk, U, V such that
M1 + · · · + Mk =E dec(U, V ) =E M1 + · · · + Nk it is not the case that (M1, . . . ,Mk ) '
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(N1, . . . , Nk ).
3.3 Security definition: Election verifiability
To fully capture election verifiability, the tests ΦIV and ΦUV must be supplemented with
a test ΦEV . We suppose that the public credentials of registered voters appear on the
bulletin board and ΦEV allows an observer to check that only these individuals (that is,
those in possession of credentials) cast ballots, and at most one ballot is tallied per voter.
Definition 3.7 (Election verifiability). A voting specification 〈V,A〉 satisfies election ver-
ifiability if there exists a test ΦIV , where for all m ∈ N there exists tests ΦUVm ,ΦEVm ,
such that fn(ΦIV ) = fn(ΦUVm ) = fn(Φ
EV
m ) = rv(Φ
UV
m ) = rv(Φ
EV
m ) = ∅ and rv(ΦIV ) ⊆
rv(R(V )), and for all names s1, . . . , sn the conditions below hold. Let r˜ = rv(Φ
IV ),
ΦIVi = Φ
IV {si/v, r˜i/r˜, pii(wˆ)/w} and X = fv(ΦEVm )\dom(VP+n (s1, . . . , sn)).
Soundness. For all contexts C, such that C[VP+n (s1, . . . , sn)] (→∗ α−→→∗)∗ B and ϕ(B) ≡
νn˜.σ for some process B, substitution σ and names n˜, we have Conditions (3.1)–(3.3)
and Conditions (3.5) – (3.7) hold.
ΦEVm σ ∧ ΦEVm {x
′
/x | x ∈ X\yˆ}σ ⇒ wˆσ ' wˆ′σ (3.5)
ΦEVm σ ∧ ΦEVm {x
′
/x | x ∈ X\wˆ}σ ⇒ yˆσ ' yˆ′σ (3.6)∧
1≤i≤n
ΦIVi {pii(yˆ)/y}σ ∧ ΦEVn {wˆ
′
/wˆ}σ ∧ sndn(wˆ)σ =E ∅⇒ wˆσ ' wˆ′σ (3.7)
Effectiveness. There exists a context C, process B, substitution σ and names n˜ such
that C[VP+n (s1, . . . , sn)] (→∗ α−→→∗)∗ B, ϕ(B) ≡ νn˜.σ and Condition (3.8) holds.
∧
1≤i≤n
ΦIVi {pii(yˆ)/y}σ ∧ ΦUVm σ ∧ ΦEVm σ (3.8)
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An observer should verify that the test ΦEVm holds when instantiated with the public
bulletin board, to ensure that ballots were cast by eligible voters. Given ballots yˆσ
provided by the environment, Condition (3.5) ensures that ΦEVm succeeds for only one
tuple of public voter credentials. Similarly, given credentials wˆσ, Condition (3.6) ensures
that only one tuple of ballots yˆσ are accepted by ΦEVm (observe that for such a strong
requirement to hold, we expect the voting specification’s frame to contain a public key
to root trust). Condition (3.7) ensures that if the bulletin board contains ballots cast
by voters with public credentials wˆσ, then ΦEVm holds only on a permutation of these
credentials. Finally, the effectiveness condition is similar to Condition (3.4) of the previous
section.
Case studies: Raising hands, FOO and Helios 2.0. Neither FOO nor Helios use
public voting credentials in a manner suitable for eligibility verifiability. In FOO, the
administrator is responsible for ensuring eligibility, that is, checking the validity of the
voter’s ballots; whereas in Helios, there are no public voting credentials. It follows im-
mediately that Condition (3.6), in particular, cannot be satisfied. By comparison, the
raising hands protocol (Example 3.1) does define suitable public voting credentials and
satisfies our definition.
Proposition 3.1. The raising hands protocol 〈Aex, Vex〉 satisfies election verifiability.
The proof of this result appears in Appendix A.1.
3.4 Case study: JCJ-Civitas
The protocol by Juels, Catalano & Jakobsson [JCJ02, JCJ05, JCJ10] is based upon
mixnets and was implemented by Clarkson, Chong & Myers [CCM08, CCM07] as an
open-source voting system called Civitas.
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3.4.1 Protocol description
An election is created by naming a set of registrars and talliers. The protocol is divided
into four phases: setup, registration, voting and tallying. We now detail the steps of the
protocol, starting with the setup phase.
1. The registrars, respectively talliers, run a protocol which constructs a public key
pair and distributes a share of the secret part amongst the registrars, respectively
talliers. The public part pk(skR), respectively pk(skT ), of the key is published. The
registrars also construct a distributed signing key pair sskR, pk(sskR).
The registration phase then proceeds as follows.
2. The registrars generate and distribute voter credentials. These consist of a private
part d and a public part penc(pk(skR),m
′′, d), that is, the probabilistic encryption
of d under the registrars’ public key pk(skR). This is done in a distributed manner,
so that no individual registrar learns the value of any private credential d.
3. The registrars publish the signed public voter credentials.
4. The registrars announce the candidate list t˜ = (t1, . . . , tl).
The protocol then enters the voting phase.
5. Each voter selects her vote s ∈ t˜ and computes two ciphertexts M = penc(pk(skT ),
m, s) and M ′ = penc(pk(skR),m′, d), where m,m′ are nonces. M contains her vote
and M ′ her credential. In addition, the voter constructs a non-interactive zero-
knowledge proof of knowledge (or signature proof of knowledge) demonstrating the
correct construction of her ciphertexts and the validity of her chosen candidate.
(The proof provides protection against coercion resistance, by preventing forced
abstention attacks via a write in, and binds the two ciphertexts for eligibility verifi-
ability.) The voter derives her ballot as the triple, consisting of her ciphertexts and
signature proof of knowledge, and posts it to the bulletin board.
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After some predefined deadline the tallying phase commences.
6. The talliers read the n′ ballots posted to the bulletin board by voters (that is, the
triples consisting of the two ciphertexts and the signature proof of knowledge) and
discards any entries for which the signature proof of knowledge does not hold.
7. Elimination of re-votes is performed on the ballots using pairwise plaintext equality
tests (PET) on the ciphertexts containing private voter credentials. (A PET [JJ00]
is a cryptographic predicate which allows a key holder to provide a proof that
two ciphertexts contain the same plaintext.) Re-vote elimination is performed in a
verifiable manner with respect to some publicly defined policy, for example, by the
order of ballots on the bulletin board.
8. The talliers perform a verifiable re-encryption mix on the ciphertexts in the ballots
(recall that the ballots include a vote ciphertext and a public credential ciphertext;
the link between these ciphertexts is preserved by the mix.) The mix ensures that
a voter cannot trace her vote, allowing the protocol to achieve coercion resistance.
9. The talliers perform a verifiable re-encryption mix on the list of public credentials
published by the registrars. This mix anonymises public voter credentials, breaking
any link with the voter for privacy purposes.
10. Ballots based upon invalid credentials are weeded using PETs between the mixed
ciphertexts provided by voters and the mixed public credentials. (Using PETs the
correctness of weeding is verifiable.)
11. Finally, the talliers perform a verifiable decryption and publish the result.
3.4.2 Equational theory
The protocol uses the homomorphic ElGamal encryption scheme. Accordingly, we adopt
the signature and associated equational theory from the Helios case study. We model the
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signature proof of knowledge demonstrating correct construction of the voter’s ciphertexts,
re-encryption and PETs by the equations














renc(yrand, penc(pk(xsk), xrand, xplain)) = penc(pk(xsk), xrand ◦ yrand, xplain)
pet(petPf(xsk, ciph, ciph
′), ciph, ciph′) = true
where ciph =ˆ penc(pk(xsk), xrand, xplain) and ciph
′ =ˆ penc(pk(xsk), x′rand, xplain). In addition,
we consider verifiable re-encryption mixnets, and introduce for each permutation χ on
{1, . . . , n}, where n ∈ N, the equation:
checkMix(mixPf(xciph,1, . . . , xciph,n, ciph1, . . . , ciphn, zrand,1, . . . , zrand,n),
xciph,1, . . . , xciph,n, ciph1, . . . , ciphn) = true
where ciphi =ˆ renc(zrand,i, xciph,χ(i)). We also define re-encryption of pairs of ciphertexts,
and introduce for each permutation χ on {1, . . . , n},= where n ∈ N, the equation:
checkMixPair(mixPairPf((x1, x
′
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3.4.3 Model in applied pi
We make the following trust assumptions for verifiability:
• The voter is able to construct her ballot; that is, she is able to generate nonces
m,m′, construct her ciphertexts and generate a signature proof of knowledge.
• The registrars construct distinct credentials d for each voter and construct the
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voter’s public credential correctly. (The latter assumption can be dropped if the
registrars provides a designated verified proof that the public credential is correctly
formed [JCJ02, JCJ05, JCJ10].) The registrars keep the private part of the signing
key secret.
Although neither voters nor observers can verify that the registrars adhere to such ex-
pectations, they trust them because trust is distributed. The trusted components are
modelled by the voting process specification 〈Ajcj, Vjcj〉 (Definition 3.8). The context Ajcj
distributes private keys on a private channel, launches an unbounded number of registrar
processes, and publishes the public keys of both the registrars and talliers. The regis-
trar R constructs a fresh private credential d and sends the private credential along with
the signed public part (that is, sign(sskR, penc(xpkR ,m
′′, d))) to the voter; the registrar
also publishes the signed public credential on the bulletin board. The voter Vjcj receives
the private and public credentials from the registrar and constructs her ballot; that is,
the pair of ciphertexts and a signature proof of knowledge demonstrating their correct
construction.
Definition 3.8. The voting process specification Ajcj, Vjcj is defined where:
Ajcj =ˆ ν a, sskR.(!R | {pk(skR)/xpkR , pk(sskR)/xspkR , pk(skT )/xpkT} | )
Vjcj =ˆ ν m,m
′.a(xcred).let ciph = penc(xpkT ,m, v) in
let ciph′ = penc(xpkR ,m
′, pi1(xcred)) in
let spk = ballotPf(xpkT ,m, v, xpkR ,m
′, pi1(xcred)) in
c〈(ciph, ciph′, spk)〉
R =ˆ ν d,m′′. let sig = sign(sskR, penc(xpkR ,m
′′, d)) in a〈(d, sig)〉.c〈sig〉
At the end of the election, the bulletin board is represented by a frame. In our
formalism, we expect the frame to contain the substitution σ which defines the voters’
public credentials as wˆ, the registrars’ public keys as xpkR and xspkR , and talliers’ public key
as xpkT . A tuple yˆ containing triples representing each voter’s ciphertexts and signature
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proofs of knowledge. The mixed re-encryptions of the voter’s ciphertexts zbal,1, . . . , zbal,n,
along with a proof zmixPairPf that the mix was performed correct. For verifiable decryption,
we assume zpartial,i is defined as a partial decryption associated with the proof zpartialPf,i.
For the purposes of eligibility verifiability, we also expect the mixed re-encryptions of
the voter’s public credentials zcred,1, . . . , zcred,1, along with a proof of correctness zmixPf .
For convenience, a reordering z¯cred,1, . . . , z¯cred,n of these re-encryptions is also computed.
Finally, we expect PET proofs zpetPf,1, . . . , zpetPf,n for the re-encryptions of the ciphertext
constructed by the voter on her private credential (that is, the output of the verifiable
mix in Step 8 of the protocol) and the re-encryptions of the voter’s public credential
constructed by the registrars (that is, the output of the mix in Step 9), such that the PET
holds, that is, the pair of ciphertexts contain the same private credential. Accordingly,
given n voters we expect σ to be such that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n we have:
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where ci =ˆ penc(pk(skT ),m, si), c
′
i =ˆ penc(pk(skR),m
′, di), c′′i =ˆ penc(pk(skR),m
′′, di) and
χ, χ′ are permutations on {1, . . . , n}.
3.4.4 Analysis: Election verifiability
We assume record variables r˜ = (rcred, rm, rm′) = rv(R(V )) (corresponding to the variable
xcred and names m, m
′ in the process V ). Accordingly, given m ∈ N we define:
ΦIV =̂ y =E (penc(xpkT , rm, v), penc(xpkR , rm′ , pi1(rcred)),
ballotPf(xpkT , rm, v, xpkR , rm′ , pi1(rcred))) ∧ w = pi2(rcred)
ΦUVm =̂ checkMixPair(zmixPairPf , (pi1(pi1(yˆ)), pi2(pi1(yˆ))), . . . , (pi1(pim(yˆ)), pi2(pim(yˆ))),
zbal,1, . . . , zbal,m) =E true
∧ (dec(zpartial,1, pi1(zbal,1)), . . . , dec(zpartial,m, pi1(zbal,m))) =E vˆ
∧ ∧mi=1 checkPartialPf(xpkT , pi1(zbal,i), zpartial,i, zpartialPf,i) =E true
ΦEVm =̂
∧m
i=1 checkBallot(pi3(pii(yˆ)), pi1(pii(yˆ)), pi2(pii(yˆ))) =E true
∧ checkMixPair(zmixPairPf , (pi1(pi1(yˆ)), pi2(pi1(yˆ))), . . . , (pi1(pim(yˆ)), pi2(pim(yˆ))),
zbal,1, . . . , zbal,m) =E true
∧ ∧mi=1 pet(zpetPf,i, pi2(zbal,i), z¯cred,i) =E true
∧ (zcred,1, . . . , zcred,m) ' (z¯cred,1, . . . , z¯cred,m)
∧ checkMix(zmixPf , getmsg(pi1(wˆ)), . . . , getmsg(pim(wˆ)), zcred,1, . . . , zcred,m) =E true
∧ ∧mi=1 checksign(xspkR , pii(wˆ)) =E true∧m
i=1 pi4(yˆ) =E ∅ ∧ sndm(wˆ) =E ∅ ∧ sndm(yˆ) =E ∅
The test ΦIV checks that the voter’s ballot and public credential are recorded on the
bulletin board. The test ΦUVm checks that the tally is correctly computed; that is, the
mix is checked, the validity of partial decryptions have been verified and the decrypted
tally corresponds to the election outcome. Finally, the test ΦEVm checks that only eligible
ballots are considered; that is, ballots are correctly formed, mixes have been handled in a
suitable manner, PETs have been verified and only authentic public voter credentials are
considered.
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Theorem 3.3. 〈Ajcj, Vjcj〉 satisfies election verifiability.
The proof of Theorem 3.3 is presented in Appendix A.2.
3.5 Summary
This chapter presents a symbolic definition of election verifiability which allows the precise
identification of voting system components that need to be trusted for the purposes of
verifiability. The suitability of systems can then be evaluated and compared on the
basis of trust assumptions. The consideration of eligibility verifiability is of particular
interest, since it provides an essential mechanism for detecting ballot stuffing, although
it is often neglected within the literature and only satisfied by a few protocols. Our
definition of election verifiability has been successfully used to evaluate three electronic
voting protocols, namely: FOO, which uses blind signatures; Helios 2.0, which is based
upon homomorphic encryption; and JCJ-Civitas, which uses mixnets. For each of these
protocols the trust assumptions required for election verifiability are discussed. Helios 2.0
and JCJ-Civitas protocols have been implemented and deployed, therefore demonstrating
the suitability of the framework for analysing real-world election systems.
4
Anonymity in Direct Anonymous Attestation†
Overview. A definition of user-controlled anonymity is introduced in the con-
text of Direct Anonymous Attestation schemes. The definition is expressed as
an equivalence property suited to automated reasoning using ProVerif. The
practicality of the definition is demonstrated by analysing the RSA-based Di-
rect Anonymous Attestation protocol by Brickell, Camenisch & Chen. The
analysis discovers a vulnerability which can be exploited by a passive adver-
sary and, under weaker assumptions, corrupt administrators. A security
fix is identified and the revised scheme is shown to satisfy our definition of
user-controlled anonymity.
Trusted computing allows commodity computers to provide cryptographic assurances
about their behaviour. At the core of the architecture is a hardware device called the
Trusted Platform Module (TPM). The TPM uses shielded memory to store cryptographic
keys, and other sensitive data, which can be used to achieve security objectives. In par-
ticular, the chip can measure and report its state, and authenticate. Cryptographic oper-
ations, by their nature, may reveal a platform’s identity and as a consequence the TPM
threatens privacy. Brickell, Camenisch & Chen [BCC04] have introduced the notion of Di-
rect Anonymous Attestation (DAA) to overcome these privacy concerns. More precisely,
DAA is a remote authentication mechanism for trusted platforms which provides user-
†This chapter is partly based upon [SRC07, DRS08]. A preliminary analysis of the RSA-based DAA
protocol (Section 4.4) – which discovered an attack and presented a fix – originally appeared in [SRC07],
and an initial analysis (Section 4.4.5) of the fixed scheme was considered in [DRS08].
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controlled anonymity and user-controlled traceability. The concept is based upon group
signatures with stronger anonymity guarantees; in particular, the identity of a signer can
never be revealed, but signatures may be linked with the signer’s consent, and signatures
produced by compromised platforms can be identified. A DAA scheme considers a set of
hosts, issuers, TPMs, and verifiers ; the host and TPM together form a trusted platform
or signer. DAA protocols proceed as follows. A host requests membership to a group
provided by an issuer. The issuer authenticates the host as a trusted platform and grants
an attestation identity credential (occasionally abbreviated credential). The host can now
produce signatures using the credential, thereby permitting a verifier to authenticate the
host as a group member and therefore a trusted platform.
Brickell, Chen & Li [BCL08b, BCL09] characterise the following properties for Direct
Anonymous Attestation schemes:
• User-controlled anonymity.
– Privacy. The identity of a signer cannot be revealed from a signature.
– Unlinkability. Signatures cannot be linked without the signer’s consent.
• User-controlled traceability.
– Unforgeability. Signatures cannot be produced without a TPM.
– Basename linkability. Signatures are linkable with the signer’s consent.
• Correctness. Valid signatures can be verified and, where applicable, linked.
The contrasting nature of anonymity and traceability properties aims to provide a balance
between the privacy demands of users and the accountability needs of administrators.
The first concrete Direct Anonymous Attestation scheme was introduced by Brickell,
Camenisch & Chen [BCC04] and is based upon RSA. The RSA-based DAA protocol is
reliant on the strong RSA and decisional Diffie-Hellman assumptions. However, some
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users are uncomfortable with these assumptions. This motivated the work of Brickell,
Chen & Li [BCL08a, BCL09] who provide the first ECC-based DAA protocol using sym-
metric pairing. This scheme is reliant on the LRSW [LRSW00] and decisional Bilinear
Diffie-Hellman assumptions. Moreover, ECC-based schemes are more efficient and there-
fore better suited to devices with limited resources, such as the TPM. Chen, Morrissey
& Smart [CMS08a, CMS08b] extend the scheme based upon symmetric pairing to an
asymmetric setting to improve efficiency; however, Li discovered a vulnerability which
violates user-controlled traceability and Chen & Li propose a fix [CL10]. Chen, Morrissey
& Smart [CMS09] identified further traceability attacks against the asymmetric scheme
and proposed a fix. In addition, Chen, Morrissey & Smart [CMS10] have found trace-
ability attacks against the symmetric pairing based scheme [BCL08a, BCL09] and the
original RSA-based scheme [BCC04]. These attacks allow a malicious host to extract
the TPM’s secret tsk, if the protocol is implemented in hardware without stage control
mechanisms ; the host can then violate user-controlled traceability by forging signatures.
However, since the TPM provides stage control protection, there is no practical threat in
the current setting; but, we should still consider these attacks interesting because it iden-
tifies settings in which DAA protocols cannot be deployed (for example, in other trusted
computing settings which do not use the TPM). We remark that the analysis of user-
controlled traceability of the RSA-based scheme by Backes, Maffei & Unruh [BMU08]
could not identify this attack because they consider a setting where the host and TPM
are both honest. An optimisation of the fixed asymmetric scheme has been proposed by
Chen, Page & Smart [CPS10] and three further ECC-based DAA protocols have been
defined: Chen & Feng [CF08], Brickell & Li [BL09a, BL09b] and Chen [Che10, Che11].
Chapter contribution
A definition of user-controlled anonymity is presented as an equivalence property which
is suited to automated reasoning using ProVerif. Informally, the definition asserts that an
adversary cannot distinguish between signatures produced by two distinct signers, even
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when the adversary controls the issuer and has observed previous signatures produced by
each signer.
The application of the definition is demonstrated by analysing user-controlled anonym-
ity in the RSA-based DAA protocol [BCC04]. Support for the RSA-based scheme is
mandated by the TPM specification version 1.2 [TCG07] which has been defined as an
ISO/IEC international standard [Int09]. Moreover, estimates suggest that the TPM has
been embedded in over 300 million computers [Tru09] (although, some experts claim
only 15 million of these TPMs have been turned on [Mar08, §6]). This demonstrates
the suitability of this framework for analysing schemes which have been deployed in the
real-world.
The analysis of RSA-based DAA discovers a vulnerability in the protocol which allows
an adversary to violate user-controlled anonymity. As a consequence, applications which
use RSA-based DAA as a building block – for example, the peer-to-peer networking scheme
by Balfe, Lakhani & Paterson [BLP05a, BLP05b] and the authentication scheme by Leung
& Mitchell [LM07] – are also flawed. A fix is identified, and the revised RSA-based DAA
protocol is shown to be secure.
Structure of this chapter. Section 4.1 recalls the variant of the applied pi calculus in-
troduced by [Bla04, BAF08]. Section 4.2 defines Direct Anonymous Attestation protocols,
and presents a formalisation in the applied pi calculus. Section 4.3 defines user-controlled
anonymity as an observational equivalence property, and the definition is used in Sec-
tion 4.4 to analyse the RSA-based DAA protocol. Finally, a summary is presented in
Section 4.5.
4.1 Preliminaries: Calculus of ProVerif
The calculus presented here is a combination of the applied pi calculus (Chapter 2) with
one of its dialects [Bla04, BAF08]. This variant is particularly useful due to the automated
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support provided by ProVerif.
4.1.1 Syntax and semantics
The calculus assumes an infinite set of names, an infinite set of variables and a signature Σ
consisting of a finite set of function symbols each with an associated arity. An explicit
distinction is made between constructors (termed functions in Chapter 2) and destructors
within the signature. We write f for a constructor, g for a destructor, and h for either a
constructor or destructor. Terms are built by applying constructors to names, variables
and other terms (Figure 4.1). As usual, the signature Σ is equipped with an equation
theory E.
The semantics of a destructor g of arity l is given by a finite set defΣ(g) of rewrite
rules g(M ′1, . . . ,M
′
l )→M ′, whereM ′1, . . . ,M ′l ,M ′ are terms that contain only constructors
and variables; moreover, the variables of M ′ are bound in M ′1, . . . ,M
′
l , and variables are
subject to renaming. The term g(M1, . . . ,Ml) is defined if and only if there exists a
substitution σ and a rewrite rule g(M ′1, . . . ,M
′
l ) → M ′ in defΣ(g) such that Mi = M ′iσ
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , l}, and in this case g(M1, . . . ,Ml) is defined as M ′σ.
The grammar for processes is presented in Figure 4.1. The process let x = D in P else
Q tries to evaluate D; if this succeeds, then x is bound to the result and P is executed,
otherwise Q is executed. For convenience, the statement let x = D in P else Q may be
abbreviated as let x = D in P when Q is the null process.
The syntax does not include the conditional if M = N then P else Q, but this can be
defined as let x = eq(M,N) in P else Q, where x is a fresh variable and eq is a binary
destructor with the rewrite rule eq(x, x)→ x. We always include this destructor in Σ. In
addition, evaluation contexts forbid holes under the scope of a term evaluation. The rest
of the syntax is standard (see Chapter 2 and [Bla04, BAF08]). The bracketing conventions
defined in Section 2.1 will be adopted with an additional assumption that the expression
P | Q | R is bracketed as P | (Q | R). Although (P | Q) | R ≡ P | (Q | R), this
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convention simplifies our compiler design in Chapter 5.
The rules of Figure 4.2 axiomatise the reduction relation for processes (→Σ), thus
defining the operational semantics of our calculus. Auxiliary rules define term evaluation
(⇓Σ) and the structural congruence relation (≡). Both ≡ and →Σ are defined only on
closed processes. We write →∗Σ for the reflexive and transitive closure of →Σ, and →∗Σ≡
for its union with ≡. When Σ is clear from the context, we abbreviate →Σ and ⇓Σ to →
and ⇓, respectively.
4.1.2 Biprocesses
The calculus provides a notation for modelling pairs of processes that have the same
structure and differ only by the terms and term evaluations that they contain. We call such
a pair of processes a biprocess. The grammar for the calculus is a simple extension of the
grammar of Figure 4.1, with additional cases so that diff[M,M ′] is a term and diff[D,D′]
is a term evaluation. The semantics for biprocesses include the rules in Figure 4.2, except
for (Red I/O), (Red Fun 1), and (Red Fun 2) which are revised in Figure 4.3. We
also extend the definition of contexts to permit the use of diff, and sometimes refer to
contexts without diff as plain contexts.
Given a biprocess P , we define two processes fst(P ) and snd(P ), as follows: fst(P ) is
obtained by replacing all occurrences of diff[M,M ′] with M and diff[D,D′] with D in P ;
and similarly, snd(P ) is obtained by replacing diff[M,M ′] with M ′ and diff[D,D′] with
D′ in P . We define fst(D), fst(M), snd(D), and snd(M) similarly.
4.1.3 Observational equivalence
Intuitively, processes P and Q are said to be observationally equivalent if they can output
on the same channels, no matter what context they are placed inside. Formally, we write
P ↓M when P can send a message on M , that is, when P ≡ C[M ′〈N〉.R] for some
evaluation context C[ ] such that fn(C)∩ fn(M) = ∅ and Σ `M = M ′. The definition of
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Figure 4.1 Syntax for terms and processes
M,N ::= terms
a, b, c, . . . , k, . . . ,m, n, . . . , s name
x, y, z variable
f(M1, . . . ,Ml) constructor application
D ::= term evaluations
M term
eval h(D1, . . . , Dl) function evaluation
P,Q,R ::= processes
0 null process
P | Q parallel composition
!P replication
ν a.P name restriction
M(x).P message input
M〈N〉.P message output
let x = D in P else Q term evaluation
Figure 4.2 Semantics for terms and processes
M ⇓M
eval h(D1, . . . , Dn)⇓Nσ
if h(N1, . . . , Nn)→ N ∈ defΣ(h),
and σ is such that for all i, Di ⇓Mi and Σ `Mi = Niσ
P | 0 ≡ P
P | Q ≡ Q | P
(P | Q) | R ≡ P | (Q | R)
ν a.ν b.P ≡ ν b.ν a.P
ν a.(P | Q) ≡ P | ν a.Q
if a /∈ fn(P )
P ≡ P
Q ≡ P ⇒ P ≡ Q
P ≡ Q, Q ≡ R ⇒ P ≡ R
P ≡ Q ⇒ P | R ≡ Q | R
P ≡ Q ⇒ ν a.P ≡ ν a.Q
N〈M〉.Q | N ′(x).P → Q | P{M/x} (Red I/O)
if Σ ` N = N ′
let x = D in P else Q→ P{M/x} (Red Fun 1)
if D ⇓M
let x = D in P else Q→ Q (Red Fun 2)
if there is no M such that D ⇓M
!P → P | !P (Red Repl)
P → Q ⇒ P | R → Q | R (Red Par)
P → Q ⇒ ν a.P → ν a.Q (Red Res)
P ′ ≡ P, P → Q, Q ≡ Q′ ⇒ P ′ → Q′ (Red ≡)
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Figure 4.3 Generalised semantics for biprocesses
N〈M〉.Q | N ′(x).P → Q | P{M/x} (Red I/O)
if Σ ` fst(N) = fst(N ′) and Σ ` snd(N) = snd(N ′)
let x = D in P else Q→ P{diff[M1,M2]/x} (Red Fun 1)
if fst(D)⇓M1 and snd(D)⇓M2
let x = D in P else Q→ Q (Red Fun 2)
if there is no M1 such that fst(D)⇓M1 and
there is no M2 such that snd(D)⇓M2
observational equivalence [Bla04, BAF08] can now be recalled as follows.
Definition 4.1 (Observational equivalence). Observational equivalence ∼ is the largest
symmetric relation R between closed processes such that P R Q implies:
1. if P ↓M , then Q ↓M ;
2. if P → P ′, then Q→ Q′ and P ′ R Q′ for some Q′;
3. C[P ] R C[Q] for all evaluation contexts C[ ].
We define observational equivalence as a property of biprocesses.
Definition 4.2. The closed biprocess P satisfies observational equivalence if fst(P ) ∼
snd(P ).
It follows from the semantics of biprocess that if P −→ Q for some biprocesses P,Q,
then fst(P ) −→ fst(Q) and snd(P ) −→ snd(Q). However, reductions in fst(P ) or snd(P ) do
not necessarily imply biprocess reductions in P ; that is, there exist biprocesses P such
that fst(P ) −→ fst(Q), but there is no such reduction P −→ Q, and symmetrically for
snd(P ). For example, consider the biprocess P = diff[a, c]〈n〉 | a(x), we have fst(P ) −→ 0,
but there is no reduction P −→ 0. Blanchet, Abadi & Fournet [Bla04, BAF08] have shown
that a biprocess P satisfies observational equivalence when reductions in fst(P ) or snd(P )
imply reductions in P . This proof technique is formalised using the notion of uniformity.
Definition 4.3 (Uniform). A biprocess P is uniform if for all processes Q1 such that
fst(P ) −→ Q1, then P −→ Q for some biprocess Q, where fst(Q) ≡ Q1, and symmetrically
for snd(P ) −→ Q2.
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Definition 4.4 (Strong uniformity). A closed biprocess P satisfies strong uniformity if
for all plain evaluation contexts C and biprocesses Q such that C[P ] −→∗≡ Q, then Q is
uniform.
Theorem 4.1 (Strong uniformity implies equivalence [BAF08]). Given a closed biprocess
P , if P satisfies strong uniformity, then P satisfies observational equivalence.
4.2 Formalising DAA protocols
The concept of Direct Anonymous Attestation was defined by Brickell, Camenisch &
Chen [BCC04], and a historical account of its development is presented in [BCC05]. A
Direct Anonymous Attestation scheme allows remote authentication of trusted platforms,
and comprises of five algorithms, each of which will now be discussed.
Setup. The setup algorithm is primarily used by the issuer to construct a public key pair
skI , pk(skI), and the public part pk(skI) is published. In addition, the setup algorithm
may define implementation specific parameters.
Join. The join algorithm is run between a trusted platform and an issuer for the purpose
of obtaining group membership. The algorithm assumes that the trusted platform and
issuer have established a one-way authenticated channel, that is, the issuer is assured to
be communicating with a host and TPM. The definition of DAA does not mandate a par-
ticular authentication mechanism, although the Trusted Computing Group recommend
encrypting every message sent by the issuer under the TPM’s endorsement key [TCG07].
(Although, as demonstrated by the RSA-based DAA scheme, lighter solutions are possi-
ble.) On successful completion of the join algorithm, the issuer grants the trusted platform
with an attestation identity credential cre based upon a secret tsk known only by the
TPM.
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Sign. The sign algorithm is executed by a trusted platform to produce a signature σ,
based upon an attestation identity credential cre and secret tsk, which asserts group
membership and therefore trusted platform status. The algorithm takes as input a mes-
sage m and a basename bsn (which is used to control linkability between signatures). If
bsn = ⊥, then signatures should be unlinkable; otherwise, signatures produced by the
same signer and based upon the same basename can be linked.
Verify. The verification algorithm is used by a verifier to check the validity of a sig-
nature. The algorithm takes as input a set of secret keys ROGUEtsk, which are known
to have been successfully extracted from compromised TPMs (see Tarnovsky [Tar10] for
further details on key extraction), allowing the identification of rogue platforms. The
methodology used to build ROGUEtsk is not defined by DAA.
Link. The link algorithm is used by a verifier to check if two valid signatures σ, σ′ are
linked, that is, signed using the same basename bsn and secret tsk.
The inputs and outputs of these algorithms are explicitly summarised in Table 4.1.
Linkability in DAA protocols. The ability to link signatures, without revealing the
identity of the signer, is a particularly interesting aspect of DAA schemes and the degrees
of linkability are identified below, with reference to an application domain in which several
verifiers offer multiple services and signers must consent to linkability.
1. Single-service linkability. A verifier offering a single service is able to link multiple
transactions with the same signer.
2. Cross-service linkability. A verifier offering multiple services which share the same
basename is able to link transactions with the same signer over multiple services.
3. Cross-verifier linkability. Multiple verifiers offering services which share the same
basename are able to link transactions with the same signer across all services.
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The classifications of linkability all assume the existence of a single issuer. Cross issuer
linkability, that is, linkability between signatures produced in different groups (under
different issuers), is not expressly forbidden by Direct Anonymous Attestation; however,
the schemes considered in this thesis do not provide this property because the secret
tsk is partly derived from the issuer’s public key. Moreover, the game-based security
definition [BCL08b, BCL09] does not consider this case.
4.2.1 DAA process specification
This chapter considers user-controlled anonymity, which is dependent on a trusted plat-
form’s behaviour, that is, the join and sign algorithms. Formally, these algorithms are
captured by a Direct Anonymous Attestation process specification (Definition 4.5). Since
our focus is on automated reasoning, we will adopt the calculus of ProVerif (Section 4.1).
Definition 4.5 (Direct Anonymous Attestation process specification). A Direct Anony-
mous Attestation process specification is a tuple of processes 〈Join, Sign〉.
The signer (or trusted platform) is able to execute arbitrarily many instances of the
join, and sign, algorithms, to become a member of a group and subsequently produce
signatures as a group member. This behaviour is captured by the Signer process modelled
below. The join and sign algorithms are modelled by the processes Join and Sign, which are
expected to behave like services; that is, they can be called by, and return results to, the
Signer process. The communication between the Signer and Join/Sign processes is achieved




s. In essence, the private channel
communication models the internal bus used by computer systems for communication
between the host and TPM.
This chapter focuses on user-controlled anonymity and hence it is sufficient to assume
the processes Join and Sign are initiated by input on channels aj and as; and similarly,
output results on channels a′j and a
′
s. Intuitively, it follows that some processes not sat-
isfying these conditions will satisfy our definition of user-controlled anonymity. In fact,
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the Direct Anonymous Attestation process specification 〈0, 0〉 will satisfy our definition.
We tolerate this limitations here, and in future work we will consider a complete defini-
tion of the DAA properties, including correctness and user-controlled traceability. The
correctness property will exclude degenerate process specifications such as 〈0, 0〉. Simi-
lar considerations are made in the literature, for example, in definitions of vote privacy
for electronic voting [KR05, DKR06, DKR09, DKR10b] and privacy for vehicular ad-hoc
networks [DDS10].




s . ( (!Join) | (!Sign) | (ν cnt.ν DAASeed.ν skM .c〈pk(skM)〉.
!c(wparams).aj〈(wparams, DAASeed, cnt, skM )〉.a′j(x).
let xcre = pi1(x) in let xtsk = pi2(x) in (
!c(y).let ybsn = pi1(y) in let ymsg = pi2(y) in
as〈(wparams, ybsn, ymsg, xcre, xtsk)〉.a′s(z).c〈z〉
)
))
The process Signer instantiates arbitrarily many instances of the Join and Sign processes.
The restricted channel names aj, a
′
j are introduced to ensure communication between the
Signer and Join processes is private; similarly, names as, a
′
s ensure private communication
between the Signer and Sign processes. The bound name cnt is a counter value selected by
the host. The bound name DAASeed represents the TPM’s internal secret and skM repre-
sents the TPM’s endorsement key (these values are defined during manufacture [TCG07]).
The public part of the endorsement key is published by the Signer process. The remainder
of the Signer process models a signer’s ability to execute arbitrarily many instances of the
join and sign algorithms. The Signer process must first input system parameters wparams,
provided by the issuer. The Join process is assumed to act like a service and listens for
input on channel aj. It follows, that the Signer process can invoke the service by message
output aj〈(wparams, DAASeed, cnt, wek)〉, where (wparams, DAASeed, cnt, wek) models the join
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algorithm’s parameters. The Join process is assumed to output results on channel a′j, and
this response can be received by the Signer process using message input a′j(x); the result
is bound to the variable x, and is expected to consist of a pair (xcre, xtsk) represent-
ing the attestation identity credential and TPM’s secret. The interaction between the
Sign and Signer processes is similar. The Signer process first inputs a variable y which
is expected to be a pair representing the verifier’s basename ybsn and a message ymsg.
The invocation of the sign algorithm by the signer is modelled by the message output
as〈(wparams, ybsn, ymsg, xcre, xtsk)〉, where (wparams, ybsn, ymsg, xcre, xtsk) represents the algo-
rithm’s parameters. The sign algorithm is expected to output a signature which can be
sent to a verifier, in the Signer process this signature is received from the Sign process by
message input a′s(z) and the variable z representing the signature is immediately output.
4.3 Security definition: User-controlled anonymity
Informally, the notion of user-controlled anonymity asserts that given two honest signers
A and B, an adversary cannot distinguish between a situation in which A signs a message,
from another one in which B signs a message. Based upon Brickell, Chen & Li [BCL08b,
BCL09] we present the following security definition.
Initial: The adversary constructs the public key pair skI , pk(skI) and publishes the pub-
lic part pk(skI) for the signers. The adversary also publishes any additional parameters.
Phase 1: The adversary makes the following requests to signers A and B:
• Join. The signer executes the join algorithm to create cre and tsk. The adversary,
as the issuer, learns cre but typically not tsk.
• Sign. The adversary submits a basename bsn and a message m. The signer runs
the sign algorithm and returns the signature to the adversary.
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At the end of phase 1, both signers are required to have run the join algorithm at least
once.
Phase 2 (Challenge): The adversary submits a message m and a basename bsn to the
signers, with the restriction that the basename has not been previously used if bsn 6= ⊥.
Each signer produces a signature on the message and returns it to the adversary.
Phase 3: The adversary continues to probe the signers with join and sign requests, but
is explicitly forbidden to use the basename used in phase 2 if bsn 6= ⊥.
Result: The protocol satisfies user-controlled anonymity if the adversary cannot distin-
guish between the two signatures output during the challenge.
Formally, this definition can be modelled as an observational equivalence (Definition 4.6),
which is suitable for automated reasoning, based upon the augmented Direct Anonymous
Attestation biprocess DAA expressed in Figure 4.4. As observed by Rudolph [Rud07],
and as specified by Brickell, Chen & Li [BCL08b, BCL09], user-controlled anonymity can
only be expected if both signers use pk(skI) for the issuer (that is, the signers do not
accept two distinct keys from the issuer). This is captured by the biprocess DAA by
providing the same parameters wparams to both signers. The Challenge process is designed
to capture the behaviour of the signers in phase 2. This is achieved by outputting an
attestation identity credential xcre and a secret xtsk, produced by the signers in phase
1, on the private channels bA, bB in Signer
+, and inputting these values in the Challenge
process. The Challenge process then continues by producing a signature in the standard
manner, but uses diff[xcre, ycre] and diff[xtsk, ytsk] to ensure that the signature is produced
by A on the left hand side and B on the right hand side. Finally, the necessity for a
distinct basename in phase 2 (when bsn 6= ⊥) is enforced by prefixing the basename used
by Challenge with chl− and, similarly, prefixing the basenames used by Signer+ with chl+.
The definition of user-controlled anonymity follows naturally.
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Figure 4.4 Biprocess modelling user-controlled anonymity in DAA
Given a Direct Anonymous Attestation process specification 〈Join, Sign〉, the augmented
Direct Anonymous Attestation biprocess DAA is defined as
ν bA.ν bB.c(wparams) . (Challenge | Signer+{bA/wb} | Signer+{bB/wb})
such that bA, bB 6∈ (fn(Sign) ∪ fv(Sign) ∪ fn(Join) ∪ fv(Join)) and where




s.( (!Join) | (!Sign) | (ν cnt.ν DAASeed.ν skM .c〈pk(skM)〉
!aj〈(wparams, DAASeed, cnt, skM )〉.a′j(x).
let xcre = pi1(x) in let xtsk = pi2(x) in (
!c(y).let ybsn = pi1(y) in let ymsg = pi2(y) in
if ybsn =⊥ then
as〈(wparams, ybsn, ymsg, xcre, xtsk)〉.a′s(z).c〈z〉
else





Challenge = ν as.ν a
′
s . ( (Sign) | (
bA(x).let xcre = pi1(x) in let xtsk = pi2(x) in
bB(y).let ycre = pi1(y) in let ytsk = pi2(y) in
c(z).let zbsn = pi1(z) in let zmsg = pi2(z) in
if zbsn =⊥ then
as〈(wparams, zbsn, zmsg, diff[xcre, ycre], diff[xtsk, ytsk])〉.a′s(z).c〈z〉
else
as〈(wparams, (chl−, zbsn), zmsg, diff[xcre, ycre], diff[xtsk, ytsk])〉.a′s(z).c〈z〉
))
for some constants chl+, chl−.
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Definition 4.6 (User-controlled anonymity). Given a Direct Anonymous Attestation pro-
cess specification 〈Join, Sign〉, user-controlled anonymity is satisfied if the augmented Di-
rect Anonymous Attestation biprocess DAA satisfies observational equivalence.
The definition has been used to analyse user-controlled anonymity in RSA-based DAA.
4.4 Case study: RSA-based DAA
The first concrete Direct Anonymous Attestation scheme was introduced by Brickell,
Camenisch & Chen [BCC04] and is based on RSA.
4.4.1 Primitives and building blocks
We first recall the details of Camenisch-Lysyanskaya (CL) signatures [CL03, Lys02], which
form the foundations of RSA-based DAA, and introduce some notational conventions.
Signature scheme. A CL signature is denoted clsign(xsk, xprime, xrand, xmsg), where xsk is
the secret key, xprime is a random prime, xrand is a nonce, and xmsg is a message. The prime
and nonce components can be derived from a signature. Verification is standard given a
signature, message, and public key, that is, checkclsign(pk(xsk), xmsg, clsign(xsk, xprime, xrand,
xmsg)) = accept.
Signature scheme for committed values. The scheme supports signatures on com-
mitted values. Given the public part of a signing key pk(xsk), a message xcsk, and com-
mitment factor xcf , the committed value is U = clcommit(pk(xsk), xcf , xcsk) and the asso-
ciated signature is clsign(xsk, yprime, yrand, U) for some prime yprime and random yrand. This
signature can be opened to recover σ = clopen(pk(xsk), xcf , clsign(xsk, yprime, yrand, U)) =
clsign(xsk, yprime, yrand ◦ xcf , xcsk), that is, the signature on xcsk. (A proof should also be
provided to demonstrate that σ does not contain a covert channel – such details will be
omitted from the model presented here – see Appendix B for further details.)
82 CHAPTER 4. ANONYMITY IN DIRECT ANONYMOUS ATTESTATION
Notation for primitives that prove knowledge. Various primitives which prove
knowledge of, and relations among, discrete logarithms are used by CL signatures and
RSA-based DAA. These primitives will be described using the notation introduced by
Camenisch & Stadler [CS97a]. For instance,
PK{(α, β) : N = commit(α,Z) ∧ U = clcommit(pk(skI), α, β)}
denotes a “zero-knowledge Proof of Knowledge of α, β such that N = commit(α,Z) and
U = clcommit(pk(skI), α, β) holds.” In the example, the Greek letters in parentheses are
used for values about which knowledge is being proved and these values are kept secret
by the prover. All other values, that is, those from the Latin alphabet, are known to
the verifier. The Fiat-Shamir heuristic [FS87, PS96] allows an interactive zero-knowledge
scheme to be converted into a signature scheme. A signature acquired in this way is
termed a Signature Proof of Knowledge and is denoted, for example, as SPK{(α) : N =
commit(α,Z)}(m), where m is a message.
Proving knowledge of a signature. The signature scheme for committed values can
be used to build an anonymous credential system. Given a signature σ = clsign(xsk, xprime,
xrand, xcsk) and commitment factor xcf , an anonymous credential σˆ = clcommit(pk(xsk), xcf ,
σ). The zero-knowledge proof of knowledge
PK{(xcsk, xcf) : checkclsign(pk(xsk), xcsk, clopen(pk(xsk), xcf , σˆ)) = accept}
can then be used to demonstrate that the anonymous credential σˆ is indeed a commitment
to a signature on the message xcsk using commitment factor xcf .
The application of these primitives to construct the RSA-based DAA protocol will be
considered in the next section.
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4.4.2 Protocol description
For the purpose of studying user-controlled anonymity, it is sufficient to consider the join
and sign algorithms. Given system parameters pk(skI), bsnI (that is, the issuer’s public
key and basename), the TPM’s secret DAASeed, a counter value cnt, and the TPM’s
endorsement key; the join algorithm (Figure 4.5) proceeds as follows:
Figure 4.5 RSA-based DAA join algorithm
Trusted platform Issuer
Trusted platform publishes pk(skM)
Issuer publishes pk(skI) and bsnI
tsk = hash(hash(DAASeed, hash(pk(skI))), cnt, 0)
Generate v′
ζI = hash(0, bsnI)
NI = commit(tsk, ζI)
U = clcommit(pk(skI), v
′, tsk)
NI , U .
Generate n, ne
E = penc(pk(skM), n, ne)
/ E





nt, SPK{(tsk, v′) : NI = commit(tsk, ζI) ∧




/ clsign(skI , e, v
′′, U)
1. The host computes ζI = hash(0, bsnI) and inputs the value to the TPM. The TPM
computes secret tsk = hash(hash(DAASeed, hash(pk(skI))), cnt, 0) and derives the
commitment NI = commit(tsk, ζI). The TPM also generates a blinding factor v
′,
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which is used to compute the commitment U = clcommit(pk(skI), v
′, tsk). The
trusted platform sends U,NI to the issuer.
2. The issuer generates a nonce ne and sends the encrypted nonce to the TPM. The
TPM decrypts the ciphertext to recover ne, computes aU = hash(U, ne) and sends
aU to the issuer, therefore authenticating as a trusted platform. (Note that the
protocol does not rely on the authentication technique recommended by the Trusted
Computing Group.)
3. The trusted platform generates a signature proof of knowledge that the messages
U,NI are correctly formed and sends it to the issuer.
4. The issuer verifies the proof and generates a signature clsign(skI , e, v
′′, U). The
signature is sent to the trusted platform.
5. The trusted platform verifies the signature and opens it to reveal the credential
cre = clsign(skI , e, v
′ ◦ v′′, tsk), that is, the TPM’s secret tsk signed by the issuer.
The join algorithm outputs cre, tsk; which can be provided as input, along with the
system parameters, a basename bsn, and message m, to the sign algorithm. The sign
algorithm proceeds as follows.
5. If bsn = ⊥, the host generates a nonce ζ; otherwise, the host computes ζ =
hash(0, bsn). The host provides the TPM with ζ. The TPM computes the com-
mitment NV = commit(tsk, ζ) and generates the anonymous credential ĉre =
clcommit(pk(skI), w, cre) using a nonce w. The trusted platform then produces
a signature proof of knowledge that ĉre is a commitment to a valid credential, and
that NV is correctly formed.
The sign algorithm outputs the signature proof of knowledge which is sent to the verifier.
Intuitively, if a verifier is presented with such a proof, then the verifier is convinced that
it is communicating with a trusted platform.
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4.4.3 Equational theory
The signature is defined below
Σ = {accept,⊥, 0, 1,Fjoin,Fsign, clgetnonce, clgetprime, hash, pk, commit, ◦,
dec, open, checkclsign, checkspk, clcommit, clopen, penc, spk, clsign}
Functions accept, ⊥, 0, 1, Fjoin, Fsign are constant symbols; clgetnonce, clgetprime, hash,
pk are unary functions; commit, ◦, dec, open are binary functions; checkclsign, checkspk,
clcommit, clopen, penc, spk are ternary functions; and clsign is a function of arity four.
Since hash is defined as a unary function, we occasionally write hash(xplain,1, . . . , xplain,n)
to denote hash((xplain,1, . . . , xplain,n)). The equations associated with these functions are
defined below.
dec(xsk, penc(pk(xsk), xrand, xplain)) = xplain
clgetprime(clsign(xsk, xprime, xrand, xmsg)) = xprime
clgetnonce(clsign(xsk, xprime, xrand, xmsg)) = xrand
checkclsign(pk(xsk), xmsg, clsign(xsk, xprime, xrand, xmsg)) = accept
open(xrand, commit(xrand, xplain)) = xplain
clopen(x, xrand, clcommit(x, xrand, xplain)) = xplain
clopen(pk(xsk), xrand, clsign(xsk, yprime, yrand, clcommit(pk(xsk), xrand, xmsg)))
= clsign(xsk, yprime, yrand ◦ xrand, xmsg)
A signature proof of knowledge is encoded in the form spk(F,U, V ), where F is a constant
declaring the particular proof in use, U denotes the witness (or private component) of a
signature of knowledge, and V defines the public parameters and message being signed.
The function checkspk is used to verify a signature and we define the following equations.
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checkspk(Fjoin, V, spk(Fjoin, (xtsk, xcf), V )) = accept
where V = (xζI , xpk, commit(xtsk, xζI), clcommit(xpk, xcf , xtsk), xmsg)
checkspk(Fsign, V, spk(Fsign, (xtsk, xcf), V )) = accept
where V = (xζ , pk(xsk), commit(xtsk, xζ),
clcommit(pk(xsk), xcf , clsign(xsk, xprime, xrand, xtsk)), xmsg)
The first equation is used to verify the signature proof of knowledge produced by the
trusted platform during the join algorithm and the second is used by a trusted platform
during the sign algorithm to assert group membership.
4.4.4 Model in applied pi
The RSA-based DAA process specification is presented in Definition 4.7. For convenience
we abbreviate c(x).let x1 = pi1(x) in . . . let xn = pin(x) in P as c(x1, . . . , xn).P . The
join process JoinRSA is instantiated by inputting the join algorithm’s parameters: the
RSA-based DAA system parameters wparams; the TPM’s internal secret wDAASeed; the
counter value wcnt chosen by the host; and the TPM’s endorsement key wek. The system
parameters wparams are expected to be a pair containing the issuer’s public key wpk and
basename wbsnI . The process constructs the terms NI , U in accordance with the protocol’s
description (Section 4.4.2) and outputs the values to the issuer. The process then receives
a ciphertext x, which it decrypts, and outputs the hash of the plaintext paired with
U . A nonce y is then input and a signature proof of knowledge is produced. Finally,
the process inputs a signature z on the commitment U and concludes by outputting the
attestation identity credential cre and TPM’s secret tsk on the private channel a′j; that
is, the JoinRSA process returns the values cre, tsk to the Signer
+ process. The sign
process SignRSA is instantiated by inputting the sign algorithm’s parameters: the RSA-
based DAA system parameters wparams; the verifier’s basename wbsn; the message wmsg
to be signed; the attestation identity credential wcre; and the TPM’s secret wtsk. The
process recovers the issuer’s public key wpk from the system parameters, and inputs a
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Definition 4.7. The DAA process specification 〈JoinRSA, SignRSA〉 is defined where
JoinRSA =ˆ aj(wparams, wDAASeed, wcnt, wek) . ν v
′ .
let wpk = pi1(wparams) in let wbsnI = pi2(wparams) in
let ζI = hash(0, wbsnI) in
let tsk = hash(hash(wDAASeed, hash(wpk)), wcnt, 0) in
let NI = commit(tsk, ζI) in
let U = clcommit(wpk, v
′, tsk) in
c〈(NI , U )〉 . c(x) . c〈hash(U, dec(wek, x))〉 . c(y) . ν nt .
c〈(nt, spk(Fjoin, (tsk, v′), (ζI , wpk, NI , U, (nt, y))))〉 . c(z)
let cre = clopen(wpk, v
′, z) in
if checkclsign(wpk, tsk, cre) = accept then
a′j〈(cre, tsk)〉
SignRSA =ˆ as(wparams, wbsn, wmsg, wcre, wtsk) . let wpk = pi1(wparams) in
c(x) . ν nt . ν w .
if wbsn =⊥ then
ν ζ .
let ĉre = clcommit(wpk, w, wcre) in
let NV = commit(wtsk, ζ) in
let spk = spk(Fsign, (wtsk, w), (ζ, wpk, NV , ĉre, (nt, x, wmsg))) in
a′s〈(ζ, wpk, NV , ĉre, nt, spk)〉
else
let ζ = hash(0, wbsn) in
let ĉre = clcommit(wpk, w, wcre) in
let NV = commit(wtsk, ζ) in
let spk = spk(Fsign, (wtsk, w), (ζ, wpk, NV , ĉre, (nt, x, wmsg))) in
a′s〈(ζ, wpk, NV , ĉre, nt, spk)〉
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nonce x from the verifier. The if-then-else branch models the signer’s ability to produce
either linkable or unlinkable signatures, based upon the parameter wbsn; in particular, the
if-branch produces an unlinkable signature, whereas the else-branch produces a linkable
signature. The process concludes by outputting a signature on the private channel a′s;
that is, the SignRSA process returns the signature to the Signer
+ process.
4.4.5 Analysis: Violating user-controlled anonymity
The Direct Anonymous Attestation process specification 〈JoinRSA, SignRSA〉 does not sat-
isfy user-controlled anonymity (Theorem 4.2). This is due to a vulnerability which can
be exploited by the following adversaries to violate privacy.
1. Passive adversary. A passive adversary can violate privacy under the assumptions:
a) the identity of a trusted platform can be observed during the join algorithm1; b)
there exists a basename which is shared between an issuer and a verifier; and c) a
signer is willing to accept the same basename from an issuer and verifier. The attack
proceeds as follows. We have bsnI = bsn, and since the signer is willing to accept
the same basename as input to both the sign and join algorithms we have ζI = ζ,
hence NI = NV . Since the NI , NV values are unique for a particular signer and the
adversary knows the identity of the trusted platform that produced NI during the
join algorithm; it follows that the signer’s identity can be revealed.
2. Corrupt administrators. Corrupt administrators can violate privacy under the as-
sumption that a signer is willing to accept the same basename from an issuer and
verifier. An issuer and verifier can conspire to use the same basename (that is,
bsnI = bsn) and since the issuer knows the identity of the trusted platform that
produced NI , the identity of the signer can be revealed.
1The RSA-based DAA protocol [BCC04] does not explicitly specify how the issuer learns a trusted
platform’s public endorsement key during an execution of the join algorithm. However, it seems reasonable
to assume that the public key would be sent as plaintext. By contrast, Cesena et al. [CLR+10, Ces10]
define an extension of RSA-based DAA which uses TLS to hide the affiliation between groups and trusted
platforms; this variant would thwart a passive adversary, but not corrupt administrators.
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The linchpin of these attacks is the willingness of a signer to accept the same basename
from an issuer and verifier. This can be justified as follows. Firstly, this mode of operation
is not explicitly forbidden by the protocol definition [BCC04]. Secondly, this behaviour is
expected when the issuer and verifier are the same entity, as demonstrated, for example,
by Camenisch et al. [CL01, CH02] in the idemix system. Finally, the signer has insufficient
resources to handle such a duty.
Theorem 4.2. The RSA-based Direct Anonymous Attestation process specification
〈JoinRSA, SignRSA〉 does not satisfy user-controlled anonymity.
Formally, Theorem 4.2 can be proved by presenting a context C[ ] such that
fst(C[DAARSA]) −→∗ Q and Q can output on some channel M , but there is no reduc-
tion snd(C[DAARSA]) −→∗ Q′ such that Q′ can output on M , where both reductions are of
the same length and DAARSA is the augmented Direct Anonymous Attestation biprocess
derived from 〈JoinRSA, SignRSA〉. Such a context is presented in Appendix C.1. In addi-
tion to the formal result (Theorem 4.2), a real-world attack is demonstrated against the
RSA-based Direct Anonymous Attestation protocol [BCC04] in Appendix B.3.
4.4.6 Solution: Restoring user-controlled anonymity
The protocol can be fixed by refining the definition of ζ; the revised RSA-based Di-
rect Anonymous Attestation process specification 〈JoinRSA′ , SignRSA′〉 is the same as the
original, with ζ redefined as ζ = hash(1, bsn). The attacks presented are no longer pos-
sible, regardless of whether bsnI = bsn. Furthermore, the revised RSA-based Direct
Anonymous Attestation process specification 〈JoinRSA′ , SignRSA′〉 satisfies user-controlled
anonymity; this can be automatically verified using ProVerif (see Appendix C.2). A fix
for the concrete scheme [BCC04] is presented in Appendix B.4.
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4.5 Summary
This chapter presents a definition of user-controlled anonymity for Direct Anonymous
Attestation protocols. The definition is expressed as an equivalence property suitable for
automated reasoning. The practicality of the approach is demonstrated by evaluating
the RSA-based Direct Anonymous Attestation protocol. This scheme is particularly sig-
nificant because support is mandated by the TPM specification version 1.2, which has
been implemented and deployed in over 300 million computers. The analysis discovers a
vulnerability which can be exploited by a passive adversary and, under weaker assump-
tions, by corrupt administrators. A security fix is identified and the revised protocol is
shown to satisfy user-controlled anonymity. The fix only affects the host’s part of the
protocol and therefore no hardware changes to the TPM are required. Furthermore, this
research appears to have influenced the design of subsequent Direct Anonymous Attesta-




The lack of formal security analysis prior to system deployment
can be partially attributed to the absence of suitable tools.




Observational equivalence and barriers†
Overview. A procedure for the automated analysis of observational equiv-
alence is delivered. In addition, the notion of barrier synchronisation is
characterised for processes. The study of barrier synchronisation in relation
to equivalence is particularly interesting because certain equivalence proper-
ties can only be realised under specific synchronisation assumptions. In par-
ticular, privacy preserving protocols – including electronic voting schemes,
vehicular ad-hoc networking protocols, and anonymity networks – make such
assumptions. The results have been implemented in the tool ProSwapper, an
extension to ProVerif, and the applicability of this research is demonstrated
by analysing vote privacy in electronic voting protocols and privacy in vehic-
ular ad-hoc networks.
Blanchet, Abadi & Fournet [Bla04, BAF08] focus on equivalences P ∼ Q in which pro-
cesses P and Q share the same structure and differ only in the choice of terms. Their
work introduces the notion of strong uniformity (see Section 4.1), a sufficient condition for
observational equivalence, that has been implemented in ProVerif, an automatic analysis
tool for protocols written in the applied pi calculus. Strong uniformity is a sufficient con-
dition for observational equivalence, but it is not necessary. This precludes the automated
analysis of certain equivalence properties, as a simple example will demonstrate.
†This chapter is partly based upon [DRS08] which introduces the fundamental notion of swapping at
synchronisation points and considered a preliminary analysis of privacy in FOO. The software associated
with this chapter is available online: http://www.bensmyth.com/proswapper.php.
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Example 5.1. The biprocess P = c〈diff[m,n]〉 | c〈diff[n,m]〉 is observationally equivalent
because fst(P ) ≡ snd(P ). However, the plain evaluation context
C[ ] = | c(x).let y = eq(x,m) in 0 else 0
is such that C[P ] −→ Q, where Q = c〈diff[n,m]〉 | let y = eq(diff[m,n],m) in 0 else 0 and
fst(Q) −→ c〈n〉; but, there is no biprocess R such that Q −→ R and fst(R) ≡ c〈n〉, because
fst(eq(diff[m,n],m)) ⇓ m, but there is no term M2 such that snd(eq(diff[m,n],m)) ⇓
M2. It follows immediately that P does not satisfy Definition 4.4, that is, it cannot be
shown to satisfy observational equivalence using Theorem 4.1. Similarly, the biprocess
(if a = diff[a, c] then c〈c〉 else 0) | (if b = diff[c, b] then c〈c〉 else 0) satisfies observational
equivalence but does not satisfy strong uniformity.
Barrier synchronisation [Bro86, HFM88, AJ89, Lub90] is a concept to coordinate the
actions performed by concurrently executing processes. More precisely, the mechanism
ensures that a process will block, when a barrier is encountered, until all other processes
executing in parallel reach this barrier. Capturing such synchronisation is an important
building block for protocol analysis because certain security properties can only be re-
alised if processes synchronise their actions in a specific manner. For example, privacy
preserving protocols typically require the existence of at least two honest participants
that synchronise prior to performing critical actions. This particular prerequisite can
be observed in domains including: electronic voting [DKR09, BHM08], vehicular ad-hoc
networks [DDS10], and anonymity networks [RR98, PK01, Cho06].
Resolving the difficulties apparent in Example 5.1 is relatively straightforward: the
biprocess P ′ = c〈diff[m,m]〉 | c〈diff[n, n]〉 can trivially be shown to satisfy observational
equivalence using strong uniformity as a proof technique, and since fst(P ) ≡ fst(P ′) and
snd(P ) ≡ snd(P ′), it follows that P satisfies observational equivalence because observa-
tional equivalence is closed under structural equivalence. However, this technique cannot
be applied to more complicated examples in which barriers occur.
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Example 5.2. Consider the biprocess
P = c〈m〉.1:: c〈diff[m,n]〉 | 1:: c〈diff[n,m]〉
in which 1:: represents a barrier synchronisation. Intuitively, there is no structurally
equivalent biprocess P ′ satisfying strong uniformity, but nevertheless, barrier synchro-
nisation ensures indistinguishability between fst(P ) and snd(P ). (This example will be
elaborated upon once we formalise barrier synchronisation.)
This chapter introduces a strictly weaker notion of uniformity which can be used to
automatically reason with observational equivalence between processes containing barri-
ers.
Chapter contribution
The contribution of this chapter is threefold. Firstly, the process syntax (Section 4.1)
is extended to capture barriers and it is shown how the semantic behaviour of barriers
can be encoded in the standard ProVerif model. Although the formalisation of barriers is
only an encoding, it considerably simplifies the modelling process and, moreover, forms
the foundation for our automated analysis technique.
Secondly, a methodology for automatic analysis of equivalence properties is developed,
based upon [Bla04, BAF08]. This approach avoids the limitations of [Bla04, BAF08]
by swapping data at synchronisation points. For example, in Example 5.2 swapping
data between the two sides of the parallel composition is permitted at synchronisa-
tion; in essence, it is therefore sufficient to prove the equivalence of the biprocess P ′ =
c〈m〉.1:: .c〈diff[m,m]〉 | 1:: c〈diff[n, n]〉, which is trivially true because fst(P ′) = snd(P ′).
Finally, automated support is provided by defining a static compiler which encodes
barrier synchronisation and swapping using private channel communication. The compiler
is designed to compute an approximation of a process’s observable behaviour, and hence,
if ProVerif can show observational equivalence between a pair of compiled processes, then
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the original pair of processes satisfies observational equivalence. The compiler has been
implemented as a tool called ProSwapper. Furthermore, the analysis of vote privacy in
electronic voting protocols and privacy in vehicular ad-hoc networks demonstrate the
applicability of this work.
Chapter limitations. Proving soundness of the proof technique is ongoing work. Al-
though some confidence may be provided by the tool’s adoption within the research com-
munity (for example, [BHM08, DDS10]), this is no substitute for a thorough proof.
Structure of this chapter. Section 5.1 extends the process syntax of Section 4.1 to
capture barrier synchronisation and provides mechanical reasoning techniques for such
processes. Section 5.2 defines a methodology for automatic analysis of equivalence prop-
erties. In Section 5.3 the applicability of this work is demonstrated by presenting an
automated analysis of privacy in the electronic voting protocol FOO and in Appendix E
privacy in vehicular ad-hoc networks is considered; the technique’s adoption by the re-
search community will also be discussed. Finally, a summary is presented in Section 5.4.
5.1 Processes with barriers
A notion of synchronisation, called stages, has previously been studied in the applied
pi calculus by Blanchet, Abadi & Fournet [BAF08, §8]; however, stages are insufficient
for our purposes. In the spirit of [BAF08, §8], we proceed by allowing processes to
be annotated with barriers. Barriers are written t:: and may appear before a process
P , where t ∈ N. Intuitively, t::P blocks P until all processes running in parallel are
ready to synchronise at barrier t. For example, the process 1:: c〈k〉.2:: c〈m〉 | 2:: c〈n〉 can
only output n after synchronisation at barrier t = 2. It follows that the process cannot
output n without having previously output k; this is in direct contrast with [BAF08,
§8], which permits the output of n without having previously observed an output of k.
Formally, the number of barriers which must be reached is computed statically, in advance
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of execution, and thus branching behaviour may cause blocking. For example, the process
c(x).if x = k then 1:: c〈m〉 else c〈n〉 | 1:: c〈s〉 may evolve to c〈n〉 | 1:: c〈s〉 which can never
output s because synchronisation at barrier t = 1 requires two processes to synchronise.
Barriers are assumed to be ordered; that is, given t::P the process P also blocks if there
are any barriers t′ such that t′ < t. In addition, the occurrence of barriers under replication
is explicitly forbidden; this restriction is made for technical convenience, although the loss
of generality is minimal, since such a process would deadlock.
5.1.1 Mechanical analysis
Processes containing barriers are not supported by ProVerif. Accordingly, we define a
compiler which takes processes with barriers as input and returns processes defined over
the standard ProVerif syntax. Although our characterisation of barriers is just an en-
coding, we find it useful in practice and, moreover, the compiler forms the basis of the
methodology for automatic analysis which will be introduced in Section 5.2.
The barrier elimination function (Definition 5.1) takes processes containing barriers
and replaces each barrier with a message output followed by a message input1. By ensuring
that the communication channels are fresh private names and through the introduction
of a synchronisation process, the semantics of barriers can be captured in the standard
ProVerif model.
1The use of two distinct channel names for the input and output channels is not strictly necessary;
however, it aids automation. In particular, it helps avoid a ProVerif incompleteness issue that arises
because there is no distinction between messages input and messages output on a particular channel.
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Definition 5.1 (Barrier elimination function). The barrier elimination function δ maps
an infinite sequence of channel names a and a process P to another process, the function
is recursively defined as follows:
δ(c, 0) = 0
δ(c, !Q) = !Q
δ(c, ν n.Q) = ν n.δ(c, Q)
δ(c, M(x).Q) = M(x).δ(c, Q)
δ(c, M〈N〉.Q) = M〈N〉.δ(c, Q)
δ(c, t::Q) = a′〈a′〉.a′′(y).δ(tail(tail(c)), Q)
where a′ = head(c), a′′ = head(tail(c)) and y 6∈ fv(Q)
δ(c, let x = D in Q else R) = let x = D in δ(odd(c), Q) else δ(even(c), R)
δ(c, Q | R) = δ(odd(c), Q) | δ(even(c), R)
Intuitively, processes which synchronise at a particular barrier all output a message
on a private channel and these messages are received by the synchronisation process; once
all messages have been sent/received, the synchronisation process sends replies to each
of the processes and hence processes may proceed. For example, in the case where there
are n processes containing a barrier t, the synchronisation process will receive precisely
n inputs and will then send exactly n responses; prior to the responses being sent, the
processes are awaiting input on a private channel and hence block. The application of the
barrier elimination function will be demonstrated in Example 5.3; first, we study how to
control the synchronisation. To ensure that the correct pair of channel names are used
for synchronisation we first define the function ω which captures the set of channel names
introduced for synchronisation (Definition 5.2).
The functions ω, δ are logically similar and separation has only been introduced for
readability. The function ω builds a set of triples (t, a′, a′′), where t ∈ N represents
a barrier synchronisation and a′ (respectively a′′) are the output (respectively input)
channels used by δ for synchronisation at barrier t.
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Definition 5.2 (Synchronisation channels). Given a process P and an infinite sequence
of channel names a, the set of synchronisation channels is ω(a, P ), where:
ω(c, 0) = ∅
ω(c, !Q) = ∅
ω(c, ν n.Q) = ω(c, Q)
ω(c, M(x).Q) = ω(c, Q)
ω(c, M〈N〉.Q) = ω(c, Q)
ω(c, t::Q) = {(t, a′, a′′)} ∪ ω(tail(tail(c)), Q)
where a′ = head(c) and a′′ = head(tail(c))
ω(c, let x = D in Q else R) = ω(odd(c), Q) ∪ ω(even(c), R)
ω(c, Q | R) = ω(odd(c), Q) ∪ ω(even(c), R)
We introduce communication processes, defined by the grammar R ::=  | u(x) |
u〈M〉 | R.R′, such that .R = R. We omit R in u(x).R and u〈M〉.R when it is . Given
communication processes, synchronisation is controlled by a synchronisation process.
Definition 5.3 (Synchronisation process). Given a process P and an infinite sequence of
channel names a, the synchronisation process is χ(a, P ) = χˆ(0, , ω(a, P )), where for
all integers t, communication processes R and sets of triples S, we have:
χˆ(t, R, S) =

R.0 if S = ∅
a′(x).χˆ(t, R.a′′〈x〉, S\{(t, a′, a′′)}) if (t, a′, a′′) ∈ S
where x is a fresh variable
R.χˆ(t+ 1, , S) otherwise
Although communication processes are not standard processes (that is, defined by the
grammar in Figure 4.1), the function χ always returns a standard process; this process is
intended to control synchronisation of a process P in which barriers have been eliminated.
100 CHAPTER 5. OBSERVATIONAL EQUIVALENCE AND BARRIERS
Accordingly, χˆ is parametrised with S = ω(a, P ), that is, the set of triples (t, a′, a′′) defin-
ing the input and output channels used by δ to eliminate barriers. For each barrier t, an
input a′(x) is appended to the output, and the function is recursively called with R.a′′〈x〉
and S\{(t, a′, a′′)}. Once all barriers under a particular barrier t have been exhausted, the
process R is appended to the output and the barriers under the next barrier t+1 are pro-
cessed. It follows, for example, given n processes in parallel all containing a barrier t (and
no other barriers), that the synchronisation process is a1(x1). . . . .an(xn).b1〈x1〉. . . . .bn〈xn〉
for some channel names a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bn and variables x1, . . . , xn. A more complex
example will be considered in Example 5.3.
Finally, a process defined in the standard ProVerif language can be derived using our
compiler (Definition 5.4) and ProVerif can then be used to automatically reason with
processes containing barriers.
Definition 5.4 (Synchrony compiler). The synchrony compiler ∆ maps a process P to
another process, as follows: ∆(P ) = ν a˜.(δ(a, P ) | χ(a, P )), where a is an infinite sequence
of distinct channel names such that a ∩ (fn(P ) ∪ bn(P )) = ∅ and a˜ = fn(δ(a, P )) ∩ a.
The application of our compiler is demonstrated in Example 5.3.
Example 5.3. Consider the process 1:: c〈k〉.2:: c〈m〉 | 2:: c〈n〉 | 3:: c〈s〉 and let a =
(a1, a2, . . . ). We have:
δ(a, P ) = δ((a1, a3, . . . ), 1:: c〈k〉.2:: c〈m〉) | δ((a2, a4, . . . ), 2:: c〈n〉 | 3:: c〈s〉)
= a1〈a1〉.a3(x).δ((a5, a7, . . . ), c〈k〉.2:: c〈m〉) |
δ((a2, a6, . . . ), 2:: c〈n〉) | δ((a4, a8, . . . ), 3:: c〈s〉)
= a1〈a1〉.a3(x).c〈k〉.δ((a5, a7, . . . ), 2:: c〈m〉) |
a2〈a2〉.a6(y).δ((a10, a14, . . . ), c〈n〉) | a4〈a4〉.a8(z).δ((a12, a16, . . . ), c〈s〉)
= a1〈a1〉.a3(x).c〈k〉.a5〈a5〉.a7(x′).δ((a9, a11, . . . ), c〈m〉) |
a2〈a2〉.a6(y).c〈n〉 | a4〈a4〉.a8(z).c〈s〉
= a1〈a1〉.a3(x).c〈k〉.a5〈a5〉.a7(x′).c〈m〉 | a2〈a2〉.a6(y).c〈n〉 | a4〈a4〉.a8(z).c〈s〉
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ω(a, P ) = ω((a1, a3, . . . ), 1:: c〈k〉.2:: c〈m〉) ∪ ω((a2, a4, . . . ), 2:: c〈n〉 | 3:: c〈s〉)
= {(1, a1, a3)} ∪ ω((a5, a7, . . . ), c〈k〉.2:: c〈m〉) ∪
ω((a2, a6, . . . ), 2:: c〈n〉) ∪ ω((a4, a8, . . . ), 3:: c〈s〉)
= {(1, a1, a3), (2, a2, a6), (3, a4, a8)} ∪ ω((a5, a7, . . . ), 2:: c〈m〉) ∪
ω((a10, a14, . . . ), c〈n〉) ∪ ω((a12, a16, . . . ), c〈s〉)
= {(1, a1, a3), (2, a5, a7), (2, a2, a6), (3, a4, a8)} ∪ ω((a9, a11, . . . ), c〈m〉)
= {(1, a1, a3), (2, a5, a7), (2, a2, a6), (3, a4, a8)}
χ(a, P ) = χˆ(1, , {(1, a1, a3), (2, a5, a7), (2, a2, a6), (3, a4, a8)})
= a1(x).χˆ(1, a3〈x〉, {(2, a5, a7), (2, a2, a6), (3, a4, a8)})
= a1(x).a3〈x〉.χˆ(2, , {(2, a5, a7), (2, a2, a6), (3, a4, a8)})
= a1(x).a3〈x〉.a5(x′).χˆ(2, a7〈x′〉, {(2, a2, a6), (3, a4, a8)})
= a1(x).a3〈x〉.a5(x′).a2(y).χˆ(2, a7〈x′〉.a6〈y〉, {(3, a4, a8)})
= a1(x).a3〈x〉.a5(x′).a2(y).a7〈x′〉.a6〈y〉.χˆ(3, , {(3, a4, a8)})
= a1(x).a3〈x〉.a5(x′).a2(y).a7〈x′〉.a6〈y〉.a4(z).χˆ(3, a8〈z〉, ∅)
= a1(x).a3〈x〉.a5(x′).a2(y).a7〈x′〉.a6〈y〉.a4(z).a8〈z〉
Observe a∩ (fn(P )∪ bn(P )) = ∅, a˜ = a1, . . . , a8 and hence it follows that ∆(P ) is defined
as the process:
ν a˜.(a1〈a1〉.a3(x).c〈k〉.a5〈a5〉.a7(x′).c〈m〉 | a2〈a2〉.a6(y).c〈n〉 | a4〈a4〉.a8(z).c〈s〉 |
a1(x).a3〈x〉.a5(x′).a2(y).a7〈x′〉.a6〈y〉.a4(z).a8〈z〉)
By inspection we can observe that the process enforces the expected behaviour; that is, the
name k must be output before m, n and s. This can be witnessed by annotating the process
with events and analysing using ProVerif (see Appendix D).
We will now revisit Example 5.2 to show why uniformity is an insufficient proof tech-
nique to prove observational equivalence of certain biprocesses containing barriers.
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Example 5.4. Recall the biprocess P = c〈m〉.1:: c〈diff[m,n]〉 | 1:: c〈diff[n,m]〉 from Ex-
ample 5.2. The process ∆(P ) is uniform, but ∆(P ) −→∗ Q where Q = c〈diff[m,n]〉 |
c〈diff[n,m]〉, and Q is not uniform.
The next section introduces a methodology to overcome this limitation of uniformity as
a proof technique for observational equivalence.
5.2 Automated reasoning for equivalence
In this section, the compiler (Section 5.1) is extended to overcome the limitations of strong
uniformity as a proof technique. This can be achieved in a static manner by swapping
data between processes which share the same structure, as will now be demonstrated.
Example 5.5. Recall the biprocess P = c〈diff[m,n]〉 | c〈diff[n,m]〉 from Example 5.1 and
observe that P = Rσ | Rτ , where R = c〈x〉, σ = {diff[m,n]/x} and τ = {diff[n,m]/x}.
By extending diff to substitutions, the process Q = R diff[σ, τ ] | R diff[τ, σ] is such that
fst(P ) ≡ fst(Q) and snd(P ) ≡ snd(Q); that is, the biprocess Q preserves the underlying
structure of P . It follows immediately that fst(P ) ∼ fst(Q) and snd(P ) ∼ snd(Q). Fur-
thermore, Q satisfies strong uniformity and hence P satisfies observational equivalence by
transitivity.
This approach can be generalised to swapping data between sub-processes which share
the same structure under the same barrier, since the semantics of barriers provide certain
guarantees about dynamic process behaviour.
Example 5.6. Recall the biprocess P = c〈m〉.1:: c〈diff[m,n]〉 | 1:: c〈diff[n,m]〉 from Ex-
ample 5.2. Intuitively, P can only reduce to R = 1:: c〈diff[m,n]〉 | 1:: c〈diff[n,m]〉 in one
step. Now consider the biprocess Q = c〈m〉.1:: c〈diff[m,m]〉 | 1:: c〈diff[n, n]〉 which is ob-
tained from P by swapping the second components of the diff operator. It follows that
fst(∆(P )) ∼ fst(∆(Q)) and snd(∆(P )) ∼ snd(∆(Q)). Now since ∆(Q) trivially satisfies
strong uniformity, ∆(P ) satisfies observational equivalence by transitivity.
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These examples intuitively demonstrate the notion of swapping, and, moreover, its appli-
cation for automatically proving observational equivalence. The remainder of this section
will formalise swapping as an extension to our compiler.
The revised barrier elimination function permits the possibility of swapping during
synchronisation. In particular, at the start of each barrier synchronisation, all free names
and variables under that barrier (in our formalism this will include those names and vari-
ables bound previously) are output and a possibly distinct set of names and variables
are subsequently input. This behaviour is fully captured by renaming the names and
variables under that barrier in accordance with the binder used for the aforementioned
input (Definition 5.5). By ensuring that swapping occurs in a suitable manner, an ap-
proximation of a process’s observational behaviour can be derived; this will be achieved
by the introduction of a swapping process. Before presenting the formal definition of our
revised barrier elimination function δ′, we provide an intuitive example of how δ′ works
without swapping.
Example 5.7. Recall the process ∆(P ) from Example 5.3, where P = 1:: c〈k〉.2:: c〈m〉 |
2:: c〈n〉 | 3:: c〈s〉. Let a = (a1, a2, . . . ) and consider the process Q = ν a1, . . . , a8.(δ′(a, P ) |
χ(a, P )). We have δ′(a, P ) defined as follows:
a1〈(c, k,m)〉.a3(x).pi1(x)〈pi2(x)〉.a5〈(pi1(x), pi3(x))〉.a7(x′).pi1(x′)〈pi2(x′)〉 |
a2〈(c, n)〉.a6(y).pi1(y)〈pi2(y)〉 | a4〈(c, s)〉.a8(z).pi1(z)〈pi2(z)〉
In this instance, observe ∆(P ) ∼ Q, which can be witnessed using ProVerif (see Ap-
pendix D).
Definition 5.5 (Barrier elimination function with swapping). The barrier elimination
function with swapping δ′ maps an infinite sequence of channel names a and a process P
to another process, as follows, δ′(a, P ) = δˆ′(a, τ, P ) for the substitution τ = {} (that is,
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the empty substitution), where:
δˆ′(c, σ, 0) = 0
δˆ′(c, σ, !Q) = !Qσ
δˆ′(c, σ, ν n.Q) = ν n.δˆ′(c, {z/u | {z/u} ∈ σ and u 6= n}, Q)
δˆ′(c, σ, M(x).Q) = Mσ(x).δˆ′(c, {z/u | {z/u} ∈ σ and u 6= x}, Q)
δˆ′(c, σ, M〈N〉.Q) = M〈N〉σ.δˆ′(c, σ, Q)
δˆ′(c, σ, t::Q) = a′〈(u1, . . . , ul)σ〉.a′′(y).δˆ′(tail(tail(c)), τ, Q)
where a′ = head(c), a′′ = head(tail(c)) and
τ = {pi1(y)/u1, . . . , pil(y)/ul} for some names
and variables u1, . . . , ul, y such that
fn(Q) ∪ fv(Q) = u1, . . . , ul and y 6∈ fv(Q)
δˆ′(c, σ, let x = D in Q else R) = let x = Dσ in δˆ′(odd(c), τ, Q)
else δˆ′(even(c), σ, R)
where τ = {z/u | {z/u} ∈ σ and u 6= x}
δˆ′(c, σ, Q | R) = δˆ′(odd(c), σ, Q) | δˆ′(even(c), σ, R)
By definition of the barrier elimination function, at the start of each barrier synchro-
nisation a process outputs all of the free names and variables under that barrier. The
synchronisation process (Definition 5.3) would simply return these values, as demonstrated
in Example 5.7. Intuitively, however, it is possible to swap values between sub-processes
which share the same structure under a particular barrier. Since this preserves the un-
derlying structure of the biprocesses, it is useful for proofs of observational equivalence.
In order to track which processes may swap data, the function ω is modified:
ω(c, t::Q) = {(t, a′, a′′, δˆ′(cˆ, σ, Q))} ∪ ω(cˆ, Q)
where a′ = head(c), a′′ = head(tail(c)), cˆ = tail(tail(c)) and σ = {pi1(y)/u1, . . . , pil(y)/ul} for
some names and variables u1, . . . , ul, y such that fn(Q)∪ fv(Q) = u1, . . . , ul and y 6∈ fv(Q).
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For simplicity, this definition, and Definition 5.5, assume there is exactly one tuple of
names and variables u1, . . . , ul, y such that fn(Q)∪ fv(Q) = u1, . . . , ul and y 6∈ fv(Q); that
is, the same names and variables are used by the functions ω and δ′.
The swapping process (Definition 5.6) is similar to the synchronisation process, but
considers all possible swapping strategies in addition to synchronisation. In particular, the
function χ¯ is introduced for this purpose. More precisely, sub-processes under a particular
barrier are permitted to swap if they are syntactically equal. The consideration of the
bijection f ∈ F ensures all swapping strategies are considered.
Definition 5.6 (Swapping process). Given a process P and an infinite sequence of channel
names a, the set of swapping processes is χ′(a, P ) = χˆ′(1, , , ω(a, P )), where for all
integers t, communication processes R, R′ and sets S, we have:
χˆ′(t, R, R′, S) =

{R.R′.0} if S = ∅
χ¯(t, R, R′, S, Q) if (t, a, b, Q) ∈ S
χˆ′(t+ 1, R.R′, , S) otherwise
such that χ¯(t, R,R′, S,Q) is defined as
⋃
f∈F
χˆ′(t, R.a1(y1). · · · .an(yn), R′.b1〈diff[y1, yf(1)]〉. · · · .bn〈diff[yf(n), yn]〉,
S\{(t, a1, b1, Q), . . . , (t, an, bn, Q)})
where (t, a1, b1, Q), . . . , (t, an, bn, Q) ∈ S, F is the set of bijections on {1, . . . , n}, and
variables y1, . . . , yn are fresh.
Correctness of barrier ordering follows as before, and moreover, the notion of swapping is
intuitively sound because it occurs between syntactically equal processes.
Finally, a set of processes in the standard ProVerif language, which consider all possible
swapping strategies, can be derived.
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Definition 5.7 (Swapping compiler). The swapping compiler ∆′ maps a process P to
a set of process, as follows: ∆′(P ) = {ν a˜.(δ′(a, P ) | R) | R ∈ χ′(a, P )}, where a is
an infinite sequence of distinct channel names such that a ∩ (fn(P ) ∪ bn(P )) = ∅ and
a˜ = fn(δ′(a, P )) ∩ a.
Intuitively, if there exists a swapping strategy such that the compiled process satisfies ob-
servational equivalence, then the original process satisfies observational equivalence. The
application of Definition 5.7 is demonstrated by Example 5.8 and has been implemented
as a tool called ProSwapper [KSR10].
Example 5.8. Recall the process P = c〈m〉.1:: c〈diff[m,n]〉 | 1:: c〈diff[n,m]〉 from Exam-
ple 5.2 and assume a = (a1, a2, . . . ). We have:
δ′(a, P ) = c〈m〉.a1〈(c,m, n))〉.a3(x).pi1(x)〈diff[pi2(x), pi3(x)]〉 |
a2〈(c, n,m)〉.a4(x).pi1(x)〈diff[pi2(x), pi3(x)]〉
ω(a, P ) = {(1, a1, a3, pi1(x)〈diff[pi2(x), pi3(x)]〉), (1, a2, a4, pi1(x)〈diff[pi2(x), pi3(x)]〉)}
χ′(a, P ) = {a1(y).a2(z).a3〈diff[y, y]〉.a4〈diff[z, z]〉,
a1(y).a2(z).a3〈diff[y, z]〉.a4〈diff[z, y]〉}
By Definition 5.7 we derive the set of processes which represent all possible swapping
strategies:
{ν a1, a2, a3, a4.(δ′(a, P ) | a1(y).a2(z).a3〈diff[y, y]〉.a4〈diff[z, z]〉),
ν a1, a2, a3, a4.(δ
′(a, P ) | a1(y).a2(z).a3〈diff[y, z]〉.a4〈diff[z, y]〉)}
and since the latter process satisfies strong uniformity (see Appendix E), we believe the
process ∆(P ) satisfies observational equivalence. (Note that, in order to express results
about P , rather than ∆(P ), a formal semantics for barriers must be considered; for further
discussion, see Section 6.1.)
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5.3 Privacy in electronic voting
This section will demonstrate the suitability of the methodology for analysing vote pri-
vacy in electronic voting protocols. In particular, an automated analysis of vote privacy
in the electronic voting protocol by Fujioka, Okamoto & Ohta [FOO92] is presented.
Moreover, the generality of our approach has been demonstrated by Backes, Hrit¸cu &
Maffei [BHM08] who prove a stronger property – namely, coercion resistance – of the
protocol by Juels, Catalano & Jakobsson [JCJ02, JCJ05, JCJ10] which has been imple-
mented by Clarkson, Chong & Myers [CCM08, CCM07] as Civitas. Our technique has
also been adopted by Dahl, Delaune & Steel [DDS10] to analyse privacy in vehicular
ad-hoc networks. (Note that Dahl, Delaune & Steel use an earlier version [DRS08] of
this work, and Backes, Hrit¸cu & Maffei make use of the fundamental principles, possibly
based upon preliminary results presented at Dagstul [Smy07].) In Appendix E, the model
of privacy in vehicular ad-hoc networks [DDS10] is revisited and automatically analysed
using ProSwapper.)
5.3.1 Case study: FOO
The FOO protocol, by Fujioka, Okamoto & Ohta [FOO92], is a seminal work based
upon blind signatures. Delaune, Kremer & Ryan [KR05, DKR06, DKR09, DKR10b]
have studied the protocol and present a hand-based proof of vote privacy, and Chothia
et al. [COPD07] provide an automated analysis using µCRL. We will use the results
of Section 5.2 to present an automated analysis; although this result is not new, it is
useful to demonstrate our technique. The protocol description and equational theory
were presented in Section 3.2.2 and we proceed immediately to an applied pi model of the
voter process.
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Model in applied pi
The formal specification of the voter process in FOO (Definition 5.8) follows immediately
from our protocol description (Section 3.2.2). Observe that phases of the protocol are
seperated within the voting process using barriers. We do not assert the secrecy of voters’
keys and, accordingly, they can be modelled as free names. Of course, these keys are
required to be secret for other properties. It follows that the process Pfoo{s1/xvote, sk1/xsk} |
· · · | Pfoo{sn/xvote, skn/xsk} models an election with n voters casting votes s1, . . . , sn.
Definition 5.8. The process Pfoo modelling a voter in FOO is defined as follows
Pfoo = ν k.ν k
′.
let M = commit(k, xvote) in
let Mˆ = blind(k′,M) in
c〈(pk(xsk), sign(xsk, Mˆ))〉.c(y).
if checksign(pk(skR), y) = true then
if getmsg(y) = Mˆ then
let M ′ = unblind(k′, y) in
1:: c〈(M,M ′)〉.2:: c(z).
if (pi2(z), pi3(z)) = (M,M
′) then
c〈(pi1(z), k)〉
where xsk is variable referring to the voter’s signing key and xvote is a variable referring
to voter’s vote.
Analysis: Vote privacy
Consider two voters A, B and two candidates s, s′. Based upon [KR05, DKR06, DKR09,
DKR10b], we formalise vote privacy for two voters with the assertion that an adversary
cannot distinguish between a situation in which voter A votes for candidate s and voter
B votes for candidate s′, from another one in which A votes s′ and B votes s. Formally,
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this is written as the equivalence:
Pfoo{skA/xsk, s/xvote} | Pfoo{skB/xsk, s′/xvote} ∼ Pfoo{skA/xsk, s′/xvote} | Pfoo{skB/xsk, s/xvote}
which can be checked using the methodology introduced. To provide further insight into
how the swapping compiler works, let us consider how to informally prove this equiva-
lence. Let us call the left hand side Lhs, and the right hand side Rhs. By definition of
equivalence we must show that the Lhs is indistinguishable from the Rhs. Indeed, as the
Lhs evolves, the corresponding evolution of the Rhs is the one that mimics A moves on
the Lhs with A moves on the Rhs, and B moves on the Lhs with B moves on the Rhs,
up to the first barrier. After the first synchronisation, A moves on the Lhs are mimicked
by B moves on the Rhs, and B moves on the Lhs are mimicked by A moves on the Rhs.
The reason for the ‘swap’ in mimicking is to ensure that no context can distinguish the
actions performed. Before the synchronisation, the output data produced by A on both
the Lhs and the Rhs are indistinguishable (and similarly for B); observe that on the Lhs
the output by A reveals
(pk(skA), sign(skA, blind(k
′
a, commit(ka, s))), blind(k
′
a, commit(ka, s)))




′))), blind(k′a, commit(ka, s
′)))
where names ka, k
′
a are under restriction in both the Lhs and the Rhs. (Note that
indistinguishability between the Lhs and the Rhs is due to the properties of blinding.)
After the first and second synchronisation, A will reveal
(sign(skR, commit(ka, s)), commit(ka, s)) and (`, ka)
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on the Lhs and
(sign(skR, commit(ka, s
′)), commit(ka, s′)) and (`, ka)
on the Rhs, where ` is chosen by the adversarial environment; that is, A reveals her vote
s on the Lhs and her vote s′ on the Rhs (similarly, B will reveal s′ on the Lhs and s
on the Rhs). Hence, after the first synchronisation the actions mimicked are swapped.
The compiler manages the swapping, and hence ProSwapper can be used to automatically
analyse privacy in FOO (see Appendix E).
5.4 Summary
This chapter extends the process syntax of ProVerif to include barriers, for the purpose
of synchronisation, and defines an automated methodology for proving equivalence. The
result has been implemented as ProSwapper and the suitability of the tool is demon-
strated by analysing vote privacy in the FOO electronic voting protocol. Furthermore,
the fundamental principles of our methodology have been adopted by the wider research
community: Dahl, Delaune & Steel [DDS10] use an preliminary version of this chap-
ter (formally presented in [DRS08]) to analyse privacy in vehicular ad-hoc networks, and
Backes, Hrit¸cu & Maffei [BHM08] use the basic concept (presumably based upon [Smy07])





Further work and conclusion
In this thesis, we advance the capabilities of the formal verification community by defining
symbolic definitions of security properties (Part II) and developing procedures for evalua-
tion of security properties (Part III). The key contributions are:
• A definition of election verifiability for electronic voting protocols.
• A definition of user-controlled anonymity for Direct Anonymous Attestation schemes.
• An automated analysis technique for observational equivalence.
This final chapter presents future work and a further appraisal of results.
6.1 Further work
We begin by discussing possible future research directions arising from Chapters 3–5 and
identifying open questions that have emerged from this thesis.
6.1.1 Election verifiability in electronic voting
The definition of election verifiability includes three aspects: individual, universal and
eligibility verifiability. The conditions which these properties must satisfy are believed to
be necessary, but may not be sufficient. Ultimately, a verifiable election should convince
the most sceptic of voters and/or election observers that votes have been recorded, tallied
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and declared correctly. Establishing whether voting protocols which satisfy our definition,
are also considered to achieve this objective, remains an open research problem.
The definition of election verifiability is based upon earlier work [SRKK10] in which
automated reasoning was considered. Extending Chapter 3 to include an automated
procedure for evaluating election verifiability would appear to be a logical step; however,
this has been precluded by the lack of efficient tools for evaluating our definition in the
general case. In particular, the tests must be embedded within processes (cf. [SRKK10,
§4]) and parametrised by an arbitrary number of voters, but such parametrisation is not
currently supported by ProVerif. Providing automated tool support for processes which
require parametrisation is further work and, moreover, such a tool would be useful for
analysing security properties in a variety of cryptographic protocols.
The study of election verifiability identified eligibility verifiability – a property that
has been largely neglected by the literature and is only satisfied by a few protocols –
as a mechanism to detect ballot stuffing. As an alternative to eligibility verifiability,
some electronic voting protocols provide a weaker notion of eligibility – which cannot be
checked by voters or observers – under various trust assumptions. For example, such an
eligibility property may assert that if the election officials follow the protocol, then each
ballot published on the bulletin board was cast by a registered voter and at most one
ballot is tallied per voter. Indeed, this assumption was thought to be reasonable in the
presidential election at the Catholic University of Louvain which used Helios. However,
similar assumptions must not be made about national elections. Accordingly, the study
of electronic voting protocols which simultaneously satisfy election verifiability and other
desirable properties, such as privacy and usability, remains an open problem.
6.1.2 Anonymity in Direct Anonymous Attestation
Direct Anonymous Attestation is a relatively new concept and its properties merit further
study. In particular, user-controlled traceability and correctness have received limited at-
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tention. Furthermore, new properties (for example, non-frameability [Che10, Che11]) are
emerging. Extending this work to include a complete definition of DAA properties would
be an interesting direction for future research. Moreover, establishing a unified defini-
tion which includes all properties (that is, correctness, non-frameability, user-controlled
anonymity and user-controlled traceability) would be of interest to reduce the verification
workload. As a starting point, this could be achieved by suitably developing the notion of
a Direct Anonymous Attestation process specification to distinguish between operations
performed by the host and those performed by the TPM. This distinction is not necessary
for our definition of user-controlled anonymity because this property can only be achieved
if both the host and TPM are trusted. By contrast, a corrupt host – even in collabora-
tion with a corrupt TPM (where the TPM is known to be rogue) – should not be able
to violate traceability properties and therefore an alternative process specification, which
distinguishes between actions performed by the host and TPM, would be required.
For user-controlled anonymity it is necessary to ensure a distinct basename is used
during phase 2 (when bsn 6=⊥). Since the applied pi calculus does not record state, this
is achieved by an abstraction. Proving that this abstraction does not lose generality is an
open problem. In addition, a stateful variant of the applied pi calculus would be useful.
The study of user-controlled anonymity in Direct Anonymous Attestation schemes is
particular interesting due to the real-world deployment of the TPM. However, verification
of cryptographic protocols does not ensure their secure deployment because vulnerabil-
ities may be introduced during implementation [GLP05, BFGT06, BFGT08, APW09].
Automatically deriving models from implementations and verifying security properties
using ProVerif has been considered [BFGT06, BFGT08, BFGS08] and verified reference
implementations have been introduced to aid the development of secure systems [BFG06,
BCFZ08, MGR09]. In the context of DAA, automatically verifying implementations (for
example, [Smy06, SS08, SGPV09, CPS10]) and developing a secure reference implemen-
tation remains as future work.
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6.1.3 Observational equivalence and barriers
Evaluating whether the synchronous compiler (Definition 5.4) enforces the informally
discussed semantic behaviour of barrier synchronisation is difficult to establish due to
the complexity of definition. In this instance, it would be more suitable to formally
define the semantics in the calculus of ProVerif and prove that the synchronous compiler
encodes an approximation of the desired observational behaviour. Moreover, by extending
the definition of observational equivalence to consider barriers, stronger results could be
stated; that is, results could be stated about P rather than ∆(P ) (see, for example,
Examples 5.6 & 5.8 and Section 5.3.1).
Proving soundness of the proof technique is ongoing work. At a high level it would
be sufficient to show that for all biprocesses P , if there exists Q ∈ ∆′(P ) such that Q
satisfies strong uniformity, then ∆(P ) satisfies observational equivalence. Accordingly,
it would be sufficient to prove that for all biprocesses P , we have for all Q ∈ ∆′(P ),
that fst(∆(P )) ∼ fst(Q) and snd(∆(P )) ∼ snd(Q). (As previously stated, the formal
semantics of barriers are not defined and thus we cannot state observational equivalence
results involving processes with barriers; that is, we must rely upon the synchronous
compiler.)
The definition of labelled bisimilarity [AF01, §4.3], which complements observational
equivalence (Definition 2.1), has proven to be useful for handwritten proofs of equivalence.
A similar notion to complement Definition 4.1 may be useful to prove observational equiva-
lence in cases where automated reasoning is not possible. Furthermore, general procedures
which consider arbitrary processes (rather than biprocesses) could be sought.
6.1.4 Emerging directions
The formalisation of user-controlled anonymity in Direct Anonymous Attestation (Chap-
ter 4) is similar, but distinct, from the formalisation of privacy in electronic voting (Sec-
tion 5.3) and vehicular ad-hoc networks (Appendix E.2). In electronic voting, vote privacy
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for two voters A, B is formalised as the indistinguishability between a situation in which
voter A votes for candidate s and voter B votes for candidate s′, from another in which
A votes s′ and B votes s. Using terminology from our formalisation of user-controlled
anonymity, this essentially corresponds to two voters participating in the challenge phase.
By comparison, in DAA we consider a single signer during the challenge phase. It is nec-
essary to consider two voters for vote privacy because the election outcome will be made
public and this would represent an observable distinction if only a single voter partici-
pated in the challenge, that is, we can distinguish between an election outcome of s and
s′. Establishing a generic class of definitions suitable for analysing privacy in a variety of
settings would be desirable to obviate the need for numerous protocol dependent privacy
definitions (for example, [KR05, Cho06, BHM08, DKR09, ACRR10, BCH10, DDS10]).
Moreover, such a framework would allow the relative degrees of privacy to be studied.
6.2 Conclusion
This thesis will aid the secure design of cryptographic protocols and facilitate the eval-
uation of existing schemes by advancing formal method verification techniques. Our
definition of election verifiability has been shown to be suitable for the analysis of a wide
range of electronic voting protocols and its future application will allow the thorough
analysis of schemes prior to deployment, thereby helping ensure integral elections. The
study of user-controlled anonymity in RSA-based Direct Anonymous Attestation discov-
ered a vulnerability and established a fix which potentially avoided violations of privacy
for TPM users. Our definition of user-controlled anonymity will also facilitate the anal-
ysis of future DAA schemes, helping prevent privacy invasions. Finally, the adoption of
our reasoning technique for observational equivalence, by the research community, gives
us confidence that the methodology is of value and, moreover, can be used to evaluate
numerous security properties including vote privacy and coercion resistance in electronic
voting, and privacy in vehicular ad-hoc networks.






This appendix contains proofs supporting Chapter 3.
A.1 Election verifiability in raising hands
This appendix presents a proof of election verifiability in raising hands (Example 3.1).
The proof illustrates an interesting aspect of our definition: we do not require a voter
to identify her credential, it is sufficient for a voter to identify a credential. If desired, a
stronger definition of election verifiability can be constructed with the additional sound-
ness condition ΦIVi σ ∧ ΦIVi {wˆ′/wˆ}σ ⇒ pii(wˆ)σ ' pii(wˆ′)σ.
A.1.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1
Proof. Suppose m ∈ N and tests ΦIV , ΦUVm , ΦEVm are given as follows:
ΦIV =̂ y =E (pk(r), sign(r, v)) ∧ checksign(xpk, w) =E true





checksign(xpk, pii(wˆ)) =E true ∧ pi1(pii(yˆ)) =E getmsg(pii(wˆ))
∧ checksign(pi1(pii(yˆ)), pi2(pii(yˆ))) =E true
∧ snd(snd(snd(pii(yˆ)))) =E ∅
) ∧ sndm(wˆ) =E ∅ ∧ sndm(yˆ) =E ∅
where r = rv(ΦIV ). We will now show for all names s1, . . . , sn that the conditions of
Definition 3.7 hold.
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(3.1) Suppose C is a context, B is a process, σ is a substitution, n˜ is a tuple of names and i, j are
integers where C[VP+n (s1, . . . , sn)] (→∗ α−→→∗)∗ B, ϕ(B) ≡ νn˜.σ, ΦIV {si/v, ri/r, pii(wˆ)/w}σ
and ΦIV {sj/v, rj/r, pij(wˆ)/w}σ. It follows that pi1(y)σ =E pk(ri)σ =E pk(rj)σ. Since the
record variables ri, rj are handles for fresh nonces generated by name restriction in the
process Aex and sent to Vex,i, Vex,j using a private channel, it follows that i = j.
(3.2) We prove a stronger result: namely, the condition holds for all substitutions σ. Suppose
σ is an arbitrary substitution such that ΦUVm σ and Φ
UV
m {vˆ′/vˆ}σ hold. We have
vˆσ =E (getmsg(pi2(pi1(yˆ))), . . . , getmsg(pi2(pim(yˆ))))σ =E vˆ
′σ
and immediately derive vˆσ ' vˆ′σ.
(3.3) Again, we will show that the condition holds for all substitutions σ. Suppose σ is









i {pii(yˆ)/y}σ it must be the case for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n that pii(yˆ)σ =E
(pk(ri), sign(ri, si))σ and hence getmsg(pi2(pii(yˆ)))σ =E si. Moreover, since n = m and
ΦUVm σ, we have
vˆσ =E (getmsg(pi2(pi1(yˆ))), . . . , getmsg(pi2(pim(yˆ))))σ =E (s1, . . . , sn)
The result (s1, . . . , sn) ' vˆσ follows.
(3.5) We prove a stronger result: namely, for any substitution σ the condition holds. Suppose
σ is an arbitrary substitution such that ΦEVm σ and Φ
EV
m {x′/x | x ∈ X\yˆ}σ hold. For all
1 ≤ i ≤ m, we have
getmsg(pii(wˆ))σ =E pi1(pii(yˆ))σ ∧ pi1(pii(yˆ))σ =E getmsg(pii(wˆ′))σ
∧ checksign(pii(wˆ), xpk)σ =E true ∧ checksign(pii(wˆ′), xpk)σ =E true
and, by inspection of the equational theory, it must be the case that pii(wˆ)σ = pii(wˆ
′)σ =
A.1. ELECTION VERIFIABILITY IN RAISING HANDS 123
sign(Ki, pi1(pii(yˆ)))σ, where xpkσ = pk(Ki). By Φ
EV
m σ and Φ
EV
m {x′/x | x ∈ X\yˆ}σ
we also have sndm(wˆ) =E snd
m(wˆ′) =E ∅. It must be the case that wˆσ = wˆ′σ =
(sign(K1, pi1(pi1(yˆ))), . . . , sign(Km, pi1(pim(yˆ))))σ and hence wˆσ ' wˆ′σ.
(3.6) Suppose C is a context and B is a process such that C[VP+n (s1, . . . , sn)] (→∗ α−→→∗)∗ B,
ϕ(B) ≡ νn˜.σ, and ΦEVm σ ∧ ΦEVm {x′/x | x ∈ X\wˆ}σ. For all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, we have
checksign(xpk, pii(wˆ))σ =E true, where xpkσ = pk(skA) and skA ∈ n˜. By inspection of
the equational theory it is the case that pii(wˆ)σ =E sign(skA,Mi) for some term Mi.
Since the signing key is under restriction and, by inspection of the voting process, it
follows that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m we have Mi =E pk(skVi), where skVi ∈ n˜. By ΦEVm σ and
ΦEVm {x′/x | x ∈ X\wˆ}σ we also have pi1(pii(yˆ))σ =E getmsg(pii(wˆ))σ =E pi1(pii(yˆ′))σ, that
is,
pi1(pii(yˆ))σ =E pk(skVi) =E pi1(pii(yˆ
′))σ.
Moreover, checksign(pi1(pii(yˆ)), pi2(pii(yˆ)))σ =E true ∧ checksign(pi1(pii(yˆ′)), pi2(pii(yˆ′)))σ =E
true. Since the signing keys skV1 , . . . , skVm are under restriction it follows for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m
that
pi2(pii(yˆ))σ =E sign(skVi , si) =E pi2(pii(yˆ
′))σ
Furthermore, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, we have snd(snd(snd(pii(yˆ)))) =E snd(snd(snd(pii(yˆ′)))) =E
∅ and hence
pii(yˆ)σ =E (pk(skVi), sign(skVi , si)) =E pii(yˆ
′)σ
Since sndm(yˆ)σ =E snd
m(yˆ′)σ =E ∅, we have yˆσ =E yˆ′σ and hence yˆσ ' yˆ′σ.
(3.7) Suppose C is a context and B is a process such that C[VP+n (s1, . . . , sn)] (→∗ α−→→∗)∗ B,
ϕ(B) ≡ νn˜.σ, and ∧1≤i≤n ΦIVi {pii(yˆ)/y}σ ∧ ΦEVn {wˆ′/wˆ}σ ∧ sndn(wˆ)σ =E ∅ holds. For all
1 ≤ i ≤ n, we have checksign(xpk, pii(wˆ))σ =E true, where xpkσ = pk(skA) and skA ∈ n˜.
By inspection of the equational theory it is the case that pii(wˆ)σ =E sign(skA,Mi) for
some term Mi. Since the signing key is under restriction and, by inspection of the voting
process, it follows for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n that Mi =E pk(skVi), where skVi ∈ n˜. Moreover,
124 APPENDIX A. ELECTION VERIFIABILITY RESULTS
sndn(wˆ)σ =E ∅ and hence
wˆσ =E (sign(skA, pk(skV1)), . . . , sign(skA, pk(skVn)))
Similarly, we have 1 ≤ i ≤ n that checksign(xpk, pii(wˆ′))σ =E true, where xpkσ = pk(skA)
and skA ∈ n˜. As before, pii(wˆ′)σ =E sign(skA, Ni) by inspection of the equational theory.
Since the signing key is under restriction and, by inspection of the voting process (in
particular, observe that Aex outputs exactly n messages of the form sign(skA, Ni)), there
exists a permutation χ defined over {1, . . . , n} such that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n we have
Ni =E pk(skVχ(i)). Moreover, by Φ
EV
n {wˆ′/wˆ}σ we have sndn(wˆ′) =E ∅ and hence
wˆ′σ =E (sign(skA, pk(skVχ(1))), . . . , sign(skA, pk(skVχ(n))))
The result wˆσ ' wˆ′σ follows.
(3.8) Suppose s1, . . . , sn are names and consider the context
C =ˆ c(w1). . . . .c(wn).c〈(w1, . . . , wn)〉.
c(y1). . . . .c(yn).c〈(y1, . . . , yn)〉.
c〈(getmsg(pi2(y1)), . . . , getmsg(pi2(yn)))〉
We have C[VP+n (s1, . . . , sn)] (→∗ α−→→∗)∗ B such that ϕ(B) ≡ νskA, skV1 , . . . , skVn .σ,
where
σ = {skV1/r1 , . . . ,skVn /rn , (s1, . . . , sn)/vˆ, (sign(skA, pk(skV1)), . . . , sign(skA, pk(skVn)))/wˆ,
pk(skA)/xpk , ((pk(skV1), sign(skV1 , s1)), . . . , (pk(skVn), sign(skVn , sn)))/yˆ}




i {pii(yˆ)/y}σ ∧ ΦUVm σ ∧ ΦEVm σ.
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A.2 Election verifiability in Civitas
This appendix presents a proof of election verifiability in Civitas. The following lemmata
are introduced to demonstrate useful properties of our equational theory (pp59). We make
use of the notation Mˆ
•' Mˆ ′ to denote that the ciphertext tuples Mˆ , Mˆ ′ are defined over
the same plaintexts for some public key K, that is, Mˆ =E (penc(K,R1, N1), . . . , penc(K,
Rn, Nn)), Mˆ
′ =E (penc(K,R′1, N
′




n)) for some terms N1, N
′
1, R1, R1,
. . . , Nn, N
′
n, Rn, Rn and integer n ∈ N such that there exists a permutation χ defined over
{1, . . . , n}, where for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n we have Ni =E N ′χ(i). The relation
•' is trivially seen
to be an equivalence relation. Moreover, if Mˆ
•' Nˆ and Mˆ ' Mˆ ′, then Mˆ ′ •' Nˆ .
Lemma A.1. Given terms L,M,N , if pet(L,M,N) =E true, then M
•' N .
Lemma A.2. Given terms L, Mˆ, Nˆ , if checkMix(L, Mˆ, Nˆ) =E true, then Mˆ
•' Nˆ .
Lemma A.3. Given terms L, Mˆ, Nˆ , if checkMixPair(L, Mˆ, Nˆ) =E true, then (pii(M1),
. . . , pii(M|M˜ |))
•' (pii(N1), . . . , pii(N|Nˆ |)), where i ∈ {1, 2}.
A.2.1 Proof of Theorem 3.3
Proof. Suppose m ∈ N and the tests ΦIV ,ΦUVm ,ΦEVm are given above. We will now show
for all names s1, . . . , sn that the conditions of Definition 3.7 hold.
(3.1) Suppose C is a context, B is a process and i, j are integers such that C[VP+n (s1, . . . , sn)]
(→∗ α−→→∗)∗ B, ϕ(B) ≡ νn˜.σ and ΦIV {si/v, r˜i/r˜, pii(wˆ)/w}σ ∧ ΦIV {sj/v, r˜j/r˜, pij(wˆ)/w}σ. It
follows that pi1(y)σ =E penc(xpkT , rm,i, si)σ =E penc(xpkT , rm,j, sj)σ and, by inspection of
the equational theory, it is the case that rm,iσ = rm,jσ. Since the record variables rm,i,
rm,j are handles for fresh nonces created by name restriction in the voter process, it follows
immediately from rm,iσ = rm,jσ that i = j.
(3.2) We prove a stronger result: namely, for any substitution σ the condition holds. Suppose
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ΦUVm σ ∧ ΦUVm {vˆ′/vˆ}σ and hence
vˆσ =E (dec(zpartial,1, pi1(zbal,1)), . . . , dec(zpartial,m, pi1(zbal,m)))σ =E vˆ
′σ
It follows immediately that vˆσ ' vˆ′σ.
(3.3) Again, we will show that the condition holds for all substitutions σ. Suppose ΦIV {si/v,
r˜i/r˜, pii(wˆ)/w, pii(yˆ)/y}σ holds for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and hence
∧
1≤i≤n
pi1(pii(yˆ))σ =E penc(xpkT , rm,i, si)σ.
Moreover, suppose ΦUVm σ holds and n = m, therefore
checkMixPair(zmixPairPf , (pi1(pi1(yˆ)), pi2(pi1(yˆ))), . . . ,
(pi1(pim(yˆ)), pi2(pim(yˆ))), zbal,1, . . . , zbal,m)σ =E true
holds. By inspection of the equational theory we have
pi1(zbal,i)σ =E penc(xpkT , rm,χ(i) ◦Ri, sχ(i))σ
where 1 ≤ i ≤ n for some permutation χ defined over {1, . . . , n} and terms R1, . . . , Rn
(note R1, . . . , Rn appear in zmixPairPfσ). By our hypothesis, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we have
checkPartialPf(xpkT , pi1(zbal,i), zpartial,i, zpartialPf,i)σ =E true
and hence zpartial,iσ is a partial decryption for pi1(zbal,i)σ. It follows, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, that
dec(zpartial,i, pi1(zbal,i))σ =E sχ(i)
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Finally, by hypothesis, we also have
(dec(zpartial,1, pi1(zbal,1)), . . . , dec(zpartial,m, pi1(zbal,m)))σ =E vˆσ
and hence it follows that (s1, . . . , sn) ' vˆσ.
(3.5) Suppose C is a context and B is a process such that C[VP+n (s1, . . . , sn)] (→∗ α−→→∗)∗
B, ϕ(B) ≡ νn˜.σ, and ΦEVm σ ∧ ΦEVm {x′/x | x ∈ X\yˆ}σ. For all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, we have
checkBallot(pi3(pii(yˆ)), pi1(pii(yˆ)), pi2(pii(yˆ)))σ =E true and it follows by inspection of the
equational theory that
pi2(pii(yˆ))σ =E penc(Ki, Si,Mi)
for some terms Ki, Si,Mi. Since checkMixPair(zmixPairPf , (pi1(pi1(yˆ)), pi2(pi1(yˆ))), . . . ,
(pi1(pim(yˆ)), pi2(pim(yˆ))), zbal,1, . . . , zbal,m)σ =E true and checkMixPair(zmixPairPf
′, (pi1(pi1(yˆ)),
pi2(pi1(yˆ))), . . . , (pi1(pim(yˆ)), pi2(pim(yˆ))), z
′
bal,1, . . . , z
′
bal,m)σ =E true; it follows by Lemma
A.3 and transitivity of
•' that
(pi2(zbal,1), . . . , pi2(zbal,m))σ
•' (pi2(z′bal,1), . . . , pi2(z′bal,m))σ.





cred,i)σ =E true; by Lemma A.1 it follows that
(z¯cred,1, . . . , z¯cred,m)σ
•' (z¯′cred,1, . . . , z¯′cred,m)σ.
We have (zcred,1, . . . , zcred,m)σ ' (z¯cred,1, . . . , z¯cred,m)σ, (z′cred,1, . . . , z′cred,m)σ ' (z¯′cred,1, . . . ,
z¯′cred,m)σ and hence we trivially derive
(zcred,1, . . . , zcred,m)σ
•' (z′cred,1, . . . , z′cred,m)σ.
Since checkMix(zmixPf , getmsg(pi1(wˆ)), . . . , getmsg(pim(wˆ)), zcred,1, . . . , zcred,m)σ =E true and
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checkMix(zmixPf
′, getmsg(pi1(wˆ′)), . . . , getmsg(pim(wˆ′)), z′cred,1, . . . , z
′
cred,m)σ =E true; it fol-
lows by Lemma A.2 that
(getmsg(pi1(wˆ)), . . . , getmsg(pim(wˆ)))σ
•' (getmsg(pi1(wˆ′)), . . . , getmsg(pim(wˆ′)))σ.
For all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, we have checksign(xspkR , pii(wˆ))σ =E true and checksign(xspkR , pii(wˆ′))σ
=E true, where xspkRσ = pk(sskR) and sskR ∈ n˜. By inspection of the equational theory
it is the case that pii(wˆ)σ =E sign(sskR,Mi)σ and pii(wˆ
′)σ =E sign(sskR,M ′i)σ for some
terms Mi,M
′
i . Furthermore, since, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, we have getmsg(pii(wˆ))σ =E Mi,
getmsg(pii(wˆ
′))σ =E M ′i and because (getmsg(pi1(wˆ)), . . . , getmsg(pim(wˆ)))σ
•'
(getmsg(pi1(wˆ
′)), . . . , getmsg(pim(wˆ′)))σ, it follows that M˜
•' M˜ ′. Now, since the sign-
ing key is under restriction and, by inspection of the voting process and its possible





′))σ =E penc(pk(skR),m′′χ′(i), dχ′(i))
where di,m
′′
i are names under restriction in the registrar process R, xpkRσ =E pk(skR) and
χ, χ′ are permutations defined over {1, . . . , n}. Finally, we have sndm(wˆ) =E sndm(wˆ′) =E
∅ and hence conclude wˆσ ' wˆ′σ.
(3.6) Suppose C is a context and B is a process such that C[VP+n (s1, . . . , sn)] (→∗ α−→→∗)∗ B,
ϕ(B) ≡ νn˜.σ, and ΦEVm σ ∧ ΦEVm {x′/x | x ∈ X\wˆ}σ. For all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, we have
checksign(xspkR , pii(wˆ))σ =E true, where xspkRσ = pk(sskR) and sskR ∈ n˜. By inspection
of the equational theory it is the case that
pii(wˆ)σ =E sign(sskR,Mi)σ
for some term Mi. Since the signing key is under restriction and, by inspection of the
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i are names under restriction in the registrar process R and xpkRσ =E pk(skR).
Since checkMix(zmixPf , getmsg(pi1(wˆ)), . . . , getmsg(pim(wˆ)), zcred,1, . . . , zcred,m)σ =E true,
checkMix(zmixPf
′, getmsg(pi1(wˆ)), . . . , getmsg(pim(wˆ)), z′cred,1, . . . , z
′
cred,m)σ =E true and for
all 1 ≤ i ≤ m we have getmsg(pii(wˆ))σ =E Mi; it follows that
(zcred,1, . . . , zcred,m)σ
•' (z′cred,1, . . . , z′cred,m)σ
by Lemma A.2. We have (zcred,1, . . . , zcred,m)σ ' (z¯cred,1, . . . , z¯cred,m)σ and (z′cred,1, . . . ,
z′cred,m)σ ' (z¯′cred,1, . . . , z¯′cred,m)σ; it trivially follows that
(z¯cred,1, . . . , z¯cred,m)σ
•' (z¯′cred,1, . . . , z¯′cred,m)σ.





cred,i)σ =E true; hence by Lemma A.1 it follows that
(pi2(zbal,1), . . . , pi2(zbal,m))σ
•' (pi2(z′bal,1), . . . , pi2(z′bal,m))σ.
By checkMixPair(zmixPairPf , (pi1(pi1(yˆ)), pi2(pi1(yˆ))), . . . , (pi1(pim(yˆ)), pi2(pim(yˆ))), zbal,1, . . . ,
zbal,m)σ =E true, checkMixPair(zmixPairPf
′, (pi1(pi1(yˆ′)), pi2(pi1(yˆ′))), . . . , (pi1(pim(yˆ′)),
pi2(pim(yˆ
′))), z′bal,1, . . . , z
′
bal,m)σ =E true and Lemma A.3 we have
(pi2(pi1(yˆ)), . . . , pi2(pim(yˆ)))σ
•' (pi2(pi1(yˆ′)), . . . , pi2(pim(yˆ′)))σ.
For all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, we have checkBallot(pi3(pii(yˆ)), pi1(pii(yˆ)), pi2(pii(yˆ)))σ =E true and
checkBallot(pi3(pii(yˆ
′)), pi1(pii(yˆ′)), pi2(pii(yˆ′)))σ =E true. By inspection of the equational
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theory and because (pi2(pi1(yˆ)), . . . , pi2(pim(yˆ)))σ
•' (pi2(pi1(yˆ′)), . . . , pi2(pim(yˆ′)))σ •'
(penc(pk(skR),m
′′
1, d1), . . . , penc(pk(skR),m
′′
n, dn)) it is the case that
pi3(pii(yˆ))σ =E ballotPf(PKTi , Ri, Ni, pk(skR), Si, dχ(i))
pi3(pii(yˆ




i , pk(skR), S
′
i, dχ′(i))







i and permutations χ, χ
′ defined over {1,
. . . , n}. Since for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m the name di is under restriction in the voting process
specification, it follows that




′))σ =E ballotPf(pk(skT ),mχ′(i), sχ′(i), pk(skR),m′χ′(i), dχ′(i))
(that is, pi3(pii(yˆ))σ and pi3(pii(yˆ
′))σ are the signature proofs of knowledge output by the
voters) and, moreover, by the validity of the proof, we have
pi1(pii(yˆ))σ =E penc(pk(skT ),mχ(i), sχ(i))
pi1(pii(yˆ





′))σ =E penc(pk(skR),m′χ′(i), dχ′(i))
Since
∧m
i=1 pi4(yˆ) =E ∅ and
∧m
i=1 pi4(yˆ
′) =E ∅, it follows for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m that pii(yˆ) =E
pii(yˆ). Finally, snd
m(yˆ) =E snd
m(yˆ′) =E ∅ and hence we conclude yˆσ ' yˆ′σ.
(3.7) Suppose C is a context and B is a process such that C[VP+n (s1, . . . , sn)] (→∗ α−→→∗)∗ B,
ϕ(B) ≡ νn˜.σ, and ∧1≤i≤n ΦIVi {pii(yˆ)y/}σ ∧ ΦEVn {wˆ′/wˆ}σ ∧ sndn(wˆ)σ =E ∅ holds. For all
1 ≤ i ≤ n, we have pii(wˆ)σ = pi2(rcredi)σ. Since sndn(wˆ)σ =E ∅ and, by inspection of the
voting process, we have
wˆσ =E (sign(sskR, penc(pk(skR),m
′′
1, d1)), . . . , sign(sskR, penc(pk(skR),m
′′
n, dn)))
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In addition, we have pi2(pii(yˆ))σ =E penc(pk(skR),m
′
i, di) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and by similar
reasoning to the above (see Condition 3.5) we derive wˆσ ' wˆ′σ.
(3.8) This can be witnessed by modelling the complete JCJ-Civitas protocol as the context
C[ ].
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B
Violating anonymity in the
RSA-based DAA specification
This appendix recalls the mathematical description of the RSA-based Direct Anonymous
Attestation protocol [BCC04] and demonstrates that the specification does not satisfy
privacy.
B.1 Primitives and building blocks
This section recalls the mathematical primitives which form the building blocks of RSA-
based DAA. First we introduce some notation.
Notation. The binary string of length l is denoted {0, 1}l. Concatenation of binary
strings α and β is written α‖β. The u least significant bits of the binary string α
are LSBu(α) = α − 2ub α2u c and the u most significant bits of the binary string α are
MSBu(α) = b α2u c. It should be noted that α = MSBu(α)‖LSBu(α) = 2uMSBu(α) +
LSBu(α).
B.1.1 Protocols to prove knowledge
This section summarises the proofs of knowledge used by RSA-based DAA; the concrete
algorithms can be found in the original papers. Since the RSA-based DAA protocol applies
proofs of knowledge to the group of quadratic residues modulo a safe prime product,
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the prover must demonstrate that elements are indeed quadratic residues, because the
verifier is unable to do so. The prover is therefore required to show that the square
root of the element exists; this can be achieved by executing PK{(α) : y2 = (g2)α} or
PK{(α) : y = ±gα} instead of PK{(α) : y = gα}, such that α = logg2 y2, which is
equivalent to α = logg y in the case where y ∈ QRn [BCC04].
Demonstrating possession of a discrete logarithm. A proof of knowledge of an
element y ∈ G with respect to base g ∈ G is denoted PK{(α) : y = gα} [CEG88,
CEGP87]. Furthermore, it can be generalised to prove knowledge of y ∈ G with respect
to several bases g0, . . . , gv ∈ G, as denoted by PK{(α0, . . . , αv) : y = gα00 · · · gαvv }.
A proof of knowledge of a discreet logarithm y ∈ G with respect to bases g ∈ G such
that α ∈ ±{0, 1}l is denoted PK{(α) : y = gα∧ (−2l < α < 2l)} [CM98b, CM98a, CM99,
BCDG88]. To enable the prover to successfully complete the protocol, it is necessary to
use a tighter bound α ∈ ±{0, 1}(l−2)/lφ , where lφ controls the statistical zero-knowledge
property. Since the protocol uses bit challenges, it is not very efficient. Boudot presents
an enhanced solution [Bou00] and Camenisch & Michels [CM98b, CM98a] provide a mod-
ification which allows a proof that (b− 2l < α < b+ 2l) for a fixed offset b.
Proving equality of discrete logarithms. A proof of equality of discreet logarithms
of group elements y0, y1 ∈ G with respect to bases g ∈ G and h ∈ G (that is, the prover
knows α such that logg y0 ≡ logh y1) is denoted PK{(α) : y0 = gα∧y0 = hα} [CP94, CP93,
Cha90]. Generalisations to prove equalities among y0, . . . , yv ∈ G to bases g0, . . . , gv ∈ G
are trivial [CS97b].
Proving equality of discrete logarithms in different groups. A proof of equality
of discrete logarithms y0, y1 ∈ G0 to the bases g0 ∈ G0 and g1 ∈ G1, where G0 and
G1 are different groups can be constructed as follows. Let the orders of the groups be
q0, respectively q1, and let l be an integer such that 2
l+1 < min(q0, q1). The prover
can convince the verifier that logg0 y0 ≡ logg1 y1 if α is an element in the tighter range
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{0, 1}(l−2)/lφ by executing PK{(α) : y0 G0= gα0 ∧y1 G1= gα1 ∧ (−2l < α < 2l)}. The prover and
verifier engage in an initial setup during which the prover commits to y˜ = gβhα (mod n),
where G = 〈g〉 = 〈h〉 – the order of which is unknown (to the verifier) – and β ∈R G. The
prover then carries out PK{(α, β) : y0 G0= gα0 ∧ y1 G1= gα1 ∧ y˜ G= gαhβ ∧ (−2l < α < 2l)} in
collaboration with the verifier [CM99].
B.1.2 Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signature scheme
RSA-based DAA is based upon the Camenisch-Lysyanskaya (CL) signature scheme [CL03,
Lys02] which is secure under the strong RSA assumption. A summary of the scheme for
signing blocks of L messages m0, . . . ,mL−1, and a variant for signatures on committed
values, are presented below.
Key generation. On input length ln of the special RSA modulus, choose safe primes
p and q of length d ln
2
e. Let n = pq and select R0, . . . , RL−1, S, Z ∈R QRn.
Message space. The message space is the set {(m0, . . . ,mL−1) : mi ∈ ±{0, 1}lm},
where lm is a parameter and L is the number of blocks.
Signature scheme for blocks. On input message blocks m0, . . . ,mL−1, choose a ran-
dom prime e of length le ≥ lm+1 and select a random number v of length lv > ln+ lm+ lr,
where lr is a security parameter. Compute A such that Z ≡ Rm00 · · ·RmL−1L−1 SvAe (mod n).
The signature on blocks (m0, . . . ,mL−1) is defined as (A, e, v).
Signature scheme for committed values. On input message blocks m0, . . . ,mL−1,
select v′ ∈R {0, 1}ln+lφ and compute the commitment U = Rm00 · · ·RmL−1L−1 Sv
′
(mod n),
where lφ is a security parameter. Send the U to the signer. On receipt of U the signer
chooses a random prime e of length le ≥ lm+ 1, selects v′′ ∈R [2lv−1, 2lv −1] and computes
A such that Z ≡ USv′′Ae (mod n). The signature (A, e, v′′) on the commitment U is
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returned. The signature on the block of messages m0, . . . ,mL−1 is (A, e, v = v′ + v′′). In
order to keep m0, . . . ,mL−1 secret, v must remain secret, while A and e can be public.
Verification algorithm. To verify that the tuple (A, e, v) is indeed a signature on the
block of messages m0, . . . ,mL−1, check that Z ≡ Rm00 · · ·RmL−1L−1 SvAe (mod n) and ensure
2le > e > 2le−1.
B.2 Protocol description
RSA-based DAA [BCC04] was the first concrete Direct Anonymous Attestation scheme,
and is of particular significance because support is mandated in the TPM specification
version 1.2 which has been implemented and deployed in over 300 million computers. This
section presents a detailed protocol description.
B.2.1 Security parameters
The security parameters ln, lf , lv, le, l
′
e, lφ, lr, lH , lΓ, lρ are defined. The purpose of each will
now be discussed. The number in parentheses represents the proposed values of these
parameters, which have been adopted from the original schema [BCC04]. The parameter
ln (2048) is the size of the RSA modulus and lf (104) is the size of the TPM’s secret
tsk = (f0, f1) values. The size of the random v part of the certificate is specified by lv
(2536); the size of prime e is le (368); and l
′
e (120) is the size of the interval from which
the e’s are selected. lφ (80) controls the statistical zero-knowledge property, lr (80) is
needed for the reduction in the proof of security and lH (160) is the length of the output
from the hash function used for the Fiat-Shamir heuristic. The parameter lΓ is the size
of the modulus Γ and finally, lρ is the size of the order ρ of the subgroup of Z∗Γ that is
used for rogue tagging. The scheme requires that: le > lφ + lH + max(lf + 4, l
′
e + 2),
lv > ln + lφ + lH + max(lf + lr + 3, lφ + 2) and lρ = 2lf . Finally, let H(·) and HΓ(·)
be two collision resistant hash functions such that H(·) : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}lH and HΓ(·) :
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{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}lΓ+lφ . It should be noted that collision resistant hash functions exist under
the strong RSA assumption.
B.2.2 Setup algorithm
The description of how an issuer creates a key pair, and a non-interactive proof that the
key values are correctly formed, are shown below (adapted from [BCC04]). The latter
provides an assurance to the host that privacy requirements will be preserved.
1. Choose a special RSA modulus n = pq with p = 2p′ + 1 and q = 2q′ + 1, where
p, p′, q, q′ are all primes and n has ln bits.
2. Select a random generator g′ of QRn.
3. Choose xg, xh, xs, xz, x0, x1 ∈R [1, φ(n)] and compute:
g = g′xg mod n h = g′xh mod n S = hxs mod n
Z = hxz mod n R0 = S
x0 mod n R1 = S
x1 mod n
4. Generate a group of prime order. Pick random primes ρ and Γ such that Γ = rρ+ 1
for some r with ρ - r, 2lΓ−1 < Γ < 2lΓ and 2lρ−1 < ρ < 2lρ . Select γ ∈R Z∗Γ, where
γ(Γ−1)/ρ 6≡ 1 (mod Γ).
5. Produce a non-interactive proof that g, h, S, Z,R0, R1 are computed correctly, that
is, g, h ∈ 〈g′〉, S,Z ∈ 〈h〉 and R0, R1 ∈ 〈S〉.
(a) Choose randoms
x˜(g,1), . . . , x˜(g,lH) ∈R [1, φ(n)] x˜(h,1), . . . , x˜(h,lH) ∈R [1, φ(n)]
x˜(s,1), . . . , x˜(s,lH) ∈R [1, φ(n)] x˜(z,1), . . . , x˜(z,lH) ∈R [1, φ(n)]
x˜(0,1), . . . , x˜(0,lH) ∈R [1, φ(n)] x˜(1,1), . . . , x˜(1,lH) ∈R [1, φ(n)]
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(b) Compute for i = 1 to lH
g˜(g,i) = g
′x˜(g,i) mod n h˜(h,i) = g′x˜(h,i) mod n
S˜(s,i) = h
x˜(s,i) mod n Z˜(z,i) = h
x˜(z,i) mod n
R˜(0,i) = S
x˜(0,i) mod n R˜(1,i) = S
x˜(1,i) mod n
(c) Compute
c = H(n‖g′‖g‖h‖S‖Z‖R0‖R1‖g˜(g,1)‖ . . . ‖g˜(g,lH)‖
h˜(h,1)‖ . . . ‖h˜(h,lH)‖S˜(s,1)‖ . . . ‖S˜(s,lH)‖Z˜(z,1)‖ . . . ‖Z˜(z,lH)‖
R˜(0,1)‖ . . . ‖R˜(0,lH)‖R˜(1,1)‖ . . . ‖R˜(1,lH))
(d) Compute for i = 1 to lH , where ci is the ith bit of c
xˆ(g,i) = x˜(g,i) − cixg mod φ(n) xˆ(h,i) = x˜(h,i) − cixh mod φ(n)
xˆ(s,i) = x˜(s,i) − cixs mod φ(n) xˆ(z,i) = x˜(z,i) − cixz mod φ(n)
xˆ(0,i) = x˜(0,i) − cix0 mod φ(n) xˆ(1,i) = x˜(1,i) − cix1 mod φ(n)
(e) Let
proof = (c, xˆ(g,1), . . . , xˆ(g,lH), xˆ(h,1), . . . , xˆ(h,lH), xˆ(s,1), . . . , xˆ(s,lH),
xˆ(z,1), . . . , xˆ(z,lH), xˆ(0,1), . . . , xˆ(0,lH), xˆ(1,1), . . . , xˆ(1,lH))
6. Finally, the public key (n, g′, g, h, S, Z,R0, R1, γ,Γ, ρ) and proof are published. The
private key values p′, q′ are stored by the issuer.
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Verification of the Issuer’s public key
A valid public key is essential to ensure the privacy of the host. Incorrectly formed
g, h, S, Z,R0, R1 values could potentially break this property. Furthermore, if γ does
not generate the subgroup Z∗Γ the issuer can link transactions (signatures presented to
the verifier). The requirement that n is a special RSA modulus ensures that Step 6
of the join algorithm is zero-knowledge. This is of concern to the issuer and is not
important to the security of the host. Verification of an issuer’s public key is shown below
(adapted from [BCC04]). Note that this verification need only be performed once and not
necessarily by every user of a system (that is, in a multi-user environment, it is sufficient
for a single user to perform the verification).
1. Verify the proof, that is check g, h ∈ 〈g′〉, S,Z ∈ 〈h〉 and R0, R1 ∈ 〈S〉. On input:
proof = (c, xˆ(g,1), . . . , xˆ(g,lH), xˆ(h,1), . . . , xˆ(h,lH), xˆ(s,1), . . . , xˆ(s,lH),
xˆ(z,1), . . . , xˆ(z,lH), xˆ(0,1), . . . , xˆ(0,lH), xˆ(1,1), . . . , xˆ(1,lH))
(a) Compute for i = 1 to lH , where ci is the ith bit of c
gˆ(g,i) = g
cig′xˆ(g,i) mod n hˆ(h,i) = hcig′xˆ(h,i) mod n
Sˆ(s,i) = S












= H(n‖g′‖g‖h‖S‖Z‖R0‖R1‖gˆ(g,1)‖ . . . ‖gˆ(g,lH)‖
hˆ(h,1)‖ . . . ‖hˆ(h,lH)‖Sˆ(s,1)‖ . . . ‖Sˆ(s,lH)‖Zˆ(z,1)‖ . . . ‖Zˆ(z,lH)‖
Rˆ(0,1)‖ . . . ‖Rˆ(0,lH)‖Rˆ(1,1)‖ . . . ‖Rˆ(1,lH))
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2. Check that Γ and ρ are primes. Ensure ρ | (Γ− 1), ρ - Γ−1
ρ
and γρ ≡ 1 (mod Γ).
3. Check that all public key values have the required length.
B.2.3 Join algorithm
The purpose of the join algorithm is to enable a host/TPM to acquire a CL-signature on a
secret tsk value which can later be used as an anonymous attestation identity credential.
Let PKI = (n, g
′, g, h, S, Z,R0, R1, γ,Γ, ρ) be the public key of the issuer and PK ′I the
long term public key of the issuer used to authenticate PKI . The value bsnI is a unique
basename assigned to each issuer and cnt is an internal counter stored within the TPM.
The counter records the number of times the TPM has executed the join algorithm. Prior
to executing the join algorithm, the host is assumed to verify that PKI is authenticated
by PK ′I .
The TPM computes tsk using the issuer’s public key, its secret seed DAASeed and
counter value cnt. Computing tsk from the secret seed DAASeed – as opposed to a
random nonce – reduces the computational and storage requirements of the TPM. The
counter value allows the TPM to obtain different DAA keys using the same DAASeed;
alternatively, the TPM is allowed to re-run the join algorithm using the same cnt value.
The TPM splits the tsk value into two lf bit messages; the pair (f0, f1) allows computation
of smaller exponentials and permits the use of a smaller prime e. The TPM commits to





v′ (mod n), where v′ is a
random commitment factor. The TPM also computes NI = ζ
f0+f12
lf
I (mod Γ) for rogue
tagging purposes. The TPM forwards U,NI to the host who sends them to the issuer.
The TPM and issuer establish a one-way authenticated channel to assure the issuer of the
origin of U . The issuer checks whether tsk stems from a rogue TPM or if NI has been used
too many times previously, in which case it aborts. The platform convinces the issuer that
U,NI are correctly formed, and that the fi’s are of the appropriate lengths. To grant a
certificate, the issuer executes the CL-signature protocol and sends the platform (A, e, v′′).
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The issuer also provides a signature proof of knowledge (Step 7) that A ∈ 〈h〉. The host
verifies the proof and is assured that A can be statistically hidden in 〈h〉, preventing an






(mod n), where be = 1 and b 6∈ 〈h〉. Since the sign algorithm contains
T = ASw for some random w, the adversarial would be able to link T to A (by testing
T ∈ 〈h〉) and thus violate privacy [BCC04]. The pair (A, e) is stored by the host and can
be publicly known. The host forwards v′′ to the TPM; the TPM recovers v = v′ + v′′,
that is, a signature on the TPM’s secret tsk = (f0, f1). The explicit details of the join
algorithm are provided below (adapted from [BCC04]).
1. The host computes ζI = (HΓ(0‖bsnI))(Γ−1)/ρ (mod Γ) and sends ζI to the TPM.
2. The TPM checks whether ζρI
?≡ 1 (mod Γ). Let i = b lρ+lφ
lH
c (i = 1 for the parameters













f0 = LSBlf (tsk), f1 = MSBlf (tsk), v
′ ∈R {0, 1}ln+lφ ,
U = Rf00 R
f1
1 S




The TPM forwards U and NI to the host who sends them to the issuer.
3. The issuer checks that the U value stems from the TPM that owns a given public
endorsement key (PKek):
(a) The issuer chooses ne ∈R {0, 1}lφ , encrypts ne with PKek and sends the en-
cryption to the TPM.
(b) The TPM decrypts the value, revealing ne, computes aU = H(U‖ne) and
returns aU to the issuer.
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(c) The issuer checks aU
?
= H(U‖ne).
4. The issuer ensures for all (f˜0, f˜1) on the rogue list NI
?
6≡ ζ f˜0+f˜12lfI (mod Γ). The
issuer also checks that the NI has not been used too many times. If the issuer finds
the platform to be rogue, it aborts.
5. The platform proves knowledge of f0, f1 and v
′. It executes:
SPK{(f0, f1, v′) : U ≡ Rf00 Rf11 Sv
′
(mod n) ∧ NI ≡ ζf0+f12
lf
I (mod Γ)
∧ f0, f1 ∈ {0, 1}lf+lφ+lH+2 ∧ v′ ∈ {0, 1}ln+lφ+lh+2}(nt‖ni)
(a) The TPM chooses rf0 , rf1 ∈R {0, 1}lf+lφ+lH and rv′ ∈R {0, 1}ln+lφ+lH+2. It





rv′ (mod n), N˜I = ζ
rf0+rf1+2
lf
I (mod Γ) and sends
U˜ , N˜I to the host.
(b) The issuer selects ni ∈R {0, 1}lH and sends it to the host.
(c) The host computes ch = H(n‖R0‖R1‖S‖U‖NI‖U˜‖N˜I‖ni) and sends ch to the
TPM.
(d) The TPM picks nt ∈R {0, 1}lφ , computes c = H(ch‖nt), and calculates sf0 =
rf0+c·f0, sf1 = rf1+c·f1 and sv′ = rv′+c·v′. The TPM sends (c, nt, sf0 , sf1 , sv′)
to the host, who forwards to the issuer.
(e) The issuer computes:













?∈ {0, 1}lf+lφ+lH+1 and sv′
?∈ {0, 1}ln+2lφ+lH+1
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6. The issuer chooses v′′ ∈R [2lv , 2lv−1], a prime e ∈R [2le−1, 2le−1+2l′e−1] and computes
Z = USv
′′
Ae (mod n). That is, the issuer produces a CL-signature on U.
7. To convince the host that A was correctly formed, the issuer runs the protocol:






(a) The host selects nh ∈R {0, 1}lφ and sends nh to the issuer.







c′ = H(n‖Z‖S‖U‖v′′‖A‖A˜‖nh), se = re − c′/e mod φ(n)
and sends c′, se and (A, e, v′′) to the host.










(d) The host forwards v′′ to the TPM, which in turn stores v = v′′ + v′.
B.2.4 Sign algorithm
The sign algorithm enables the host to generate a signature proof of knowledge of at-
testation on a message m. Intuitively, if a verifier is presented with such a proof, it is
convinced that it is communicating with a trusted platform and the message is genuine.
In addition, the host must convince the verifier that it is not rogue. The message m may
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be either a public part of an Attestation Identity Key (AIK) produced by the TPM or
an arbitrary message. If m is an AIK, the key can later be used to sign PCR data or
to certify a non-migratable key. Where m is an arbitrary message its purpose is appli-
cation dependent. It may, for example, be a session key. To distinguish between these
two modes of operation, a variable b is defined. When b = 0, the message was generated
by the TPM and when b = 1, the message was input to the TPM. Let nv ∈ {0, 1}lH
be a nonce generated by the verifier and bsn the verifier’s basename. The algorithm
is described below (adapted from [BCC04, BCC05]), as a result of which the signature
σ = (ζ, T,NV , c, nt, sv¯, sf0 , sf1 , se) will be produced. Many of the secrets involved in the
process are actually known to the host. In fact only f0, f1, v need to remain secret to the
TPM.
1. (a) Depending on whether linkability is desirable, the host computes ζ as follows:
ζ ∈R 〈γ〉 or ζ = (HΓ(0‖bsn))(Γ−1)/ρ (mod Γ)
and sends ζ to the TPM.
(b) The TPM checks ζ
?∈ 〈γ〉; that is, it verifies ζρ ?≡ 1 (mod Γ).
2. (a) The host picks w ∈R {0, 1}ln+lφ and computes T = ASw (mod n).
(b) The TPM computes NV = ζ
f0+f12
lf
(mod Γ) and sends NV to the host.
3. The platform produces a signature of knowledge that T commits to an attestation
certificate and NV was computed using the same secret value f0, f1:
SPK{(f0, f1, v¯, e) : Z ≡ ±T eRf00 Rf11 S v¯ (mod n) ∧ NV ≡ ±ζf0+f12
lf
(mod Γ)
∧ f0, f1 ∈ {0, 1}lf+lφ+lH+2 ∧ (e− 2le) ∈ {0, 1}l′e+lφ+lH+1}(nt‖nv‖b‖m)
(a) i. The TPM chooses random integers rv ∈R {0, 1}lv+lφ+lH and
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r˜f = rf0 + rf12
lf (mod ρ) N˜V = ζ
r˜f (mod Γ)
The TPM sends T˜1t and N˜V to the host
1.
ii. The host selects random integers:
re ∈R {0, 1}l′e+lφ+lH rv¯ ∈R {0, 1}le+ln+2lφ+lH+1
and computes T˜ = T˜tT
reSrv¯ (mod n).
(b) i. The host computes:
ch = H(n‖g‖g′‖h‖R0‖R1‖S‖Z‖γ‖Γ‖ρ‖ζ‖T‖NV ‖T˜‖N˜V ‖nv)
and sends ch to the TPM.





sends c, nt to the host.
(c) i. The TPM computes
sv = rv + c · v sf0 = rf0 + c · f0 sf1 = rf1 + c · f1
and sends sv, sf0 , sf1 to the host.
ii. The host computes:
se = re + c · (e− 2le−1) sv¯ = sv + rv − c · w · e
1Note that ζ r˜f ≡ ζf0+f12lf (mod Γ) and the order of ρ < Γ the calculation ζ r˜f (mod Γ) will involve
a smaller exponential thus providing a performance gain.
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4. The host outputs the signature σ = (ζ, T,NV , c, nt, sv¯, sf0 , sf1 , se).
The main difference between the DAA signing algorithm and the signature generation
of prior schemes [CL01, Lys02, CL03] is that DAA distributes the computation be-
tween the TPM and the host. The TPM only produces a signature proof of knowledge
SPK{(f0, f1, v) : (Z/Ae) ≡ Rf00 Rf11 Sv (mod n) ∧ NV ≡ ζf0+f12
lf
(mod Γ)}(nt‖nv‖b‖m),
which the host extends to a full DAA signature. Note that the signature produced by the
TPM is not anonymous, as the value (Z/Ae) would fully identify the host.
B.2.5 Verification algorithm
The verification algorithm defines the method by which a verifier checks a signature σ on
message m with respect to the issuer’s public key (n, g′, g, h, S, Z,R0,
R1, γ,Γ, ρ). The algorithm is described below (adapted from [BCC04, BCC05]).
1. The verifier computes:





















?∈ 〈γ〉, sf0 , sf1
?∈ {0, 1}lf+lφ+lH+1 and se
?∈ {0, 1}l′e+lφ+lH+1
Note that the check NV , ζ
?∈ 〈γ〉 can be done by raising NV and ζ to the order of γ
(which is ρ) and verifying the result is one; that is, checking that
NρV
?≡ 1 (mod Γ) and ζρ ?≡ 1 (mod Γ).
3. If ζ was derived from the verifier’s basename, check that ζ
?≡ (HΓ(0‖bsnI))(Γ−1)/ρ
(mod Γ).
4. The verifier checks for all (f˜0, f˜1) on the rogue list that NI
?
6≡ ζ f˜0+f˜12lfI (mod Γ).
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B.3 Specification analysis: Violating anonymity
Suppose a trusted platform, with a public endorsement key PKek, executes the join and
sign algorithm using the same basename bsn (such that bsn 6=⊥). Further assume that
the issuer has a public key (n, g′, g, h, S, Z,R0, R1, γ,Γ, ρ), which the trusted platform
has verified, and the security parameter lf is used. During Step 2 of the join algorithm,
the platform computes NI = ζ
f0+f12
lf
I (mod Γ), where ζI = (HΓ(0‖bsn))(Γ−1)/ρ (mod Γ),
f0 = LSBlf (tsk) and f1 = MSBlf (tsk). The value NI is sent to the issuer. The
platform then authenticates using the identity PKek. During Step 2 of the sign algorithm,
the platform computes NV = ζ
f0+f12
lf
(mod Γ), where ζ = (HΓ(0‖bsn))(Γ−1)/ρ (mod Γ),
f0 = LSBlf (tsk) and f1 = MSBlf (tsk). The value NV is sent to the verifier. It follows
immediately that NI = NV and, moreover, NI can be linked to the identity PKek; that
is, the privacy of the trusted platform is violated.
B.4 Specification solution: Restoring anonymity
The protocol can be fixed by refining Step 1 of the sign algorithm to use
ζ = (HΓ(1‖bsn))(Γ−1)/ρ (mod Γ)
when linkability is required. To maintain correctness of the protocol, Step 3 of the ver-
ification algorithm must check ζ
?≡ (HΓ(1‖bsnI))(Γ−1)/ρ (mod Γ). Appendix C.2 shows
that the revised protocol satisfies user-controlled anonymity in the formal model.




Section 4.4.5 presents an analysis of user-controlled anonymity in the RSA-based DAA
protocol and discovers a vulnerability. The proof of this result appears in Section C.1.
A security fix was presented in Section 4.4.6, and we prove that the solution satisfies
user-controlled anonymity in Section C.2.
C.1 Proof of Theorem 4.2
Proof. Let DAARSA be the augmented Direct Anonymous Attestation biprocess derived
from the specification 〈JoinRSA, SignRSA〉. Let us consider the evaluation context
C[ ] = c〈(pk(skI), bsn)〉.
c(w).c(x).c〈penc(w, n, ne)〉.c(za).if za = hash(ne, pi2(x)) then
c〈ni〉.c(zs).c〈clsign(skI , e, v′′, pi2(x))〉.
c(w′).c(x′).c〈penc(w′, n, ne)〉.c(z′a).if z′a = hash(ne, pi2(x′)) then
c〈ni〉.c(z′s).c〈clsign(skI , e, v′′, pi2(x′))〉.
c〈(bsn,msg)〉.c〈nv〉.c(y).if pi1(x) = pi3(y) then b〈fail〉 else 0 |
We have
fst(C[DAARSA]) −→∗ C ′[if commit(tsk, ζI) = commit(tsk, ζ) then b〈fail〉 else 0]
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and
snd(C[DAARSA]) −→∗ C ′[if commit(tsk, ζI) = commit(tsk′, ζ) then b〈fail〉 else 0]
where
tsk = hash(hash(DAASeed, hash(pk(skI))), cnt, 0)
tsk′ = hash(hash(DAASeed′, hash(pk(skI))), cnt′, 0)
ζI = hash(0, bsn)
ζ = hash(0, bsn)
It follows that fst(C[DAARSA]) 6∼ snd(C[DAARSA]) because fst(C[DAARSA]) can output
on channel b, but snd(C[DAARSA]) cannot; and therefore DAARSA does not satisfy user-
controlled anonymity.
C.2 Analysis: Restoring user-controlled anonymity
This section provides the scripts used to automatically verify that the revised RSA-based
DAA protocol (Section 4.4.6) satisfies user-controlled anonymity. The free name decla-
rations, function definitions and equations for the RSA-based DAA process specification
appear in Listing C.1; the join algorithm JoinRSA′ is presented in Listing C.2, and the sign
algorithm SignRSA′ appears in Listing C.3. Finally, the augmented Direct Anonymous
Attestation biprocess DAARSA′ is presented in Listing C.4. (The nonce XXTERMINATION is
introduced to avoid an over-approximation issue.) ProVerif can be used to automatically
verify observational equivalence of Listing C.4 and hence the revised RSA-based DAA
protocol satisfies user-controlled anonymity.
Optimised analysis. The ProVerif script in Listing C.4 has an execution time of 6
minutes 43 seconds By removing the name restrictions on the secret part of the endorse-
ment key for each signer, the execution time is reduced to 92 seconds. This optimised
script is presented in Listing C.5.
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fun accept /0 .
fun zero /0 .
fun one /0 .
fun FJoin /0 .
fun FSign /0 .
fun c l ge tnonce /1 .
fun c l ge tpr ime /1 .
fun hash /1 .
fun pk /1 .
fun commit /2 .
fun c i r c /2 .
fun dec /2 .
fun open /2 .
fun c h e c k c l s i g n /3 .
fun checkspk /3 .
fun clcommit /3 .
fun c lopen /3 .
fun penc /3 .
fun spk /3 .
fun c l s i g n /4 .
equation dec (k , penc ( pk ( k ) , r ,m) ) = m.
equation c l ge tpr ime ( c l s i g n ( xsk , xprime , xrand , xmsg ) ) = xprime .
equation c l ge tnonce ( c l s i g n ( xsk , xprime , xrand , xmsg ) ) = xrand .
equation c h e c k c l s i g n ( pk ( xsk ) , xmsg , c l s i g n ( xsk , xprime , xrand , xmsg ) )
= accept .
equation open ( xrand , commit ( xrand , xp la in ) ) = xp la in .
equation c lopen (x , xrand , clcommit (x , xrand , xp la in ) ) = xp la in .
equation c lopen ( pk ( xsk ) , xrand , c l s i g n ( xsk , yprime , yrand ,
clcommit ( pk ( xsk ) , xrand , xmsg ) ) ) = c l s i g n ( xsk , yprime , xrand , xmsg ) .
equation checkspk ( FJoin , ( xzeta , xpk , commit ( xtsk , xzeta ) ,
clcommit ( xpk , xv , xtsk ) , xmsg ) ,
spk ( FJoin , ( xtsk , xv ) , ( xzeta , xpk , commit ( xtsk , xzeta ) ,
clcommit ( xpk , xv , xtsk ) , xmsg ) ) ) = accept .
equation checkspk ( FSign , ( xzeta , pk ( xsk ) , commit ( xtsk , xzeta ) ,
clcommit ( pk ( xsk ) ,xw , c l s i g n ( xsk , xe , xv , xtsk ) ) , xmsg ) ,
spk ( FSign , ( xtsk , xw) , ( xzeta , pk ( xsk ) , commit ( xtsk , xzeta ) ,
clcommit ( pk ( xsk ) ,xw , c l s i g n ( xsk , xe , xv , xtsk ) ) , xmsg ) ) ) = accept .
Listing C.1: Free name declarations, function definitions and equations for DAARSA′
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l e t j o i n =
in ( aj , ( ( pkI , bsnI ) ,DAASeed , cnt , skM ) ) ;
new v ’ ;
l e t z e t a I = hash ( ( zero , bsnI ) ) in
l e t t sk = hash ( ( hash ( (DAASeed , hash ( pkI ) ) ) , cnt , ze ro ) ) in
l e t NI = commit ( tsk , z e t a I ) in
l e t U = clcommit ( pkI , v ’ , t sk ) in
out ( c , ( NI ,U) ) ;
in ( c , encNe ) ;
l e t ne = dec (skM , encNe ) in
out ( c , hash ( (U, ne ) ) ) ;
in ( c , n i ) ;
new nt ;
out ( c , ( nt , spk ( FJoin , ( tsk , v ’ ) , ( ze ta I , pkI , NI ,U, ( nt , n i ) ) ) ) ) ;
in ( c , s i g ) ;
l e t c r e = clopen ( pkI , v ’ , s i g ) in
i f c h e c k c l s i g n ( pkI , tsk , c r e ) = accept then
out ( aj ’ , ( cre , t sk ) ) .
Listing C.2: ProVerif script modelling JoinRSA′
l e t s i gn =
in ( as , ( ( pkI , bsnI ) , bsnV ,m, cre , tsk ,xxTERMINATION) ) ;
in ( c , nv ) ;
new nt ;new w;
i f bsnV = bottom then (
new ze ta ;
l e t creHat = clcommit ( pkI ,w, c r e ) in
l e t NV = commit ( tsk , ze ta ) in
out ( as ’ , ( zeta , pkI ,NV, creHat , nt ,
spk ( FSign , ( tsk ,w) , ( zeta , pkI ,NV, creHat , ( nt , nv ,m) ) ) ) )
) else (
l e t ze ta = hash ( ( one , bsnV ) ) in
l e t creHat = clcommit ( pkI ,w, c r e ) in
l e t NV = commit ( tsk , ze ta ) in
out ( as ’ , ( zeta , pkI ,NV, creHat , nt ,
spk ( FSign , ( tsk ,w) , ( zeta , pkI ,NV, creHat , ( nt , nv ,m) ) ) ) )
) .
Listing C.3: ProVerif script modelling SignRSA′




fun bottom /0 .
l e t SignerP =
new a j ;new aj ’ ;new as ;new as ’ ; ( ! j o i n ) | ( ! s i gn ) | (
new cnt ;new DAASeed ;new skM ; out ( c , pk (skM ) ) ;
! out ( aj , ( wparams , DAASeed , cnt , skM ) ) ;
in ( aj ’ , ( cre , t sk ) ) ;
( !
in ( c , ( xmsg,=bottom ) ) ;new XXTERMINATION;
out ( as , ( wparams , bottom , xmsg , cre , tsk ,XXTERMINATION) ) ;
in ( as ’ , z ) ; out ( c , z )
) | ( !
in ( c , ( xmsg , xbsn ) ) ;new XXTERMINATION;
out ( as , ( wparams , ( chlP , xbsn ) , xmsg , cre , tsk ,XXTERMINATION) ) ;
in ( as ’ , z ) ; out ( c , z )
) | (
out (wb , ( cre , t sk ) )
)
) .
l e t Chal lenge =
new as ;new as ’ ; ( s i gn ) | (
in (bA, ( creA , tskA ) ) ;
in (bB , ( creB , tskB ) ) ;
l e t c r e = choice [ creA , creB ] in
l e t t sk = choice [ tskA , tskB ] in
(
in ( c , ( xmsg,=bottom ) ) ;new XXTERMINATION;
out ( as , ( wparams , bottom , xmsg , cre , tsk ,XXTERMINATION) ) ;
in ( as ’ , x ) ; out ( c , x )
) | (
in ( c , ( xmsg , xbsn ) ) ;new XXTERMINATION;
out ( as , ( wparams , ( chlM , xbsn ) , xmsg , cre , tsk ,XXTERMINATION) ) ;




in ( c , wparams ) ;new bA;new bB ;
( l e t wb = bA in SignerP ) |
( l e t wb = bB in SignerP ) |
( Chal lenge )
Listing C.4: ProVerif script modelling user-controlled anonymity in DAARSA′




free skA , skB .
fun bottom /0 .
l e t SignerP =
new a j ;new aj ’ ;new as ;new as ’ ; ( ! j o i n ) | ( ! s i gn ) | (
new cnt ;new DAASeed ;
! out ( aj , ( wparams , DAASeed , cnt , skM ) ) ;
in ( aj ’ , ( cre , t sk ) ) ;
( !
in ( c , ( xmsg,=bottom ) ) ;new XXTERMINATION;
out ( as , ( wparams , bottom , xmsg , cre , tsk ,XXTERMINATION) ) ;
in ( as ’ , z ) ; out ( c , z )
) | ( !
in ( c , ( xmsg , xbsn ) ) ;new XXTERMINATION;
out ( as , ( wparams , ( chlP , xbsn ) , xmsg , cre , tsk ,XXTERMINATION) ) ;
in ( as ’ , z ) ; out ( c , z )
) | (
out (wb , ( cre , t sk ) )
)
) .
l e t Chal lenge =
new as ;new as ’ ; ( s i gn ) | (
in (bA, ( creA , tskA ) ) ;
in (bB , ( creB , tskB ) ) ;
l e t c r e = choice [ creA , creB ] in
l e t t sk = choice [ tskA , tskB ] in
(
in ( c , ( xmsg,=bottom ) ) ;new XXTERMINATION;
out ( as , ( wparams , bottom , xmsg , cre , tsk ,XXTERMINATION) ) ;
in ( as ’ , x ) ; out ( c , x )
) | (
in ( c , ( xmsg , xbsn ) ) ;new XXTERMINATION;
out ( as , ( wparams , ( chlM , xbsn ) , xmsg , cre , tsk ,XXTERMINATION) ) ;




in ( c , wparams ) ;new bA;new bB ;
( l e t (wb, skM) = (bA, skA) in SignerP ) |
( l e t (wb, skM) = (bB, skB ) in SignerP ) |
( Chal lenge )
Listing C.5: Optimised ProVerif script modelling user-controlled anonymity in DAARSA′
D
ProVerif scripts supporting Chapter 5
The proof of claims made in Example 5.3 can be automatically verified using Listing D.1
as input to ProVerif, and Example 5.7 can be checked using Listing D.2.
free c , k ,m, n , s .
query ev : eventM ( ) ==> ev : eventK ( ) .
query ev : eventN ( ) ==> ev : eventK ( ) .
query ev : eventS ( ) ==> ev : eventK ( ) .
process
new a1 ;new a2 ;new a3 ;new a4 ;new a5 ;new a6 ;new a7 ;new a8 ;
(
out ( a1 , a1 ) ; in ( a3 , x ) ; (* sync 1 *)
event eventK ( ) ;
out ( c , k ) ;
out ( a5 , a5 ) ; in ( a7 , x ’ ) ; (* sync 2 *)
event eventM ( ) ;
out ( c ,m)
) | (
out ( a2 , a2 ) ; in ( a6 , y ) ; (* sync 2 *)
event eventN ( ) ;
out ( c , n )
) | (
out ( a4 , a2 ) ; in ( a8 , y ) ; (* sync 3 *)
event eventS ( ) ;
out ( c , s )
) | (
in ( a1 , x ) ; out ( a3 , x ) ; (* sync 1 *)
in ( a5 , x ’ ) ; in ( a2 , y ) ; out ( a7 , x ’ ) ; out ( a6 , y ) ; (* sync 2 *)
in ( a4 , z ) ; out ( a8 , z ) (* sync 3 *)
)
Listing D.1: Analysis of barrier synchronisation behaviour in support of Example 5.3
156 APPENDIX D. PROVERIF SCRIPTS SUPPORTING CHAPTER 5
free c , k ,m, n , s .
fun bot /0 .
fun pa i r /2 .
reduc f s t ( pa i r (x , y ) ) = x .
reduc snd ( pa i r (x , y ) ) = y .
process
new a1 ;new a2 ;new a3 ;new a4 ;new a5 ;new a6 ;new a7 ;new a8 ;
(
(* start sync 1 *)
out ( a1 , choice [ a1 , pa i r ( c , pa i r (k , pa i r (m, bot ) ) ) ] ) ;
in ( a3 , x ) ;
(* end sync 1 *)
out ( choice [ c , f s t ( x ) ] , choice [ k , f s t ( snd ( x ) ) ] ) ;
(* start sync 2 *)
out ( a5 , choice [ a5 , pa i r ( f s t ( x ) , pa i r ( f s t ( snd ( snd ( x ) ) ) , bot ) ) ] ) ;
in ( a7 , x ’ ) ;
(* end sync 2 *)
out ( choice [ c , f s t (x ’ ) ] , choice [m, f s t ( snd (x ’ ) ) ] )
) | (
(* start sync 2 *)
out ( a2 , choice [ a2 , pa i r ( c , pa i r (n , bot ) ) ] ) ;
in ( a6 , y ) ;
(* end sync 2 *)
out ( choice [ c , f s t ( y ) ] , choice [ n , f s t ( snd ( y ) ) ] )
) | (
(* start sync 3 *)
out ( a4 , choice [ a4 , pa i r ( c , pa i r ( s , bot ) ) ] ) ;
in ( a8 , z ) ;
(* end sync 3 *)
out ( choice [ c , f s t ( z ) ] , choice [ s , f s t ( snd ( z ) ) ] )
) | (
in ( a1 , x ) ; out ( a3 , x ) ; (* sync 1 *)
in ( a5 , x ’ ) ; in ( a2 , y ) ; out ( a7 , x ’ ) ; out ( a6 , y ) ; (* sync 2 *)
in ( a4 , z ) ; out ( a8 , z ) (* sync 3 *)
)
Listing D.2: Analysis of ∆(P ) ∼ Q in support of Example 5.7
E
Privacy results using ProSwapper
Chapter 5 introduces a methodology to automatically analyse equivalence properties
between processes which use barrier synchronisation. This technique has been imple-
mented as a tool called ProSwapper which is available online: http://www.bensmyth.
com/proswapper.php. More precisely, ProSwapper implements the compiler specified by
Definition 5.7. It takes processes with barriers as input and outputs a process, defined
over the standard ProVerif syntax, with the possible swapping processes defined by pro-
cess macros. If ProVerif can prove equivalence for a particular swapping process, then the
input script should satisfy observational equivalence. The ProSwapper output included
in this appendix was produced by ProSwapper version 0.2 alpha.
Several of the examples in Chapter 5 have been automatically verified using ProSwap-
per. Listing E.1 models Example 5.8 (pp106) which can be compiled using ProSwapper
to produce Listing E.2, and automatically analysed using ProVerif. (For readability, the
swapping process used to prove observational equivalence is included and the alternative
swapping processes are omitted.) The remainder of this appendix considers vote pri-
vacy in the FOO electronic voting protocol (Section E.1) and privacy in vehicular ad-hoc
network (Section E.2)
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free c ,m, n .
process
(
out ( c ,m) ;
sync 1 ;
out ( c , choice [m, n ] )
) | (
sync 1 ;
out ( c , choice [ n ,m] )
)
Listing E.1: ProSwapper input script in support of Example 5.8
free c ,m, n .
process
new aaa ’ 1 ;new aaa ’ 2 ;new aaa ’ 3 ;new aaa ’ 4 ;
(
out ( c ,m) ;
out ( aaa ’ 1 , ( n ,m, c ) ) ;
in ( aaa ’ 2 , ( xxx ’ 1 , xxx ’ 2 , xxx ’ 3 ) ) ;
out ( xxx ’ 3 , choice [ xxx ’ 2 , xxx ’ 1 ] )
) | (
out ( aaa ’ 3 , (m, n , c ) ) ;
in ( aaa ’ 4 , ( xxx ’ 1 , xxx ’ 2 , xxx ’ 3 ) ) ;
out ( xxx ’ 3 , choice [ xxx ’ 2 , xxx ’ 1 ] )
) | (
in ( aaa ’ 3 , y1 ) ; in ( aaa ’ 1 , y2 ) ;
out ( aaa ’ 4 , choice [ y1 , y2 ] ) ; out ( aaa ’ 2 , choice [ y2 , y1 ] )
)
Listing E.2: ProSwapper output script in support of Example 5.8
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E.1 Privacy in electronic voting
Section 5.3.1 presents an analysis of privacy in the FOO electronic voting protocol. This
section provides the scripts used to automatically perform this analysis. The free name
declarations, function definitions and equations appear in Listing E.3. The encoding (List-
ing E.4) of vote privacy follows immediately from pp109 and this script can be provided as
input to ProSwapper to produce Listing E.5. This listing can be automatically analysed
with ProVerif.
E.2 Privacy in vehicular ad-hoc networks
Dahl, Delaune & Steel [DDS10] adopt the notion of swapping defined in [DRS08] to
analyse privacy in the CMIX vehicular ad-hoc networking protocol [FRF+07]. In this
section, [DDS10] will be revisited to show that ProSwapper can be used to automati-
cally prove privacy. First, we recall the model used by Dahl, Delaune & Steel. List-
ing E.6 contains the free name declarations, function definitions and equations as spec-
ified by [DDS10]; and Listings E.7 & E.8 present the ProVerif script manually derived
using [DRS08] (see [DDS10] for the original encoding without swapping). Listing E.9
presents a variant of Listings E.7 & E.8 written by Dahl, suitable for input to ProSwap-
per; the relative complexity of the encodings should illustrate the benefits of our abstrac-
tion. The ProSwapper input script can be compiled to produce Listing E.10, which can
be automatically analysed using ProVerif. The execution times are comparable: ProVerif
takes 44ms to analyse Listings E.7/E.8, and 30ms to analyse Listing E.10 (the associated
compile time is negligible).
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free c .
free skR , skA , skB .
fun s /0 .
fun s ’ / 0 .
fun t rue /0 .
fun b l ind /2 .
fun unbl ind /2 .
fun open /2 .
fun commit /2 .
fun pk /1 .
fun getmsg /1 .
fun s i gn /2 .
fun checks ign /2 .
equation unbl ind (x , s i gn (y , b l ind (x , z ) ) ) = s i gn (y , z ) .
equation unbl ind (x , b l ind (x , y ) ) = y .
equation open (x , commit (x , y ) ) = y .
equation checks ign ( pk ( x ) , s i gn (x , y ) ) = true .
equation getmsg ( s i gn (x , y ) ) = y .
Listing E.3: Free name declarations, function definitions and equations for FOO
l e t f oo =
new k ;new k ’ ;
l e t M = commit (k , Xvote ) in
l e t MM = bl ind (k ’ ,M) in
out ( c , ( pk (Xsk ) , s i gn (Xsk ,MM) ) ) ;
in ( c , y ) ;
i f checks ign ( pk ( skR ) , y ) = true then
i f getmsg ( y ) = MM then
l e t M’ = unbl ind (k ’ , y ) in
sync 1 ;
out ( c , (M,M’ ) ) ;
sync 2 ;
in ( c , ( z ,=M,=M’ ) ) ;
out ( c , ( z , k ) ) .
process
( l e t (Xsk , Xvote ) = (skA , choice [ s , s ’ ] ) in f oo )
| ( l e t (Xsk , Xvote ) = ( skB , choice [ s ’ , s ] ) in f oo )
Listing E.4: ProSwapper input script modelling vote privacy in FOO
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process
new aaa ’ 1 ;new aaa ’ 2 ;new aaa ’ 3 ;new aaa ’ 4 ;
new aaa ’ 5 ;new aaa ’ 6 ;new aaa ’ 7 ;new aaa ’ 8 ;
(
l e t (Xsk , Xvote ) = (skA , choice [ s ( ) , s ’ ( ) ] ) in
new k ;new k ’ ;
l e t M = commit (k , Xvote ) in
l e t MM = bl ind (k ’ ,M) in
out ( c , ( pk (Xsk ) , s i gn (Xsk ,MM) ) ) ;
in ( c , y ) ;
i f checks ign ( pk ( skR ) , y ) = true ( ) then
i f getmsg ( y ) = MM then
l e t M’ = unbl ind (k ’ , y ) in
out ( aaa ’ 1 , (k ,M’ ,M, c ) ) ;
in ( aaa ’ 2 , ( xxx ’ 1 , xxx ’ 2 , xxx ’ 3 , xxx ’ 4 ) ) ;
out ( xxx ’ 4 , ( xxx ’ 3 , xxx ’ 2 ) ) ;
out ( aaa ’ 3 , ( xxx ’ 1 , xxx ’ 4 , xxx ’ 2 , xxx ’ 3 ) ) ;
in ( aaa ’ 4 , ( xxx ’ 1 , xxx ’ 2 , xxx ’ 3 , xxx ’ 4 ) ) ;
in ( xxx ’ 2 , ( z ,=xxx ’4 ,=xxx ’ 3 ) ) ;
out ( xxx ’ 2 , ( z , xxx ’ 1 ) )
) | (
l e t (Xsk , Xvote ) = ( skB , choice [ s ’ ( ) , s ( ) ] ) in
new k ;new k ’ ;
l e t M = commit (k , Xvote ) in
l e t MM = bl ind (k ’ ,M) in
out ( c , ( pk (Xsk ) , s i gn (Xsk ,MM) ) ) ;
in ( c , y ) ;
i f checks ign ( pk ( skR ) , y ) = true ( ) then
i f getmsg ( y ) = MM then
l e t M’ = unbl ind (k ’ , y ) in
out ( aaa ’ 5 , (k ,M’ ,M, c ) ) ;
in ( aaa ’ 6 , ( xxx ’ 1 , xxx ’ 2 , xxx ’ 3 , xxx ’ 4 ) ) ;
out ( xxx ’ 4 , ( xxx ’ 3 , xxx ’ 2 ) ) ;
out ( aaa ’ 7 , ( xxx ’ 1 , xxx ’ 4 , xxx ’ 2 , xxx ’ 3 ) ) ;
in ( aaa ’ 8 , ( xxx ’ 1 , xxx ’ 2 , xxx ’ 3 , xxx ’ 4 ) ) ;
in ( xxx ’ 2 , ( z ,=xxx ’4 ,=xxx ’ 3 ) ) ;
out ( xxx ’ 2 , ( z , xxx ’ 1 ) )
) | (
in ( aaa ’ 5 , y1 ) ; in ( aaa ’ 1 , y2 ) ;
out ( aaa ’ 6 , choice [ y1 , y2 ] ) ; out ( aaa ’ 2 , choice [ y2 , y1 ] ) ;
in ( aaa ’ 7 , y3 ) ; in ( aaa ’ 3 , y4 ) ;
out ( aaa ’ 8 , choice [ y3 , y3 ] ) ; out ( aaa ’ 4 , choice [ y4 , y4 ] )
)
Listing E.5: ProSwapper output script modelling vote privacy in FOO
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free c , ack , r eque s t .
free ente rLe f t , enterRight , zone , e x i t L e f t , ex i tR ight .
private free sk .
private free prsu , krsu , kc .
private free pva1 , kva1 , pva2 , kva2 , pvb1 , kvb1 , pvb2 , kvb2 .
fun pk /1 .
fun s i gn /2 .
fun enc /2 .
fun senc /3 .
reduc getmess ( s i gn (x , y ) ) = x .
reduc checks ign ( s i gn (x , y ) , pk ( y ) ) = x .
reduc decrypt ( enc (x , pk ( y ) ) , y ) = x .
reduc sdecrypt ( senc (x , y , r ) , y ) = x .
Listing E.6: Free name declarations, function definitions and equations for [DDS10]
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l e t rsu =
in ( c ,X) ;
l e t ( SignaturePart , C e r t i f i c a t e P a r t ) = X in
l e t (Pv , PkKv) = checks ign ( C e r t i f i c a t e P a r t , pk ( kc ) ) in
l e t (=request , Ts,=Pv) = checks ign ( SignaturePart ,PkKv) in
out ( c , ( enc ( s i gn ( ( Pv , sk , Ts ) , krsu ) ,PkKv) , s i gn ( ( prsu , pk ( krsu ) ) , kc ) ) ) .
l e t carBe fo re =
out ( enter , pv1 ) ;
new t s ;
out ( enter , ( s i gn ( ( request , ts , pv1 ) , kv1 ) , s i gn ( ( pv1 , pk ( kv1 ) ) , kc ) ) ) ;
in ( enter ,X) ;
l e t ( encedPart , C e r t i f i c a t e P a r t ) = X in
l e t ( Prsu , PkKrsu ) = checks ign ( C e r t i f i c a t e P a r t , pk ( kc ) ) in
l e t SignaturePart = decrypt ( encedPart , kv1 ) in
l e t (=pv1 , sk ,= t s ) = checks ign ( SignaturePart , PkKrsu ) in
new r ; out ( zone , senc ( pv1 , sk , r ) ) ;
out ( pcPv1 , pv1 ) ;
out (pcKv1 , kv1 ) ;
out ( pcPv2 , pv2 ) ;
out (pcKv2 , kv2 ) ;
out ( pcSk , sk ) ;
out ( pcExit , e x i t ) .
l e t ca rAf t e r =
new r ;new r ’ ;
out ( ex i t , senc ( pv1 , sk , r ) ) ;
out ( ex i t , senc ( pv2 , sk , r ’ ) ) ;
out ( ex i t , pv2 ) .
Listing E.7: ProVerif script modelling privacy in [DDS10] with manual swapping, Part I
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process




new pcaExit ;new pcaKv1 ;new pcaKv2 ;new pcaPv1 ;new pcaPv2 ;new pcaSk ;
new pcbExit ;new pcbKv1 ;new pcbKv2 ;new pcbPv1 ;new pcbPv2 ;new pcbSk ;
(
l e t ( kv1 , kv2 , pv1 , pv2 ) = ( kva1 , kva2 , pva1 , pva2 ) in
l e t (pcKv1 , pcKv2 , pcPv1 , pcPv2 ) = ( pcaKv1 , pcaKv2 , pcaPv1 , pcaPv2 ) in
l e t ente r = e n t e r L e f t in
l e t e x i t = choice [ e x i t L e f t , ex i tR ight ] in
l e t pcExit = pcaExit in
l e t pcSk = pcaSk in
carBe fo re
) | (
l e t ( kv1 , kv2 , pv1 , pv2 ) = ( kvb1 , kvb2 , pvb1 , pvb2 ) in
l e t (pcKv1 , pcKv2 , pcPv1 , pcPv2 ) = (pcbKv1 , pcbKv2 , pcbPv1 , pcbPv2 ) in
l e t ente r = enterRight in
l e t e x i t = choice [ ex i tRight , e x i t L e f t ] in
l e t pcExit = pcbExit in
l e t pcSk = pcbSk in
carBe fo re
) | (
in ( pcaPv1 , aPv1 ) ; in ( pcaKv1 , aKv1 ) ; in ( pcaPv2 , aPv2 ) ;
in ( pcaKv2 , aKv2 ) ; in ( pcaSk , aSk ) ; in ( pcaExit , aExit ) ;
in ( pcbPv1 , bPv1 ) ; in (pcbKv1 , bKv1 ) ; in ( pcbPv2 , bPv2 ) ;
in (pcbKv2 , bKv2 ) ; in ( pcbSk , bSk ) ; in ( pcbExit , bExit ) ;
(
l e t pv1 = choice [ aPv1 , bPv1 ] in
l e t kv1 = choice [ aKv1 , bKv1 ] in
l e t pv2 = choice [ aPv2 , bPv2 ] in
l e t kv2 = choice [ aKv2 , bKv2 ] in
l e t sk = choice [ aSk , bSk ] in
l e t e x i t = choice [ aExit , bExit ] in
ca rAf t e r
) | (
l e t pv1 = choice [ bPv1 , aPv1 ] in
l e t kv1 = choice [ bKv1 , aKv1 ] in
l e t pv2 = choice [ bPv2 , aPv2 ] in
l e t kv2 = choice [ bKv2 , aKv2 ] in
l e t sk = choice [ bSk , aSk ] in
l e t e x i t = choice [ bExit , aExit ] in




Listing E.8: ProVerif script modelling privacy in [DDS10] with manual swapping, Part II
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l e t rsu =
in ( c ,X) ;
l e t ( SignaturePart , C e r t i f i c a t e P a r t ) = X in
l e t (Pv , PkKv) = checks ign ( C e r t i f i c a t e P a r t , pk ( kc ) ) in
l e t (=request , Ts,=Pv) = checks ign ( SignaturePart , PkKv) in
out ( c , ( enc ( s i gn ( ( Pv , sk , Ts ) , krsu ) ,PkKv) , s i gn ( ( prsu , pk ( krsu ) ) , kc ) ) ) .
l e t car =
out ( enter , pv1 ) ;
new t s ;
out ( enter , ( s i gn ( ( request , ts , pv1 ) , kv1 ) , s i gn ( ( pv1 , pk ( kv1 ) ) , kc ) ) ) ;
in ( enter ,X) ;
l e t ( encedPart , C e r t i f i c a t e P a r t ) = X in
l e t ( Prsu , PkKrsu ) = checks ign ( C e r t i f i c a t e P a r t , pk ( kc ) ) in
l e t SignaturePart = dec ( encedPart , kv1 ) in
l e t (=pv1 , sk ,= t s ) = checks ign ( SignaturePart , PkKrsu ) in
new r ;
out ( zone , senc ( pv1 , sk , r ) ) ;
sync 1 ;
new r ;
new r ’ ;
out ( ex i t , senc ( pv1 , sk , r ) ) ;
out ( ex i t , senc ( pv2 , sk , r ’ ) ) ;
out ( ex i t , pv2 ) .
process
out ( c , pk ( kc ) ) ;




l e t ( kv1 , kv2 , pv1 , pv2 ) = ( kva1 , kva2 , pva1 , pva2 ) in
l e t ente r = e n t e r L e f t in
l e t e x i t = choice [ e x i t L e f t , ex i tR ight ] in
car
) | (
l e t ( kv1 , kv2 , pv1 , pv2 ) = ( kvb1 , kvb2 , pvb1 , pvb2 ) in
l e t ente r = enterRight in
l e t e x i t = choice [ ex i tRight , e x i t L e f t ] in
car
)
Listing E.9: ProSwapper input script modelling privacy in [DDS10]
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process new aaa ’ 1 ;new aaa ’ 2 ;new aaa ’ 3 ;new aaa ’ 4 ;
out ( c , pk ( kc ) ) ; out ( c , pk ( krsu ) ) ;
( !
in ( c ,X) ;
l e t ( SignaturePart , C e r t i f i c a t e P a r t ) = X in
l e t (Pv , PkKv) = checks ign ( C e r t i f i c a t e P a r t , pk ( kc ) ) in
l e t (=request , Ts,=Pv) = checks ign ( SignaturePart , PkKv) in
out ( c , ( enc ( s i gn ( ( Pv , sk , Ts ) , krsu ) ,PkKv) , s i gn ( ( prsu , pk ( krsu ) ) , kc ) ) )
) | (
l e t ( kv1 , kv2 , pv1 , pv2 ) = ( kva1 , kva2 , pva1 , pva2 ) in
l e t ente r = e n t e r L e f t in
l e t e x i t = choice [ e x i t L e f t , ex i tR ight ] in
out ( enter , pv1 ) ;new t s ;
out ( enter , ( s i gn ( ( request , ts , pv1 ) , kv1 ) , s i gn ( ( pv1 , pk ( kv1 ) ) , kc ) ) ) ;
in ( enter ,X) ;
l e t ( encedPart , C e r t i f i c a t e P a r t ) = X in
l e t ( Prsu , PkKrsu ) = checks ign ( C e r t i f i c a t e P a r t , pk ( kc ) ) in
l e t SignaturePart = dec ( encedPart , kv1 ) in
l e t (=pv1 , sk ,= t s ) = checks ign ( SignaturePart , PkKrsu ) in
new r ; out ( zone , senc ( pv1 , sk , r ) ) ;
out ( aaa ’ 1 , ( pv2 , sk , pv1 , e x i t ) ) ;
in ( aaa ’ 2 , ( xxx ’ 1 , xxx ’ 2 , xxx ’ 3 , xxx ’ 4 ) ) ;
new r ;new r ’ ;
out ( xxx ’ 4 , senc ( xxx ’ 3 , xxx ’ 2 , r ) ) ; out ( xxx ’ 4 , senc ( xxx ’ 1 , xxx ’ 2 , r ’ ) ) ;
out ( xxx ’ 4 , xxx ’ 1 )
) | (
l e t ( kv1 , kv2 , pv1 , pv2 ) = ( kvb1 , kvb2 , pvb1 , pvb2 ) in
l e t ente r = enterRight in
l e t e x i t = choice [ ex i tRight , e x i t L e f t ] in
out ( enter , pv1 ) ;new t s ;
out ( enter , ( s i gn ( ( request , ts , pv1 ) , kv1 ) , s i gn ( ( pv1 , pk ( kv1 ) ) , kc ) ) ) ;
in ( enter ,X) ;
l e t ( encedPart , C e r t i f i c a t e P a r t ) = X in
l e t ( Prsu , PkKrsu ) = checks ign ( C e r t i f i c a t e P a r t , pk ( kc ) ) in
l e t SignaturePart = dec ( encedPart , kv1 ) in
l e t (=pv1 , sk ,= t s ) = checks ign ( SignaturePart , PkKrsu ) in
new r ; out ( zone , senc ( pv1 , sk , r ) ) ;
out ( aaa ’ 3 , ( pv2 , sk , pv1 , e x i t ) ) ;
in ( aaa ’ 4 , ( xxx ’ 1 , xxx ’ 2 , xxx ’ 3 , xxx ’ 4 ) ) ;
new r ;new r ’ ;
out ( xxx ’ 4 , senc ( xxx ’ 3 , xxx ’ 2 , r ) ) ; out ( xxx ’ 4 , senc ( xxx ’ 1 , xxx ’ 2 , r ’ ) ) ;
out ( xxx ’ 4 , xxx ’ 1 )
) | (
in ( aaa ’ 3 , y1 ) ; in ( aaa ’ 1 , y2 ) ;
out ( aaa ’ 4 , choice [ y1 , y2 ] ) ; out ( aaa ’ 2 , choice [ y2 , y1 ] )
)
Listing E.10: ProSwapper output script modelling privacy in [DDS10]
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